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“No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the 
main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory 
were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own were: any man's death diminishes 
me, because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for whom the bell 
tolls; it tolls for thee.” 
– John Donne, Meditation 
XVII 
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Preface 
 
This thesis grew from my time at Leiden University between 2013 and 2016. I am proud to 
say it can truly be considered the result of my encounters there. In my first semester I took 
part in two seminars that set the tone: one on the emerging field of new materialism in 
literary criticism and philosophy, the other on the art historian Aby Warburg (1866-1929) 
and the context of his work. Where contemporary philosophers are engaged in debates 
about the active force of materials and objects, things that have long been considered the 
passive backdrop for action, Warburg infused art history with an attention to the living force 
of images – albeit without anyone really realising the latter for apparently over half a century. 
The intriguing parallel between these two topics led me to start wondering what would 
happen if they were to collide. This thesis is an attempt at such a collision and perhaps the 
result is rather accidental when compared to the plans I drew up when I first started on the 
project. Somewhere in the wreckage are the remains of the question what the ideas of new 
materialism – whatever that may be – would mean for the practice of art history today. I do 
not know if I got any closer to an answer to that question. In fact, it would probably be 
correct to say that this thesis is not concerned with doing art history in any direct sense. 
Rather it has turned into a study of the philosophical problems associated with the material 
turn by historiographical means. The present study is definitely a testament to the relevance 
and richness of the thought that was developed by Warburg and by one of his close 
colleagues in the late 1920s, Edgar Wind (1900-1971). It is peculiar that I cannot recall the 
precise moment I became aware of his work as a philosopher. It seems this project has 
already taken so long that its origins have been lost in the mists of time. 
This length of time is also why I cannot end this preface without thanking the 
continent around me. Of course all the intellectual work involved would not have been 
possible without my supervisor Caroline van Eck. However, above all I truly value her 
continuing kindness and encouragement, despite my frustratingly slow progress over the 
past one and a half year. The phrase “I could not have done it without you” turns up an 
awful lot in acknowledgements like this. And so I do not hope the clichéd nature of this 
expression suggests that I am being disingenuous when I say that I could not have done this 
without Suzette van Haaren. I realise I have asked a lot of her. I could also not skip thanking 
my parents and their unwavering support. In addition I want to thank Ranoe Sewrattan, 
Lucas Derks, Annemieke Lensink, Sanne Coopmans and many others for the good 
conversations we were able to have and my fellow students, especially those who were with 
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me in the thesis seminar, Paris seminar, and ‘graduation support group’. Lastly I hope my 
friends forgive me for the seemingly negligible amount of attention I have given them during 
this period. I intend to make up for it. 
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Introduction: the Problem of Human-Thing Entanglement 
 
“It is an old puzzle where to draw the line between man and the objects of his 
environment. His head, we dare say, quite certainly belongs to him; without it, he 
would lose his 'identity'. But how about his hair? And if we let him have that, how 
about his hat? If his hat is taken away, or its shape is altered, is not the entire form of 
the man altered as well? A man accustomed to walking with a stick becomes another 
man if this stick is taken from him. His gait changes, his gestures, possibly the whole 
of his constitution.”1  
 
Human beings are surrounded with stuff, things, materials. We form intimate relations with 
things; we grow accustomed to them; they change us. Even as I write this, the way I am and 
the way I do, the way I give meaning to marks on a screen – all those things are habitually 
changed by the things around me. In this digital age of smart devices this is perhaps more 
obvious than ever before, but the example above shows that the proposition that humans 
are determined by the material world that surrounds them is not only applicable to the 
contemporary era. Our current times, however, have come up with a specific name for this 
idea: human-thing entanglement.2 That is not to say this is a problem that we have only 
become aware of in the past thirty years. The above quotation by the art historian and 
philosopher Edgar Wind (1900-1971), whose work is the subject of this thesis, is a clear 
testament to this. However, the so-called material turn in the humanities and the social 
sciences has recently placed it at the centre of a great deal of scholarly interest.3 In the 
process a new range of problems has arisen. 
 For example, almost 70 years after Wind the archaeologist Lambros Malafouris, with 
reference to Gregory Bateson’s example of a blind man’s stick, put the question in terms 
quite similar to those of Wind: “Where do we draw, and on what basis can we draw, a 
delimiting line across the extended cognitive system which determines the blind man’s 
locomotion?”4 Malafouris’ answer is typical of the many different branches of the material 
turn in its attempt at overcoming some form of the Cartesian dualism between mind and 
                                                
1 Wind 1963 (1936), p. 263. 
2 See Hodder 2016 for a recent example. 
3 For a detailed overview of the material turn in archaeology and anthropology see Hicks, 2010, pp. 25-98; for 
an overview of different perspectives on materiality from an art historical perspectives see Rosler, Walker 
Bynum, Eaton, et al. 2013, pp. 10-37 and especially the note by Michael Ann Holly and its accompanying 
illustration. 
4 Malafouris,2004, p. 58; Bateson 1973, p. 318. 
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matter, which also comes in other flavours such as subject/object. He argues that the 
conceptual gap between cognition and the material culture posed by the question should not 
necessarily be bridged, but rather that we should see mind and matter as continuous in 
some way. As such, the material turn’s most fundamental philosophical momentum is 
concerned with the age-old problem of the relation between mind and world, which it has 
reformulated under the header of ‘human-thing entanglement.’ 
 The idea that there is a gap between mind and matter goes back not only to René 
Descartes (1596-1650), but perhaps more importantly to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who 
– and this is of course to put it in the most crude terms possible – proposed that we have 
an autonomous intellect that gives shape to the external world by means of its own 
capacities without ever encountering any physical object in itself. Within this framework 
bridging the gap is impossible and there is also perhaps no inherent need to do so. But in the 
realm of aesthetics Kant’s philosophy did identify “a fundamental contradiction precisely in 
relation to art’s materiality”.5 Art is a material object that deals in transcendent experience. 
As Michael Podro has shown this was the central problem for the critical historians of art 
(e.g. Semper, Riegl, Wölfflin, and Warburg) of the long nineteenth century. It was in art that 
many thinkers saw the need to reconcile the mind’s realm of (aesthetic, rational) judgements 
with the material realm of (empirical) sensations.6 
One of the reasons Kant posited the independence of the human mind was ethics: it 
safeguarded the human ability for autonomous moral decision and the freedom of the will. 
This concern was in many ways mirrored in art historians’ engagement with art. On the one 
hand there was the idea that art belonged to a category that was in some sense irreducible 
and autonomous. On the other hand studying art as a historical phenomenon meant situating 
it within a context, making it determined by external factors to some degree. As a result, the 
question of freedom was of great importance: “For these writers [the critical historians of 
art] the Kantian opposition between human freedom and the constraints of the material 
world [was], in various ways, central.”7 Art was seen as a way to reconnect the rational, 
ethical self described by Kant to the sensuous life that was part of the realm of nature and 
thus governed by its laws. In other words, art offered a solution to the problems of 
transcendental idealism, because in its materiality it offered a way to connect the inner 
subject with the outside object. The problems sprouting from human-thing entanglement are 
                                                
5 See the note by Amelia Jones in Rosler, Walker Bynum, Eaton, et al. 2013, p. 17. 
6 Podro 1982. 
7 Ibidem, p. xxi. 
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concerned with the very same issues, only from a different, post-Kantian perspective. The 
nineteenth-century critical historians of art, just like contemporary scholars working after 
the material turn, were presented with the philosophical question how the relation between 
the subject and the (art) object should be imagined. How do we “console the mind in its 
confrontation with the material world?”8 
Still, while there are continuities in the issues at stake here, there is something decidedly 
different in the material turn’s approach to the question of human-thing entanglement. What 
distinguishes the material turn is its insistence that we start paying attention to ‘things’, 
‘objects’, ‘materials’, or ‘materiality’. Which of those terms we should be using depends, of 
course, on whom you ask. This basic point of semantics already gives us an indication that 
the material turn is not monolithic. It is rather – and please forgive this uninspired metaphor 
– a collection of different sized rocks and pebbles of different geological origin.9 Picking one 
example, in our case the archaeologist Bjørnar Olsen’s In Defense of Things (2010), will allow 
us to sketch out in more detail the central issues of the material turn and the associated 
problem of human-thing entanglement. 
A turn is not a turn if it does not indicate a change in direction. With the material turn’s 
insistence on renewed attention to things always comes the assertion that we have 
somehow forgotten about those things.10 This is a clear rejection of the linguistic turn (and 
especially semiotics and structuralism) that has been very influential in the humanities and 
social sciences since the 1970s. As Olsen writes, what we should be focusing on, “challenging 
the semiotic and structuralist mantra,” is “things’ difference, and thus capacity to act, 
grounded in qualities unique and essential to them.”11 It is of interest to unpack several 
implicit statements at work here. The first is that semiotics and structuralism have no eye 
for difference; there are only uniform signs and linguistic structures. The second, and 
perhaps more interesting, is that the ‘capacity to act’ is derived from the ability to ‘make a 
difference’, or even that ‘making a difference’ is equated with a ‘capacity to act’. This points 
us towards the centrality of ‘doing’ and ‘making’ in the material turn, and thus the capacity 
for doing in making in objects, i.e. ‘agency’. This focus on agency is directly opposed to a 
previous focus on meaning. 
                                                
8 Ibidem, p. 9. 
9 Again, see the note by Holly in Rosler, Walker Bynum, Eaton, et al. 2013. 
10 For example Olsen 2010, p. 2, states that “things seem to have been subjected to a kind of collective 
amnesia”. 
11 Ibidem, p. 2. 
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The material turn also brings with it a ‘realist attitude’ towards the world. This is a direct 
result from the step away from the linguistic turn and its focus on meaning, which inspired a 
“‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ in which ‘all that is solid melts into air’, including things and the 
physicality of the world – which sometimes seems reduced to little more than discursive 
objects or ‘phenomena’ of the subject’s cognitive experience”.12 So instead of being ‘trapped’ 
inside a world of our own making, which goes back to the Kantian conception of the subject 
(cf. the use of the word ‘phenomena’), Olsen (and others like him) state that we do have 
access to things themselves in some way.13 Things are real and do not only exist as a 
(mental) construct. The material turn rejects Kant’s Copernican turn by saying that things 
exist independent of us; saying anything else results in an anthropocentric worldview, 
materialists protest. Materialism’s rejection of meaning in favour of agency is tied up in a 
rejection of anthropocentric philosophy. This focus on agency is thus in the end the basis of 
a realist epistemology and vice versa, because the reality of things allows them to play an 
active role and the agency of things is an argument for their reality. 
The human-thing entanglement that is central to the material turn is also a rejection of 
the human subject as an autonomous being, because this very autonomy is often regarded as 
that which is free from material constraints. According to Olsen the ubiquity of objects in 
industrial modernity began to be viewed with distrust by many philosophers in the early 20th 
century. This “gave rise to a powerful and persistent definition of freedom and emancipation 
as that which escapes the material.”14 Materialists argue that people cannot be thought 
without things and that the materials that surround us are not in essence external to us. We 
are, in fact, not as autonomous as we have long imagined ourselves to be. The fact that we 
are not autonomous from things but entangled with them brings us back to our original 
question: how do we relate the material and the human and where do we draw the line 
between them? 
Now that we have seen, however briefly, the main characteristics of theorising human-
thing entanglement in the material turn, let us look at the problems involved and the 
questions that lead from them. One of the controversial issues of the material turn is the 
question of meaning and the symbolic. With the emergence of ‘material culture studies’ in 
the 1970s, which could really be considered the start of the material turn, there was still a 
                                                
12 Ibidem, p. 4; ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ is a reference to Paul Ricoeur, ‘all that is solid melts into air’ to Karl 
Marx. 
13 One of those others is, for instance, Bruno Latour, who has long been taken for a social constructivist, see 
Latour 1999. 
14 Olsen 2010, pp. 11-12 [Olsen’s emphasis]. 
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lot of attention to the symbolic. Dan Hicks explains this as a consequence of thinking 
‘material’ and ‘culture’ as unhyphenated terms, i.e. together apart. As the material turn 
gained ground, more and more theoretical work criticised the ‘representational’ aspects of 
traditional approaches to material culture. Within this representational framework objects 
only have a use as reference to feelings, ideas, and structures beyond them. The critique of 
the focus on meaning was aimed at a kind of reductionism, as objects do far more than 
represent.15 But the critique of meaning went far further. Meaning is a social phenomenon; it 
is something that takes place in relation to the human. As Hicks points out, this is also why 
agency is a problem, a matter of discussion. It is often thought of as the opposite to 
structure, in reference to the work of Anthony Giddens.16 This means that agents’ acts are 
only meaningful in relation to social structure. The traditional notion of agency is thus 
anthropocentric: “Theorizing agency and meaning provides solutions only to the sociological 
and literary problems of representing the world: documenting ‘relations’ between different 
domains.”17 
Malafouris, like Olsen, places his ontological solution – in the sense that cognition and 
material culture are of the same substance – to the problem of human-thing entanglement as 
clearly opposed to the model of symbolic representation. Engagement in terms of 
representation is analogous to the way computer memory operates: we establish relations 
with the world by storing our thoughts in external objects and, conversely, these external 
objects can take the shape of direct and concrete representations in our minds. The real 
world is far messier than this. Malafouris objects to the representationalist model precisely 
because of its presumed structure: it presumes a divide where one element is external to 
the other and consequently has a gap to bridge.18 What we see here is a tension between 
material entanglement (human-thing entanglement) and representation, which is considered 
incompatible with the holistic idea that we are only dealing with consubstantial components 
of the same system. What place – if any – is there in such a worldview for the symbolic and 
representation? How would this relate to the problem of agency within human-thing 
entanglement? 
 Another problem emerging from human-thing entanglement is causality. This is 
twofold. First there is the fact that, as Malafouris notes, many theories of human-thing 
                                                
15 Hicks 2010, pp. 45-71. 
16 Giddens 1984; Giddens tries to overcome the dilemma ‘which is determinant of human action, agency or 
social structure?’ and thus departs from the notion that agency means autonomy from material determinacy. 
17 Hicks 2010, p. 77. 
18 Malafouris 2004, pp. 53-60. 
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entanglement for a long time did not account for the consequences of embededness of 
cognitive processes in the material world: they were not “systematically concerned with 
figuring out the causal efficacy of materiality in the enactment and constitution of a cognitive 
system of operation.”19 In other words, how determined are the processes of the mind by 
the fact that they operate inside a material world? Again, as we have seen, there are 
similarities to the relation between mind and matter in the critical historians’ account of art, 
which was also concerned with the freedom of the human mind. This question has important 
moral and political implications as it raises one of the classic questions of Western 
philosophy, that of free will. It also reframes the problem of agency in a new way and this is 
the second way in which causality may become problematic. If agency is ‘making a difference 
in the world’, as Olsen puts it, then this gives us very little tools for distinguishing between 
events and acts. If we approach human-thing entanglement from the perspective of causality, 
it becomes apparent that there is a certain uneasiness in this limited ability; we are unable to 
construct an ethics of accountability or freedom. The awkward position of meaning also 
plays into this. What is usually considered as distinguishing an act from an event is its 
intentionality, i.e. some decision that plays a part in the process. This is another way of 
saying that there is someone giving meaning to a certain action. What we have here is a 
problematic aspect of agency in relation to human-thing entanglement, best summarised by 
Alfred Gell’s statement that agency is the abduction of intention.20 
 Enter Edgar Wind (stage left, impeccably dressed), who opened our discussion. What 
does he have to say to our audience? What I intend to do in this thesis is explore Wind’s 
philosophy in relation to the problems outlined above. This will not take the form a critical 
analysis of his art historical or philosophical oeuvre, but situate it within a certain context. 
Besides being a philosopher Wind was an art historian who was mentored by both Ernst 
Cassirer (1874-1945) and Aby Warburg (1866-1929). He was also greatly influence by the 
work of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). As such he was deeply interested in the 
symbol problem. Consequently this thesis also relates the problems of materiality and 
human-thing entanglement to art history and the symbolic. Wind’s concept of the symbol 
should not be understood in the Peircian sense as conventional, but indicates a general 
category of ‘sign’.21 In some ways Wind is situated at the crossroads of some of the issues 
above, as he is both interested in symbolic representation and a pragmatist-inspired sense of 
                                                
19 Malafouris 2004, p. 55. 
20 Gell 1998, pp. 14-17. 
21 Of course this points at a general tangle of semiotic issues that I have chosen not to discuss here. 
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realism, doing, and materiality. This is captured in his understanding of symbolic 
representation as embodiment, which he largely works out in relation to a realist theory of 
the scientific experiment. It must be noted that Wind’s concept of embodiment in its narrow 
sense is not strictly about the phenomenologist idea of embodied experience, the place of 
our bodies in the world (although it is also that). Rather it describes the becoming material 
of things in the world. Symbolic representation is embodiment in the sense that symbols are 
not immaterial ideas, but take the shape of concrete stuff. 
 Chapter one (§1) provides a background to the debates Wind was engaged in, 
especially highlighting the moral-political embeddednes of his work. It starts with a short 
biographical note that allows us to more easily situate him historically in relation to thinkers 
such as Warburg and Cassirer, but also Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). This chapter 
sketches the problem of freedom as central to Wind’s work and relates it to both his 
interest in the foundations of science and scholarship and his later ‘humanist’ work as an art 
historian. 
Chapter two (§2) engages with his general theory of the symbol and its background in 
the theories of Robert and Friedrich Theodor Vischer, and Warburg. It sketches the 
‘development’ of the concept of Einfühlung in the philosophy of the Vischers to the idea of 
Denkraum in Warburg’s work. This development stresses Wind’s concern with the problem 
of autonomy in relation to causality and ideas of the symbolic. 
Chapter three (§3) further embeds this symbolic theory in a ‘worldview’ and gives 
further details about Wind’s ideas on the embedded nature of the subject in the material 
world. The analysis of the scientific experiment as a most exemplary study of the problems 
of human-thing entanglement allows us to focus on the entailing consequences and solutions; 
how is freedom possible? How are people and the world entangled and what is the role of 
the symbolic in it? At the end of this thesis I have hopefully shown that to Wind the answer 
to all of this lies in the fact that symbols are real. 
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§1. Humanism, Knowledge, and Freedom. The Intellectual Context of Edgar 
Wind’s Philosophy 
 
1.1. Introduction: Working with Two Cultures 
 
How strange is it that someone best know for their work in the history of art should write 
about the fundamentals of the natural sciences? It turns out that the best answer to this 
question – and perhaps to most other questions – is “It depends.” As late as the eighteenth 
century it might not have been out of place for someone like Denis Diderot (1713-1784) to 
publish his thoughts on the problems of the scientific method of his age (1753, Pensées sur 
l’interprétation de la nature) while also being widely recognised as an influential art critic for 
his Salon commentaries. But as the eighteenth turned into the nineteenth and the nineteenth 
turned into the twentieth century such mutual interventions became increasingly rare in the 
Western world. And so it came to be that Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) was able to divide 
the academy into the Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften and C.P. Snow (1905-
1980) could give his infamous lecture on the ‘two cultures’.22 However, it is in between 
these two defining moments in the history of the relation between the sciences and the 
humanities that we must locate Das Experiment und die Metaphysik (1933), Edgar Wind’s 
Habilitation23 on the philosophy of science. 
 In that sense the work seems an exception for the period it was written. But when 
we consider the precise intellectual climate Wind was working in we can already discern the 
contours of an environment that sought to transcend disciplinary boundaries. This 
environment is the Hamburg circle around Aby Warburg’s Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek. 
Indeed Wind described his habilitation as growing from the spirit of its community.24 The 
involvement of Ernst Cassirer and Erwin Panofsky (1892-1968) with Warburg’s project – 
and with both Wind's doctoral thesis and habilitation – already points us in the direction of a 
broadening perspective on the relation between science and the humanities. Cassirer 
worked on the philosophy of science and contemporary developments in physics, writing, 
amongst other works on modern physics, a book on Albert Einstein’s (1872-1955) theory of 
relativity while also developing his own theory on symbolic forms and myths, and Panofsky’s 
                                                
22 Dilthey 1922; Snow 1961. 
23 The German Habilitation is the process of gaining a postdoctoral qualification, which involves writing a second 
dissertation, that gives the holder the right to the title of Privatdozent and is a prerequisite to becoming a 
professor. I will be referring to Das Experiment und die Metaphysik, Wind’s Habilitationsschrift, as a habilitation 
(cf. dissertation, thesis) throughout this text. 
24 Wind 2001 (1934), p. 69. 
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work on perspective also considered the mathematics involved.25 Besides this, the Warburg 
library itself also contained works that looked at the philosophical implications of 
contemporary scientific developments and books by important physicists such as Einstein 
and Niels Bohr (1885-1962). This is all indicative of an intellectual milieu that was actively 
engaged with both the humanities and the natural sciences and intentionally sought to bring 
down disciplinary boundaries.26 
 But to ascribe the reasons behind Wind’s expedition into the territories of the 
philosophy of science solely to his position as a member of Warburg’s circle or perhaps the 
influence of his tutor Ernst Cassirer would not give a full picture of the problems he was 
facing, especially in the case of Das Experiment und die Metaphysik. Additionally, we must also 
look at the wider context of the cultural climate in Germany at the time and perhaps to a 
period Wind spent in the United States of America. That means that we need to gain at least 
a basic understanding of Wind’s biography in order to properly appreciate where he was 
coming from. 
 
1.2. A Short Biographical Note 
 
Edgar Wind was born in Berlin in 1900 into a family with a diverse background; his father 
was Jewish of Russian origin, but born in Argentina, and his mother was of Romanian 
origin.27 As a result of this, his legal status during the first 30 years of his life was quite 
ambiguous: according to German law he was of Argentinean nationality, according to 
Argentinean law he was German. Perhaps there is a parallel here with his disciplinary status 
in his early years; Wind studied art history in Berlin (with Adolf Goldschmidt (1863-1944) 
among others) and Vienna (with Julius von Schlosser (1866-1938), Jozef Strzygowski (1862-
1941) and Max Dvoržák (1874-1921)) but also spent a semester studying philosophy with 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) (and a young Martin Heidegger) in Freiburg. He went to 
Hamburg to write his doctoral thesis and Cassirer was one of his supervisors along with 
Panofsky, who was only a Privatdozent at the time but was given special dispensation to 
oversee Wind. His thesis approached art history from a philosophical perspective, 
investigating the theoretical premises of the formalist tradition, which was dominant at the 
                                                
25 Ernst Cassirer 1921; Cassirer 1937; Cassirer 1957; Cassirer 1988 (1953); Panofsky 1925/26, pp. 258-330; for 
a recent take on the interaction between Warburg, Cassirer and Einstein see: Bredekamp, Wedepohl 2015. 
26 Rampley 2001, p. xxvi. 
27 The collection of Wind’s writings titled The Eloquence of Symbols contains a short biography and a complete 
bibliography on which most of this section is based:  Lloyd-Jones 1983, pp. xiii-xxxvi; see also Thomas 2004. 
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time in the German-speaking world.28 In fact, most of his writings up to and including his 
habilitation could perhaps be more easily classified as operating within the field of philosophy 
than the history of art. At the same time his operations in this field had their starting point in 
his training as an art historian, as evidenced by his involvement with Warburg’s library from 
1930 on. His ambiguous disciplinary status perhaps led Warburg to remark to him: “Ich 
vergesse immer, dass Sie ein geschulter Kunsthistoriker sind; Sie haben es so nett mit dem 
Denken.”29 
Besides his involvement with the Hamburg scholars Panofsky, Cassirer and Warburg 
(whom he only met in 1927 due to the time Warburg spent in a Swiss clinic during the years 
1918-1924) an experience that seems to have thoroughly shaped Wind’s thinking in the 
years up to his habilitation was the time he spent in the USA between 1924 and 1927. In that 
period he became acquainted with a philosophical discourse that diverged significantly from 
the German context: the tradition of English and American empiricism and of pragmatism. 
While in America Wind taught in high schools for a year before taking on a position at 
Chapel Hill in North Carolina as Graham Kenan Fellow and Instructor in Philosophy. He 
seems to have been influenced especially by the pragmatist philosophy of Charles Sanders 
Pearce (1839-1914), but also published a critique of the work of Alfred North Whitehead 
(1861-1947) once he had returned to Germany.30 We shall return to this influence in more 
detail later on. 
After this time in the United States Wind came back to Hamburg to work on his 
habilitation, which he completed in 1929. Again Cassirer was his supervisor, even though 
Wind’s thinking took a decidedly anti-Kantian turn in opposition to some of Cassirer’s ideas. 
Cassirer was the leading member of the neo-Kantian Marburger Schule, a group of 
philosophers who could trace their lineage back to the teachings of Hermann Cohen (1842-
1918) in the 1870’s.31 When Wind returned to Germany he also began his work as an 
assistant at the Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg (KBW), the founder of which Wind 
became very close to before his death in 1929. In this period Wind also began to turn 
                                                
28 Because of the economic situation in Germany at the time (1922) this thesis was not published in full, but 
only partly and as an abridged journal article. It has been issued in its totality a few years ago: Wind 1924; Wind 
1925, pp. 438-86; an English translation of this article has also been published: Wind 2009, pp. 211-57; Wind 
2011. 
29 Lloyd-Jones 1983, p. xvi. 
30 Wind 1932, pp. 239-80. 
31 This school of philosophy, as Wind put it, “assigned to the study of mathematics and physics a preeminent 
role in the development of philosophical thought”, while also abandoning the belief in even the existence of the 
Kantian concept of the thing in itself: “Nothing is simply ‘given’ to the mind. All that the mind knows of, 
originates in its immanent processes. All that has a distinct meaning or existence, owes it to an act of 
determination.” Wind 1925 [a], p. 479; p. 482. 
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toward less purely philosophical subjects of research, for example in his study of Joshua 
Reynolds (1723-1792) and Thomas Gainsborough (1727-1788), although he still examined 
the theoretical groundings of their works.32 The rise to power of the Nazi-party in 1933 
forced Wind and the rest of the KBW to flee Hamburg and re-establish the institute in 
London. Wind played a major part in arranging a new home – temporary at first, but 
permanent later – for the library and its associated scholars.33 Das Experiment und die 
Metaphysik never received a warm reception (or much of a reception at all) upon publication 
in 1934, which led Wind to quote David Hume by remarking that it fell “dead-born form the 
press”.34 As a consequence of his flight – although perhaps also because of its contents – 
Wind’s habilitation received little attention in the newly hostile Germany. Besides, because 
of its American influences it did not fit easily in the established German-language discourse. 
On the other side of the North Sea Wind had moved into a different academic context and 
the new audience seemed to be less preoccupied with fundamental disciplinary questions of 
philosophy.35 
 Wind played an important role in the early years of the Warburg Institute, where he 
became deputy director. Together with Rudolf Wittkower (1901-1972) he established the 
Journal of the Warburg Institute (later renamed to the Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes). Wind was also involved in organising lectures by international scholars such as 
Johan Huizinga (1872-1945) and Henri Focillon (1881-1943) at the institute. One of these, 
entitled Some Humanistic Aspects of the Natural Sciences, was by Niels Bohr, once again 
showing the interaction between different fields that still interested the Warburgian scholars 
in these years.36 Wind was invited to return to the United States to lecture there in 1939, 
just before the Second World War would start, and he would not go back to Europe 
permanently until he was appointed the first professor in art history at Trinity College, 
Oxford in 1955. 
 It was during his years in Oxford that he published the projects for which he is 
perhaps best remembered now: Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance, the book of 1958, and Art 
and Anarchy, the title under which his 1960 Reith Lectures for the BBC were published in 
1963.37 Otherwise, it might be the little affair surrounding Ernst Gombrich’s (1909-2001) 
                                                
32 Wind 1932 [a], pp. 156-229. 
33 On Wind’s role in the migration of the library see Buschendorf 1993, pp. 85-128. 
34 Wind 1958, p. 297. 
35 Rampley 2001, pp. xxvii-xxviii. 
36 Bohr’s lecture took place in February 18 1936, see: ‘The Warburg Institute, “Lectures, Courses and Classes 
January – June 1936’’, in:  Wuttke 1989, pp. 325-330. 
37 Wind 1958 [a]; Wind 1963 [a]. 
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biography of Warburg with which Wind’s name is often associated, mostly because of a 
revived interest in Warburg and the reception of his work. In 1970 Wind wrote an 
unfavourable review of Gombrich’s book for The Times Literary Supplement, stating that 
Gombrich did not do justice to Warburg’s personality and ideas in his book.38 As was 
customary for the Supplement, the review was anonymous, but after a collection of Wind’s 
writings was published in 1983 this veil was lifted and Gombrich responded with an open 
letter expressing his indignation.39 The review also proved to be one of Wind’s last feats and 
he died shortly after it was published. By then he was best know as a scholar of renaissance 
art and seemed to have moved far away from the philosophical preoccupations of his early 
career. His plea for a theoretically rigorous interpretation of Warburg’s legacy still proves 
otherwise. 
 
1.3. The Ghost of Davos: Cassirer, Heidegger, and Wind 
 
The main topic of Das Experiment und die Metaphysik are the implications of developments in 
contemporary physics for Immanuel Kant’s transcendental philosophy in general and his 
antinomies of reason in particular.40 In it Wind develops a theory of the experiment in order 
to criticise Kant’s position that metaphysical questions are ultimately beyond our reach and 
that they can never be answered. Wind refutes the point that we should only concern 
ourselves with phenomenological questions; in fact, we do have access to reality beyond mere 
appearances. But why was this problem relevant for Wind at this moment in time? And how 
does it fit into contemporary philosophical debates? It is in answering these questions that 
we should also find ourselves closer to explaining the meaning and implications of his 
philosophy. 
 It has been pointed out above that in Das Experiment und die Metahysik Wind took a 
decidedly anti-Kantian turn and this should be seen as an important feature of the way its 
argument is embedded in the intellectual climate of Weimar Germany.41 In addition to this 
Wind had another target in his sights: Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological philosophy and 
its sympathies with national socialist ideology. Wind points this out in the preface to his 
                                                
38 [Wind] 1971, pp. 735-6; republished as ‘On a recent biography of Warburg’ in Wind 1983, pp. 106-113. 
39 Gombrich 1984 6, p. 6f. 
40 Wind had published on modern physics before he habilitated (when he was in the US): Wind 1927 [a], pp. 
64-71; Wind 1927, pp. 217-224. 
41 However we can also still discern residues of neo-Kantian thinking in it; for an example of this in Wind’s 
understanding of facts see: Falkenburg 2001, p. 39. 
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book, which was written in September of 1933, as opposed to the main body on which he 
had already habilitated in 1929.42 
Here the intent of Das Experiment und die Metaphysik becomes clear immediately. 
Wind asserts that he would like to distance himself from the developments he signals in 
contemporary German philosophy: “Gerade das Unzeitgemäße der Arbeit schien mir ihre 
beste Rechtfertigung.”43 What he seem to object to most is the obscurantist nature of the 
analysis and arguments of his opponents. Whereas they only spout “grüblerische 
Deklamationen”, he aims to provide “eindeutige Thesen” and “stringente Beweise”. 44 This is 
an important point for Wind: clarity of thought should always be a top priority. The neo-
Kantian idealists on the other hand are at fault in an entirely different way.45 They have failed 
to properly confront these nebulous philosophical claims and so they might as well be the 
primary culprits of this lapse in academic standards. Idealist philosophers simply failed to 
heed the call for battle, as they should have according to Wind: 
 
“Zum Kampf gefordert, hatten sie die Wahl der Waffen. Aber sie zogen es vor, der 
Entwicklung, in die sie eingreifen sollten, von hoher Warte aus zuzusehen, durch 
Zeichen der Gunst den Feind zu umwerben, und sich in all ihrer Weisheit dem Wahn 
hinzugeben, sie könnten auch mit diese Gegner noch ihren Frieden machen.”46 
 
This seems to be a reference to the famous debate between Cassirer and Heidegger in 
Davos in 1929. This debate was characterised by the extreme politeness of Cassirer in face 
of the more confrontationally inclined Heidegger, which resulted in a far more charismatic 
performance by the latter. As a result Heidegger was generally considered the moral winner 
of the debate, while Cassirer’s strategy seemed to spring from either the unwillingness or 
                                                
42 The preface is dated 15 September 1933. 
43 Wind 2001, p. 63. 
44 Ibidem, p. 64. 
45 Of course ‘neo-Kantian idealists’ is a gross generalisation, but Wind never names this adversary beyond the 
designation ‘liberal idealism’, ibidem, p. 64; besides Cohen and Cassirer’s Marburg School, there were other 
prominent neo-Kantians like Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) and Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) who 
belonged to the so-called Baden School, which focused more on questions of cultural values and not as much 
on the natural science. I will be following the idea that the introduction to Wind 2001 reflects the debate 
between these ‘idealists’ and the phenomenologists exemplified by the Davos debate between Cassirer and 
Heidegger, see Bredekamp 2014, pp. 215-236; this ignores the fact that there are also other likely candidates 
for Wind’s scorn, especially those philosophers, like Rickert, who did not need to flee the Nazi regime but, in 
the eyes of Wind, meekly stayed on in their university posts. 
46 Wind 2001, p. 64. 
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inability to put up a fight. An echo of this might still be found in Wind review of Gombrich’s 
Warburg biography, in which he characterised Cassirer as “always impeccably Olympian”.47 
By the time Wind wrote his preface, the national socialists had taken over power in 
Berlin (Hitler was appointed chancellor in January) and they were quickly trying to centralise 
their powers by also bringing the universities under direct control. Jewish academics across 
Germany could no longer work in universities from April on. This meant that the 
Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg had to shut down as part of Hamburg University. In 
December of that year the whole institute, staff, books and equipment, would move to 
London.48 In his preface, Wind references Heidegger’s philosophy alongside that of Karl 
Jaspers (1883-1969) as indicators of a change in the philosophical mood in Germany in those 
intermediary years.49 
The precise relation between Heidegger’s philosophy and national socialist ideology 
is still controversial, although it can at least be assumed that Heidegger was sympathetically 
disposed towards the regime in its early days.50 After the Gleichschaltung of the universities in 
April 1933, Heidegger became rector of Freiburg University and he joined the Nazi party on 
May 1 of that year. His inaugural address also shows strong signs of his political sympathies 
in its strongly nationalistic tone. Although the question whether Heidegger's ideas have 
fundamental affinities with Nazism remains up for debate even today, the public image that 
the Freiburg philosopher affected, at least in the single year of his rectorate, paints him in an 
unfavourable light. The fact is that Heidegger, as one of the most prominent academics in 
Germany at the time, publicly allied himself with the new regime and tried to align its views 
with his own philosophy.51 Wind must surely have been aware of these developments and 
the sentiment is not hard to discern in the following quote from Heidegger’s oration: 
 
                                                
47 Bredekamp 2014, pp. 219-220; Iain Boyd White notes in the introduction of the translation of Bredekamp’s 
article cited here that the latter’s negative evaluation of Cassirer has changed somewhat since originally 
authoring the article and that it might not be entirely justified in light of recent scholarship on Cassirer; see for 
example Gordon 2010. 
48 Although in hindsight the political context of the time and the nature of the move to London seem clear the 
situation on the ground in 1933 was far more ambiguous. There were plans to move the library abroad from 
Aby Warburg’s visit to Rome in 1929 on and financial factors played a major role in this; see Burkart 2000, pp. 
89-119. 
49 Jaspers would later be forced to stop working at Heidelberg University, as his wife was Jewish. Wind does 
not go into any detail about the relationship between the philosophies of Jasper and Heidegger and it is 
debatable if they are akin; see Thornhill 2011. 
50 The Heigegger ‘controversy’ seems to keep on inspiring debate. In January 2015 the Freiburg philosopher 
Günter Figal resigned as president of the Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft in the wake of the publication of the 
so-called Black Notebooks, Heidegger’s diaries, which contained several anti-Semitic passages; see SWR- 
Südwestrundfunk January 16 2015; the Black Notebooks have been published in volumes 94-96 of the 
Gesamtausgabe of Heideggers work (edited by Peter Trawny). 
51 Wolin 1993 (1991), pp. 1-22. 
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“Und die geistige Welt eines Volkes ist nicht der Überbau einer Kultur, sowenig wie 
das Zeughaus für verwendbare Kenntnisse und Werte, sondern sie ist die Macht der 
tiefsten Bewahrung seiner erd- und bluthaften Kräfte als Macht der innersten 
Erregung und weitesten Erschütterung seines Daseins.”52 
 
Here, Heidegger directly links his view of culture, grounded in a thorough scepticism of 
modernity and modernism, with concepts that are closely associated with Nazi ideology, 
blood and soil, or Blut und Boden (or in this case Blut und Erde). There is also some evidence 
that, at least at that point in time, Heidegger saw some kind of link between his 
understanding of the history of philosophy and the supposed revolutionary capacities of the 
national socialist movement. In the 1953 publication of a lecture given in 1935 (Einführung in 
die Metaphysik) he would even equate one of the main points of his critique of modernity, 
namely the role technology plays in alienating modern humanity from true being, with “the 
inner truth and greatness” of the national socialist movement. Heidegger would later claim 
that references like this were not to be taken at face value and that he had only taken on the 
position of rector to better deal with the demands the university would face under the new 
government.53 
In any case, Wind could only argue against what was in front of him, whether this 
was informed by a genuine belief in Nazi values or an attempt to shield the university from 
them. The nationalistic purpose Heidegger envisioned for German academia in his rectoral 
address was strongly opposed by Wind.54 This becomes apparent in the introduction Wind 
wrote for the 1934 edition of the Kulturwissenschaftlichen Bibliographie zum Nachleben der 
Antike and the criticism it received in the Völkische Beobachter, the national socialist party 
newspaper.55 
 
1.4. Culture and Humanism 
 
Wind uses the introduction to the Bibliography to explain the methodological principles of 
Warburgian Kulturwissenschaft and how these mainly contrast with Dilthey's ideas about 
                                                
52 Heidegger 1934. 
53 See the posthumously published Der Spiegel interview, in which Heidegger is also confronted with the 
referenced passage: ‘”Only a God Can Save Us” Der Spiegel’s Interview with Martin Heidegger (1966)’, in: 
Wolin 1993, pp. 91-115; Heidegger 1953. 
54 Iain Boyd Whyte, introduction to Bredekamp 2014, p. 216. 
55 Wind 2001 [a], pp. 235-253; also reprinted in: Wuttke 1989, pp. 279-294; Martin Rasch, ‘Juden und 
Emigranten machen deutsche Wissenschaft’, Völkische Beobachter. Norddeutsche Ausgabe, (5 January 1935) 5, p. 5 
and (23 January 1935) 23, p. 6; reprinted in Wuttke 1989, pp. 295-299. 
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Geistesgeschichte. He also spends some pages on the symbol as the basic object of these 
research methods (see §2) and on the thematic organisation of the bibliography. The final 
part is devoted to some comments on the relevance of the humanist studies presented in 
the Bibliographie to contemporary society. He refers to populist attacks against the humanist 
gymnasium in Germany, attempts to distance the Roman heritage from Greek influences in 
Italy and the tendency of some in France to use humanism only in the context of nationalist 
rhetoric. He also mentions the way that humanism is used in Britain to further economic 
and colonial policies and how in America parallels between classical antiquity and the then 
present time are even extended to baseball. This all goes to show how humanism is both 
alive and threatened at the same time.56 
Wind links this decline of humanist ideals in their broader sense to what we can only 
call a 'relativist' critique of truth: 
 
“Diese Abwendung vom Humanismus erfolgt unter dem Gesichtspunkt einer 
Kulturkritik die alles 'losgelöste', 'allgemeine' Wissen, das sich an seinen 
pragmatischen Ort nicht mehr gebunden fühlt, als kulturelle Zerfallserscheinung 
wertet, – einen Wahrheitsbegriff verabscheut, der nicht das subjektiv-triebhafte 
Leben als Quelle der letzten Offenbarung anerkennt, und sich mit Verachtung lossagt 
von einer Humanitätsidee, die das einzelne Handeln als Symbol oder Beispiel eines 
'Allgemein-Menschlichen' deutet und mißt. ’Humanitas’, ’Ratio': – dies sollen, als 
allgemeinverbindliche Forderungen, Relikte einer ’überalterten’ Tradition sein, – 
Fremdköper, die ausgeschieden werden müssen um das Kulturleben zur Gesundung, 
und das heißt: zur Bodenständigkeit zurückzuführen.“57 
 
This statement gives us an indication of what connects Wind's interest in the philosophy of 
science to the political concerns of his era, while the broader context of the introduction 
also links these concerns to the Warburgian method of cultural history. As we shall see later 
on (§3), in his habilitation Wind tries to develop a theory of the experiment in which 
scientific knowledge (and therefore measurements) is neither completely mentally 
determined by symbolic forms, according to the views of his supervisor Cassirer, nor 
rejected in favour of a subjectivist and particularist notion of the truth, as can be found in 
                                                
56 Wind 2001 (1934), p. 251. 
57 Ibidem, p. 251. 
	   29 
the works of Heidegger.58 As such, having a conception of knowledge and truth that offers a 
stable basis for something like a common (human) denominator is of the utmost importance 
for Wind’s philosophy. What we can clearly see here is that Wind develops these 
philosophical ideas to update humanism, not only in light of contemporary physics but also in 
the context of the contemporary political climate, which in the reception of the Davos 
debate in particular, cast humanism as the old stale philosophy of Cassirer versus the new 
and exciting philosophy of Heidegger. The work of the Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek 
Warburg is depicted as an extension of this humanism into the broader cultural field that is 
made relevant by the disputed position of humanism in the face of repeated attacks and 
mistreatment from the side of national socialism, fascism and conservative political 
movements such as the Action française. By extension, we could see Wind's work in the 
history of art in the same vein.59 In the closing parts of this introduction we again see the 
combative Wind from the preface to Das Experiment und die Metaphysik: “Ein Gegner aber, 
der wenn auch noch so gelinde, diese retardierende Funktion erfüllt, wird damit zu einem 
integrierenden Bestandteil der Entwicklung selbst […].” This is another accusation of the 
neo-Kantians: the people who do not put up a fight are as much a problem as their 
opponents. 
We can also spot a snide remark in the specific direction of Blut und Boden ideology 
in the mention of the Bodenständigkeit of cultural life. Seen through this remark, the 
introduction can almost be read as a manifesto that directly opposes the view Heidegger 
espoused when advocating the 'self-assertion of the German university'. That the 
Bibliographie in general and the introduction in particular should be seen as a rebuttal of the 
attacks on humanist ideals and Nazi Blut und Boden ideology, was not overlooked by the 
representatives of the new establishment. In two articles published in the Völkische 
Beobachter the Bibliographie was highly criticised, precisely for its supposed foreignness. This 
is most apparent in the fact the reviewer deems it most important that the people involved 
are all either Jewish or emigrant, or both. Furthermore, the close connection between 
banking and academia in the Warburg family shows how Jews are capable of turning even 
academia into a moneymaking business. The reviewer criticises the choice to focus not on 
                                                
58 See Falkenburg 2001 for an account that situates Wind’s view in the wider context of the philosophy of 
science and his relation to, for instance, realists and constructivist schools of thought. 
59 This is why it is also fitting that The Eloquence of Symbols is subtitled Studies in Humanist Art, as is remarked in 
Bredekamp 2014, p. 221. 
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the classics themselves, but on their reception: “Das ist fast schon Wissenschaft über die 
Wissenschaft und damit typisches jüdisches Denken.”60 
However, it starts to get interesting when the review turns to the remarks in Wind’s 
introduction on the position of humanism in the present day: “Die gegen Deutschland, Italien 
und die “Action française” gemachten Bemerkungen haber ihre deutliche antifaschistische 
Spitze und werden bei allen Glaubensgenossen [members of the Warburg circle] 
bewunderndes Schmunzeln über den tapferen Herrn Wind auslösen.”61 Wind’s attack has 
not missed its mark. And the new regime apparently felt it was necessary to publicly 
confront the views expressed in the introduction to the Bibliographie. It shows that even the 
anti-intellectualistic reviewer recognised the link proposed between the philosophy and 
methodology presented in the introduction and the humanist, anti-fascist ideals Wind sought 
to defend. 
 This brings us back to the preface to Das Experiment und die Metaphysik. As we have 
seen above, the preface clearly positions the book in relation to the confrontation between 
‘phenomenological’ and ‘idealist’ philosophy, specifically going back to the Davos debate 
between Cassirer and Heidegger. The main problem Wind identifies in this debate was the 
notion of freedom.62 
 
1.5. The Problem of Freedom 
 
In Davos Cassirer and Heiderger put forward their opposing interpretations of the 
philosophy of Kant. In broad terms Cassirer started from the traditional neo-Kantian idea 
that epistemology was the central issue and Heidegger made Kant an important figure in his 
own alternative history of philosophy that focused on ontology. In his evaluation of Kant 
Cassirer recognises that freedom is perhaps the central problem of his philosophy, thus 
suggesting that it is also the underlying theme of the debate: “Wenn man das Ganze des 
Werk Kants ins Auge faßt, brechen große Problemen durch. Das eine Problem is das 
Freiheitsproblem. Das was für mich immer das eigentliche Hauptproblem Kants. Wie ist 
Freiheit möglich?”63 In sharp contrast Heidegger eventually comes back to Cassirer with the 
retort that to ask whether freedom is possible is a question that does not make sense, 
                                                
60 Völkische Beobachter in Wuttke 1989, p. 297. Accordingly, the present text must be considered akin to 
orthodox Talmudic studies. 
61 Völkische Beobachter in Wuttke 1989, p. 298. 
62 Wind 2001, pp. 64-65. 
63 ‘Davoser Disputation zwischen E. Cassirer und M. Heidegger’, in: Heidegger 1973 (1929), p. 248. 
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because freedom in unknowable as such. Cassirer would later draw a parallel between his 
own confrontation with Heidegger and the debate between Martin Luther (1483-1546) and 
Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536) on the topic of free will.64  
The way the debate was received, for many the traditional idealist notion of freedom 
was no longer relevant; it seemed “pale and schematic”. Turning to some kind of “blacked-
out internality”, however, is not a meaningful way of criticising it. Wind compares this to 
sticking your head in the sand (“eine Vogelstraußpolitik”).65 Instead he wants to re-examine 
the “cosmological foundations” upon which this notion was once built. He posits the idea 
that these foundations might have been long-shattered already. At this point the scope of his 
project becomes clear. One of the premises of (transcendental) idealism is that metaphysical 
questions are unanswerable because their object cannot be accessed by experience. This 
means that human beings are autonomous in two senses: they do not have access to this 
external reality – in that sense they are separate from it – but they are also free to make 
their own decisions in this independent state. The free will is preserved from being simply 
determined by a universe that knows no other path than the one that follows from its own 
fundamental laws: “Gerade weil Erfahrung hierauf niemals eine Antwort geben kann, ist der 
Mensch frei, die Entscheidung von sich aus (‘autonom’) zu fällen.”66 In principle this would 
mean that if only one of these so-called unanswerable questions would prove to be 
answerable, human freedom would be limited to a certain extent. Certain parts of human 
thought would then no longer be autonomous of physical externalities. That is exactly what 
happened in 1917 when Einstein thought through the implications of his theories of relativity 
for cosmology and showed that the question whether the universe is limited in space, Kant’s 
first antinomy, could be answered as a question of physics.67 
Cassirer did not agree with Wind’s analysis of the problem of freedom. The main 
objection Cassirer had with Wind’s philosophy was Wind’s willingness to say something 
about the relation between the experiment and what Cassirer called free thought.68 This was 
based in Kant’s strict separation of the causal realm of physics and the free realm of 
morality. Most fundamentally, the difference between Cassirer and his pupil Wind was that 
the former believed that symbols were ideal, while the latter was of the opinion that they 
                                                
64 Krois 1983, pp. 147-159. 
65 Wind 2001, p. 64. This critique of internality is also important in Wind’s refutation of the idea of 
Geistesgeschichte (see §2.3). 
66 Ibidem, p. 65 
67 Ibidem, p. 65; these matters are discussed in more detail further down (§3.3). 
68 This did not mean that Cassirer did not value Wind’s work on the scientific method; he refers to Wind’s 
“ausgezeichneten Darlegungen” on this matter but does not agree with the consequences Wind draws from 
them concerning freedom, see: Falkenburg 2001, p. 32n34. 
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could be real in some sense.69 In the separation between the world of the experiment and 
that of free thought, Wind also saw the basis for the methodological split of the natural 
sciences and history. In this way, the important question of human freedom is also related to 
academic methodological questions.70 
 
1.6. The Status of Scientific Knowledge 
 
It is very interesting to note that even though Cassirer was involved in Wind’s doctoral 
dissertation and his habilitation and despite the parallels in their ideas about the symbolic, 
Cassirer’s work is never explicitly discussed in any of Wind’s writings on either science or 
the symbol. One of the reasons for this might be the major role Peirce plays in his argument, 
something that we can also gather from Wind’s preface.71 According to Wind, next to 
Warburg Peirce was the single most important influence on his thinking.72 This becomes 
clear when he quotes him at length (in translation): 
 
“Wenngleich auf keiner möglichen Stufe des Wissens irgendeine Zahl groß genug sein 
kann, um die Beziehung auszudrücken zwischen der Menge dessen, was unbekannt 
bleibt, und der Menge des Bekannten, so ist es doch unphilosophisch anzunehmen, 
daß mit Bezug auf irgendeine Frage, welche eine klare Bedeutung hat, die 
Untersuchung nicht eine Antwort hervorbringen würde, wenn sie nur weit genug 
getrieben wird.”73 
 
He uses this “maxim” to argue against the neo-Kantian (idealist) assumption of the infinity of 
all epistemological processes. Both the idea that the universe is infinite (as was widely 
accepted in Kant’s day) or the idea that it is finite (an hypothesis of physics in Wind’s day) 
are historically situated states of knowledge, but this should not dissuade anyone from trying 
                                                
69 In fact, it could be argued that this is the main point of Wind’s philosophy, as I hope to show in the following 
chapter (§2.1); for a closer look at some of the aspects of the relation between Cassirer and Wind, see: Engel 
2012, pp. 369-392. 
70 Krois 1998, pp. 191-192. 
71 As such Wind is an important link between the very important figures of Cassirer and Peirce; on these three 
figures see the work of John Michael Krois: Bredekamp, Lauschke 2011. 
72 Krois 1998, p. 184. 
73 The quote in its original English is as follows: “To this I reply that, though in no possible state of knowledge 
can any number be great enough to express the relation between the amount of what rests unknown to the 
amount of the known, yet it is unphilosophical to suppose that, with regard to any given question (which has 
any clear meaning), investigation would not bring forth a solution of it, if it were carried far enough.“ Peirce 
1878, p. 301; the German above is quoted from Wind 2001, p. 68. 
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to follow through with the consequences of any of these positions position.74 We can also 
notice the reference to clarity (“klare Bedeutung”) Wind again inserts into his introduction. 
The extensive quote from Peirce’s text ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ stands in stark 
contrast with the indictment of the “grüblerische Deklamationen” of some of his opponents. 
It is therefore not atypical of Wind when he would later describe Heidegger’s teacher 
Husserl as someone who was “greatly respected for his new method of turning the 
commonplace into the obscure,” adding “He called it phenomenology, […]”.75 Wind’s 
deference to clarity can be linked to his attempt to develop an epistemologically stable 
theory of the experiment: both provide the basis for common denominators. As a 
consequence, obscurity, on the other end of the spectrum, destroys that potential common 
ground. This makes obscurity a danger to humanist ideals, which have to be grouped around 
something that can at least be referred to as “Allgemein-Menschlichen”, as Wind puts it in 
the introduction to the Bibliographie. If we were to carry this thought to the end, that would 
mean that using an obfuscating style would even be central to so-called anti-humanists, such 
as Heidegger.76 In fact, Wind himself also draws this conclusion after the war. 
The quote on Husserl cited above is from a text Wind wrote after Jean-Paul Sartre 
(1905-1980) visited Smith College, where Wind was employed, in 1946. His review of 
Sartre’s lecture also contains some further direct remarks on Heidegger, whom Wind also 
encountered personally, as he compares the two philosophers. Wind warns for the threat 
posed by Sartre’s philosophy, which is, also according to the Frenchman himself, 
(dangerously) close to that of Heidegger. To Wind this can only be a bad thing, as 
Heidegger’s philosophy is fundamentally linked to national socialism: 
 
“When I heard, some fifteen years later, that Heidegger had become a convinced 
fascist, it seemed to me a natural development. Contrary to many who “joined the 
party,” he was predestined for it. A self-assertive disdain for reason, a willful 
confusion of profundity with darkness, a playing on the sensibilities of his followers by 
caressing and threatening them in quick succession, all these were traits which 
Heidegger had developed long before Hitler turned them to political use.”77 
 
                                                
74 This idea of thinking things through to their ultimate consequences is of major importance in establishing the 
relation between the empirical and the metaphysical (see §3.2.2). 
75 Edgar Wind, ‘Jean-Paul Sartre: A French Heidegger’, Appendix I to: Bredekamp 2014, p. 230. 
76 Later commentators on Heidegger’s philosophy have also drawn links between his style of arguing and his 
political ideals. See for example: Wolin 1993, p. 16. 
77 Wind in Bredekamp 2014, p. 231. 
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Especially in the first two points of comparison between Heidegger and Hitler, which point 
to the lack of clarity in Heidergger’s philosophy, we can hear the echoes of the introduction 
to the Bibliographie and the preface to his habilitation, where Wind condemns both the 
rejection of “Ratio” instead of “das subjektiv-triebhafte Leben“ (in the former) and the wilful 
dismissal of clarity (in the latter). 
 Peirce’s ideas on clarity were not the only way the American philosopher inspired 
Wind. An even bigger influence on Wind’s argument in Das Experiment und die Metaphysik 
(and so his philosophy in general) would be Peirce’s ideas on embodiment. This would be 
the main tool and central concept in the arsenal that allowed him to distance himself from 
both phenomenology and neo-Kantianism. Peirce allowed Wind to develop an alternative for 
pure reason or psychology as the only means of legitimate thought, without rejecting either, 
as people like Heidegger advocated.78 Another scholar that influenced Wind during his early 
American years was Whitehead. Peirce replaced the mechanist worldview for one in which 
chance played a role, something which brings him close to Whitehead, whose philosophy, as 
pointed out above, Wind reviewed when he came back to Germany in the late twenties. 
Wind heard Whitehead speak several times while he was in the USA. The main concept that 
Wind took from Whitehead was emergence, as we shall see in the third chapter (§3.3.3) 
when we take a closer look at Das Experiment und die Metaphysik.79 
 
1.7. Conclusion 
 
So far the problem Wind was facing is clear: the traditional notion of human freedom had 
come under pressure, because its metaphysical foundations had become uncertain in the 
wake of the developments in modern physics, prime among them relativity; besides, 
mainstream idealist neo-Kantian philosophers were either unwilling or unable to face the 
consequences of this for their philosophical premises and defend this notion of freedom; 
additionally the rise of philosophers such as Heidegger and Jaspers worked to further 
obscure these ideas. For Wind, these developments, seen against the background of the rise 
of national socialism, were a threat to a vision of humanism that informed his scholarly 
                                                
78 Krois 1998, p. 184; in an accompanying footnote Krois also quotes a supporting passage from ‘How to Make 
our Ideas Clear’: “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the 
object.”  
79 Krois 1998, p. 188; p. 193. 
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practice. This vision was based on his ideas about the scientific experiment and the 
entanglement of the empirical and the metaphysical. 
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§2. Between Entanglement and Detachment. Wind’s Theory of the Symbol 
 
2.1. Introduction: “a deplorable lapse into empiricism” 
 
In 1957 Edgar Wind wrote a letter to the editor of the Times Literary Supplement.80 The 
subject of the letter was a review (by the art historian Roger Hinks (1903-1963), although 
published anonymously) of the recently published lectures of Fritz Saxl (1890-1948), who 
was Aby Warburg’s successor as head of the Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg and 
later the first director of the Warburg Institute in London.81 The review was written against 
the background of the opening of the new building of the Institute and attempted to relate 
Saxl’s scholarly interest to the “Warburgian Method” in general and the importance of this 
method to the cultural life in England. Hinks highlighted the interest Saxl had in astrology and 
argued that it was to form his most important connection to the work of Warburg. In a 
wider sense, astrology was also the central theme of the Warburgian method, because, as 
Cassirer explained, it is concerned with “the link between the mythical and the rational 
world-pictures”.82 This connection is further expanded upon by Hinks with the Cassirerian 
insight that “the concepts of science are symbolic representations, since they are not based 
on direct observation”;83 this all shows that the world of the cultural sciences and the world 
of the natural sciences are not autonomous. Working from their connections was one of the 
most important aspects of the Warburgian method. Hinks then explains that in Das 
Experiment und die Metaphysik Wind too agreed with his mentor Cassirer on the nature of 
symbolic representation. As we have already seen in the previous chapter (§1.5), this was 
not the case and so Wind felt the need to respond. 
 In probably no other place was Wind forced to formulate his entire philosophy so 
succinctly: “My thesis was that symbols are “real” only to the extent in which they can be 
embodied in an experimentum crucis whose outcome is directly observable − in his 
[Cassirer’s] view a deplorable lapse into ‘empiricism.’”84 Still, it is difficult to directly place 
this remark in relation to Hinks’s characterisation of Cassirer’s thoughts on the nature of 
symbols. Hinks does not explicitly refer to symbols as either being “real” or “unreal”. The 
key to understanding Wind’s response lies in the fact that Cassirer’s philosophy opposed 
positivism, or, as Hinks put it, that he “reminded a positivist world that the concepts of 
                                                
80 Wind 1958, p. 297. 
81 [Hinks] 1958, pp. 277-278; Saxl 1957. 
82 Hinks 1958, p. 277. 
83 Ibidem, p. 277. 
84 Wind 1958, p. 297. 
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science […] are not based in direct observation.”85 This means that knowledge is always 
mediated by the symbolic in the same way that for Kant experience is always mediated by 
our Anschauungsformen of time, space, and the resulting causality. Symbols are 
representations of reality in the sense that they make something present which is not 
directly accessible. Wind inserts an important caveat into this theory, signalled with the 
word “only”: “Yes,” he says, − and this is an imagined answer − “our knowledge is mediated 
by the symbolic. But this does not mean all symbols represent real knowledge.” The internal 
logic of a symbolic system alone does not guarantee truth-value. Wind justifies this 
qualification with the concept of embodiment; he says symbols “can be embodied” and only 
then are they “real”. Embodiment in this sense means ‘made material’ and so symbols are 
concepts in physical form. As we shall see, this embodiment is a form of symbolic 
representation (§3.2.1). During an experiment concepts are materially embodied in the 
measuring instrument; to Wind this is the same as saying they are represented in symbolic 
form. The symbolic representation of scientific concepts means their validity is tested against 
physical reality, as they confirm or reject the network of premises upon which they are 
based. In this way the concepts of science are shown to be real or not. 
The reality of symbols is thus a testament of their materiality. It refers to the fact 
that symbols are always already embodied. It means that they are a part of our physical 
reality, because they can only be a means of measurement (or anything else having any 
bearing on the world) if they are. Wind’s caveat seems to pertain specifically to the domain 
of science – he specifically wants to correct Hinks’s reading of Das Experiment und die 
Metaphysik’s science-focused argument – and so it speaks about symbols in a more narrow 
sense: the concepts of science as a specific category of symbol. It is, however not the case 
that his ideas about the embodied nature of symbols were limited to this domain. Work of 
art also symbolically represent artistic ideas that can only be ‘proven valid’ if they are 
realised. But it is not in the domain of art, but in science, that these ideas are laid out most 
explicitly by Wind. The concepts of science are akin to hypotheses about the nature of 
physical reality, a very fundamental example of which would that space is an absolute 
category and not relative to movement. When a yardstick moves it remains of constant 
length.86 Our hypotheses are thus embodied in the use of the yardstick as a means to 
                                                
85 Hinks 1958, p. 277. 
86 As it turns out, the assumption of absolute space was proven false by Einstein’s theory of special relativity. 
For instance, the length of a moving object approaching the speed of light will contract when observed by an 
observer who is stood still relative to the moving object. This means that the actual length of an object depends 
on the observer. The example of the yardstick or similar instruments is used by Wind throughout his texts on 
	   38 
measure distance when we assume that it is of constant dimensions. If only, following 
Peirce’s ideas on the clarity of ideas, we think out the consequences of certain ideas far 
enough, then we would be able think of consequences that would not be commensurate 
with the results of an experiment in the empirical, physical world. Ideas also have a practical 
side. In that sense, Wind’s statement is more about the nature of (scientific) knowledge and 
the way it is mediated by symbols: they are a way to test that knowledge. Symbols that are 
‘unreal’ bear that qualification only in a theoretical sense; the knowledge they represent is 
‘unreal’. They are able to show the problematic nature of the web of ideas underpinning that 
knowledge. Symbols in a more general sense are able to test knowledge by virtue of their 
very nature as embodied parts of material reality. When we take Wind’s statement as 
discussing only a specific category of symbols, this must then mean that we have to rephrase 
it in order to understand Wind’s theory of the symbol in general. To “My thesis was that 
symbols are “real,” we should add, “but that all reality is not only symbolic representation.” 
In this chapter we will begin our investigation of this thesis as the basis for Wind’s 
theory of the symbol. What is of primary interest here is the relation between human 
psychology and the symbolic. The symbolic entangles us with the world while also offering 
the basis for disentanglement in the form of the Warburgian concept of Denkraum. We will 
start with the relationship between Wind’s theory of the symbol and the Warburgian ideas 
on the same matter, primarily influenced by the philosophy of Friedrich Theodor Vischer 
(1807-1887). This discussion will then automatically move us into the territory of Wind’s 
own writings on the nature of symbols. The argument against pure autonomy – or to put it 
in Warburgian terms: “die Kampfansage gegen das ‘Grenzwächtertum’”87 – is of central 
importance here, something that Hinks rightly noticed. What the first part of this chapter 
aims to show is that this argument is the main thread that runs through the symbolic 
philosophy from Vischer to Warburg to Wind. Unlike the formalist school that formed 
perhaps the most prominent line of thinking in this period these three scholars argued 
against the autonomy of both the individual symbol (or work of art as a symbolic form) and 
the autonomy of the arts as a cultural domain. In the end this also resulted in an argument 
against the autonomy of the human subject. Images are not contemplated in disinterested 
separation solely for their artistic qualities and artistic concerns are not only related to 
other aspects of culture by some nebulous Zeitgeist. This discussion will in turn serve as an 
                                                
the experiment. The inconsistency of certain instruments under the laws of relativity is discussed by Wind in 
Wind 2001 (1934), p. 76ff. 
87 Wind 2001 [a], p. 238. 
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introduction into Wind’s philosophy of the scientific experiment in the next chapter. 
 
2.2. Preliminary Remarks on Wind, Warburg, and the Development of Ideas 
 
We are about to take a sizeable detour through the territories of the late nineteenth 
century, the realm of the young Warburg, Tito Vignoli (1829-1914), and Vischer, so that we 
can take a look at the main starting point from which Wind developed his theory of the 
symbol. It is not simply the case that he took Warburg’s work on the matter and adapted it 
according to insights from his own philosophical work nor is so that the starting point of his 
philosophy, by which I mainly mean his critical work on the scientific experiment, had its 
singular point of departure in the symbolic theory Warburg had developed or in Wind’s own 
version of that theory. This is further complicated by the fact that one of our most 
important sources on Warburg’s method as a systematic project was written by Wind 
himself, who closely identified with his tutor and as result probably did not distinguish so 
meticulously between their ideas.88 We also know that they cooperated closely in Warburg’s 
final years. Wind was familiar with Warburg’s unpublished theoretical writings, commented 
on them and had at one point taken up the plan to publish them. Warburg wrote favourably 
about his theoretical conversations with Wind in the diary of the Hamburg library and was 
enthusiastic about the insights they offered him.89 
Still, despite this close connection, it cannot be the case that Wind’s symbolic 
philosophy is wholly Warburg’s (or even Vischer’s). First of all, while Wind must probably 
have known about Warburg’s work at least from the time that he started working on his 
doctoral thesis in Hamburg, they only got to know each other in 1927. By that time Wind 
had already been working on ideas related to his habilitation for some time, as his 
contribution to the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy in 1926 shows.90 And while it 
is also true that Wind worked on his doctoral thesis under Cassirer and Erwin Panofsky, we 
cannot say that they were pure Warburgians even though they were both at the time 
involved with the Warburg library run by Saxl in Warburg’s absence. The theoretical 
position Wind develops in his thesis Ästhetischer und kunstwissenschaftlicher Gegenstand (1924) 
                                                
88 The fact that Wind saw himself as the principal successor to Warburg’s methodological project can be seen 
in a letter he wrote to Jean Seznec in 1954 in which he quotes Warburg, who supposedly had said that the 
legacy of the KBW would be safe with Wind, see: Engel 2014, p. 92, which also comments on Wind’s view of 
himself as Warburg’s heir. 
89 Pfisterer, Hönes, 2015, p. 323, p. 338; Michels, Schoell-Glass 2001. 
90 Wind 1927, pp. 217-224; in this paper Wind gave an early account of the problems (and their possible 
solution) of his habilitation. 
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clings closer still to the neo-Kantian leanings of his supervisors than the work of his 
habilitation, in which he clearly distances himself from Cassirer in particular (see §1).91 
Second of all, it is almost never the case in these matters that arguments develop by simply 
moving from point A to B. Rather, as in this case, far more often we move back and forth 
between ideas in a process of mutual influence. It is highly probable that in Warburg’s final 
years Warburg influenced Wind, but also vice versa, as they exchanged ideas in 
conversation.92 And it also cannot simply be said that one part of Wind’s work was derived 
from other parts. Instead Wind’s ideas on the symbolic informed his thoughts on the 
scientific experiment and vice versa. Nevertheless for clarity’s sake, which in the spirit of 
Wind we must take very seriously, we will discusses the different aspects of Wind’s work 
separately here. Using Vischer’s philosophy as starting point we will set out to explore 
Warburg’s take the symbol and his influence on Wind before delving deep into the 
philosophy of the experiment in the next chapter. Once we come out on the other side, we 
will be able to survey the mutual exchanges at work there and explain how they inform 
Wind’s argument for the reality of symbols. 
 
2.3. Against Autonomy: Kulturwissenschaft, Formalism and Geistesgeschichte 
 
In 1930 Wind presented a paper at the fourth Kongress für Ästhetik und Allgemeine 
Kunstwissenschaft in Hamburg on Warburg’s concept of Kulturwissenschaft.93 In it he 
contrasted Warburg’s methods with those of Alois Riegl (1858-1905) and Heinrich Wölfflin 
(1864-1945) and criticised their views on the autonomy of art. First he analysed the idea of 
art (history) as autonomous entity and how it emerged form several developments: the 
modernist ideas about the nature of art, which was supposedly the realm of pure vision; the 
related conviction of the need to separate form, the strictly visual, and content; this 
antithesis of form and content makes the developments of art a history of the development 
of form; as a result it is only possible to relate this detached concept of form back to 
broader developments in society in a meaningless way.94 
                                                
91 Wind 2011. 
92 Wind himself referred to these conversations as his primary source for his account of Warburg’s method, 
see Buschendorf 1985, pp. 165-209. 
93 We can assume that at this point in time, as pointed out above, that Wind closely identified with Warburg’s 
method as a result of their close contact in the latter’s last few years. It is thus safe to say that when Wind, at 
least in texts of this kind at this moment in time, refers to the Warburgian method he is also endorsing a point 
of view that he himself shares. So when in this chapter I refer to Wind’s take on Warburg’s methodology this 
means that, in fact, it also refers to his own theoretical point of view.  
94 Wind 1931, pp. 164-165; an English translation of this text can be found in: Wind 1983, pp. 21-36. 
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 Wind opposes this focus on autonomy with Warburg’s approach: 
 
“Man kann aber auch […], statt die erwähnten Wechselbeziehungen in abstracto zu 
behaupten, ihnen dort nachspüren, wo sie am einzelnen Objekt historisch faßbar 
werden, und in der Arbeit an diesem konkreten, gerätmäßig gebundenen Objekt 
Kategorien entwickeln und als tragfähig erweisen, die dann der Ästhetik und der 
Geschichtsphilosophie zugute kommen.”95 
 
Instead of looking at the commonalities of a culture as abstract extensions of a Zeitgeist (or 
a similar concept like Riegl’s Kunstwollen) Warburg wanted to look at the individual object as 
a nexus of different domains. These domains are not separate fields of study; the gaps in 
between them would not need to be bridged as a means of bringing them together. Rather, 
the very fact of their interwovenness is the starting point of the investigation. The image of 
bridging a gap between domains is not apposite here because these domains already come 
into being as heteronomous entities; there is no gap as such but domains flowing into each 
other.96 
 To cut one of these domains loose from the other is to kill it. It is interesting to note 
that Wind uses the common metaphor of life and death to describe the relationship 
between autonomy and heteronomy. Do we not see so very often that link between the 
autonomy of the object and its death? When historically we came to regard the image as a 
detached work of art in a museum did it not lose much of its capacity to live? Have not so 
many modernist artists decried the separation of art and life as a result of artistic autonomy? 
Of course Wind and Warburg were not free from this problem:  
 
“Es ist eine der Grundüberzeugungen Warburgs, daß jeder Versuch, das Bild aus 
seiner Beziehung zu Religion und Poesie, Kulthandlung und Drama herauszulösen, der 
Abschnürung seiner eigentlichen Lebenssäfte gleichkommt. Für wen aber das Bild diese 
unauflösliche Verflochtenheit mit der Gesamtkultur besitzt, dem stellt sich auch die 
Aufgabe, ein Bild, das man nicht mehr unmittelbar versteht, zum Sprechen zu bringen, 
ganz anders dar als jemanden, der an ein “reines Sehen” im abstrakten Sinne 
                                                
95 Wind 1931, p. 167. 
96 The use of the word ‘heteronomous’ as opposed to ‘autonomous’ goes back to Kantian ethics, where it is 
used to designate moral actions that are determined not by practical reason (which is autonomous) but by 
‘outside’ influences such as desire, see: ‘autonomy/heteronomy’, in:  Blackburn 20162 (2008), online lemma; 
Wind, who uses the term in his habilitation, seems to use it as the general antonym of ‘autonomy’ outside the 
explicit moral context of Kant, see: Wind 2001, p. 108. 
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glaubt.”97 [my emphasis] 
 
Any attempt at autonomy means to kill the image; attempts at retaining connections mean 
allowing it to come to life. In this passage that life is not seen as something that always 
naturally speaks to the historian. There is a potential for life (Lebenssaft) in the image that is 
contained (abgeschnürt) by a formalist approach, but it can also be activated (zum Sprechen 
bringen) by the Warburgian. This also points us towards the fact that here Wind describes 
the life of the image as something that is connected to its understanding (Verstehen); we can 
only understand an image that is not dead. We also see here that all attempts at setting the 
image apart are doomed to fail: the entanglement with culture as a whole is irresolvable 
(unauflöslich). This is perhaps the biggest problem with the formalist approach, that what it is 
trying to do will only result in ideas that ultimately fall short of the reality they are 
describing. 
 In Wind’s eyes another target of criticism from the point of view of the Warburgian 
method were the ideas of scholars like Dilthey and Rickert, whose propagation of 
Geistesgeschichte (Dilthey) and the confusingly named Kulturwissenschaft (Rickert) mainly 
sought to emancipate history from the natural sciences. While Wind’s account of the 
Warburgian method in the conference paper mainly points its arrows at Wölfflin and Riegl, 
the Geistesgeschichte is his primary object of critique in the introduction to the German 
edition of the Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliographie zum Nachleben der Antike. Especially Dilthey 
focuses too much on imposing linearity and unity on culture where there is none. This is 
based on the idea that the human mind is something ultimately free from external forces and 
develops in splendid internality. The tension between internality and externality is a 
returning motif in Wind’s philosophy. As we have seen in the previous chapter (§1.5), this 
allegation of internality is one that Wind also levelled at the neo-Kantians, of whom Rickert 
was a prominent member. The problem ultimately is the fact that the human mind is seen as 
autonomous. All historical problems thus become stuck in the realm of ideas, where they 
cannot be grasped as individual cases.98 Still, Dilthey cum suis were onto something when 
they tried to differentiate history from the natural sciences: 
 
“Mit recht wandten sie gegen das konstruktive Verfahren der Naturwissenschaften 
                                                
97 Wind 1931, p. 168. 
98 The fact that this also results in problems for the method of the natural sciences and that the idea of the 
autonomous mind is based on an outdated understanding of the nature of the universe is explored in the next 
chapter (§3.3). 
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ein, daß er mit seinen mathematischen formulierbaren Hypothesen und seiner 
mathematisch ableitbaren Folgerungen dem Wesen geschichtlicher Phänomene nicht 
gerecht werden könne. Aber sie übersahen, daß durch absolute ‘Verinnerlichung’ die 
geschichtlichen Phänomene ebenso vernichtet werden wie durch absolute 
‘Entäußerung’. Gerade das Symbol […] lebt von der Schwingung zwischen diesen 
beiden Polen.”99 [my emphasis] 
 
Wind highlights here that central to Warburg’s method of Kulturwissenschaft was his 
understanding of the living symbol. In fact the symbol was the basic object of inquiry 
(Forschungsgegenstand) in this method. Central to Warburg’s understanding of the symbol 
was the concept of polarity. It is this concept that also forms the basis for the rejection of 
autonomy, as it understands culture as whole as operating between the two poles of, 
broadly speaking, magic and rationality, which are in constant tension with each other, but 
can never be completely separated. Polarity was a fundamental feature of human psychology 
for Warburg and studying culture allowed him to understand it better: 
 
“Nur so wurde es ihm möglich [...] jene Ausgleichspsychologie zu entwickeln, die den 
widerstreitenden Seelenregungen verschiedene seelische Orte zuweist und sie als 
Pole einer einheitlichen Schwingung versteht, – Pole, an deren Entfernung 
voneinander sich das Ausmaß der Schwingung ermessen läßt.”100 
 
And so we must see what we call separate domains of culture as different configurations on 
the axis between these two poles and the symbol as different expressions of these 
configurations. This understanding of polarity goes back to Friedrich Theodor Vischer and 
his son Robert (1847-1933), who were important sources for Warburg’s symbolic theory. 
Where Friedrich Theodor and Robert Vischer expanded aesthetics in order to 
include the viewer’s body through the theory of Einfühlung, Wind argues that Warburg’s 
concept of Kulturwissenschaft was out to broaden the study of art beyond pure form. Time 
and again he stresses the importance of polarity in this endeavour. It is a “Verhältnis der 
relativen Bindung und Lösung”, a relationship of relative dependence and independence.101 
Distancing contemplation will always be bound to direct affect and vice versa. This is a 
                                                
99  Wind 2001, p. 241. 
100 Wind 1931, p. 169. 
101 Ibidem, p. 177. 
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completely different understanding of the object of research than the one that is found in 
Riegl and Wölfflin. Theirs is a world populated with antitheses in which it will ultimately 
prove impossible to meaningfully reconnect varying phenomena and different fields. The 
world of Warburg and Wind was one of heteronomy not autonomy. Their symbolic 
philosophy sought to give them a basis for describing it. 
 
2.4. Friedrich Theodor Vischer’s Symbolic Theory and Robert Vischer’s Empathy Theory 
 
In his paper on Warburg’s method of Kulturwissenschaft Wind points out the importance of 
Friedrich Theodor Vischer to Warburg.102 We can assume that one of the reasons for 
Wind’s paper was that Warburg had never been able to fully and systematically commit to 
paper his ideas on the nature of his method in general and the symbol in particular, at least 
not in published form. An important source for an explicit account of Warburg’s thoughts 
on the symbol is a fragmented collection of aphorisms that he worked on between 1888 and 
1905, Grundlegende Bruchstücke zur Psychologie der Kunst.103 According to Wind Warburg read 
Vischer’s paper ‘Das Symbol’ again and again, but the fragments themselves are also a clear 
indication of his influence on Warburg’s thought.104 Vischer (1807-1887) was a German 
philosopher who, in the later years of his career, developed an aesthetics based on the 
principle of expression in which the concept of the symbol played a central role.105 Vischer 
opposed the formalist aesthetics of his contemporaries. One of his main points of 
contention was the number of explanatory principles aesthetic systems should be based on; 
whereas philosophers like Robert Zimmerman espoused two principles (expression and 
aesthetic pleasure) Vischer only had use for expression. Therefore, his theory is sometimes 
                                                
102 Ibidem, p. 170. 
103 Warburg was not able to settle on a definitive title for this project, which was never published in his lifetime; 
it has only become more widely available as part of his Gesammelte Schriften: see Warburg 2015. 
104 Wind 1931, p. 170; Buschendorf 1998, p. 230; p. 230n15; of course Warburg also showed his debt to 
Vischer (and to his son Robert) in many other writings, most notably the introduction to his thesis on Botticelli: 
Warburg 1892. 
105 F. Th. Vischer 1887, pp. 151-193, republished in F. Th. Vischer 1922, pp. 420-456; Friedrich Theodor Vischer 
should not be confused with his son Robert Vischer, although he did incorporate some his son’s ideas, mainly 
the concept of Einfühlung, into his own philosophy; confusion between the two Vischers played a part in the 
controversy surrounding Wind’s review of Gombrich’s Warburg biography; a conflation of Friedrich Theodor 
and Robert led Charles Hope to criticise Wind’s attack on Gombrich in a review of The Eloquence of Symbols; 
several others (Hope, Gombrich, Jaynie Anderson, Margaret Wind, and Bernhard Buschendorf) thereafter 
wrote letters discussing the validity of Wind’s assessment: Hope 1984, pp. 13-14; see the following web page 
for the initial review and the letters in response: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v06/n05/charles-hope/naming-the-graces 
(31 December 2015); also of interest in this regard: Engel 2014, pp. 87-116. 
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referred to as monist, in contrast with the dualist aesthetics seen in the formalist school.106 
This starting point in expression gives Vischer’s philosophy, and as a result also Warburg’s 
thinking, a markedly psychological angle.107 
 
2.4.1. Einfühlung Between Coalescence and Projection 
 
The principle of expression in Vischer’s later aesthetics was informed by his son Robert’s 
work on the concept of Einfühlung, or empathy.108 Still, it can be argued that Robert was also 
influenced by his father’s earlier work and that he articulated certain ideas that Friedrich 
Theodor had already hinted at.109 The concept of Einfühlung was used generally in the 
nineteenth century to describe the sensation of an emotional affinity or closeness with an 
object.110 An important aspect of Robert’s work on the concept was the way he tried to link 
the workings of affect to the body’s physiology. To construct this link Robert uses the 
concept of Ähnlichkeit, which indicates a similarity between the form of the observed object 
and the effect it has on the body of the viewer. This means that aesthetic pleasure is derived 
from the extent of the correspondence between a particular form and the structure of the 
body as a holistic system.111 Our eyes may be arranged to make it easier to behold certain 
forms, but this does not mean that only the eyes are affected when we look at something: 
 
Es handelt sich überhaupt um den ganzen Körper; der ganze Leibmensch wird 
ergriffen. Denn in Wahrheit gibt es ja keine strikte Lokalisierung in demselben. Jede 
betonte Empfindung führt daher schliesslich entweder zu einer Steigerung oder 
Schwächung der allgemeinen Vitalempfindung.112 [R. Vischer’s emphasis] 
 
This experience of similarity only describes the first step of Einfühlung. 
The second step establishes a much deeper connection between viewer, or subject, 
and object. In order to fully establish an emotional relationship with an external object the 
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viewer needs to project their own life onto this lifeless form outside of them. The viewer 
tries to bring this inanimate object to life, because, in spite of a sensation of familiarity 
(Ähnlichkeit), in their eyes it seems to lack life. In this process the viewer is “heimlicher 
Weise in dieses Nichtich versetzt und verzaubert”.113 Robert Vischer sees in this second 
step a fundamental human urge to become one with the world, informed by a pantheistic 
idea of nature that his father did not share with him.114 There is an interesting ambiguity in 
Robert description of the process of Einfühlung. On the one hand, it happens “in a 
mysterious way”: the subject has no control over it and has become a passive element, at 
least partly. At the same time the subject initiates this process: “Ich traue also der leblosen 
Form mein individuelles Leben zu […],” is how it starts, but it ends “heimlicher Weise”.115 
This indicates ambivalence about the precise status of the object. Is it passive or at least 
partly active? 
In Robert’s sense Einfühlung is as much a process of coalescence, a melting into each 
other [Verschmelzung], as it is a process of lending life to the object. If seen as a process of 
coalescence, the object is at least partly active. If seen as a lending life, the object is always 
passively waiting to be activated by the subject. Friedrich Theodor also switched between 
different ways of describing Einfühlung. Sometimes it was more akin to a one sided filling up 
of the object by the subject, at other times it was a process in which subject and object 
approached each other.116 The mixed uses of these interpretations of Einfühlung by both 
Vischers led to some ambivalence. This would also show in the adaptation of their work by 
Warburg, as we shall see below. 
 In spite of this ambivalence, or maybe because of it, for the Friedrich Theodor of the 
later years the concept of Einfühlung was able to explain the entire spectrum of the human 
reception of art and beauty. Even the experience of beauty caused by a supposedly pure 
form can be explained as an aspect of expression if it is seen as a form of Einfühlung in 
Robert’s sense.117 As such Vischer’s work on the symbol was an attempt to define the object 
of aesthetic experience. His definition of the aesthetic experience was not one of pure 
mental processes but of interaction between subject and object. 
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2.4.2. Friedrich Theodor Vischer’s ‘Das Symbol’ 
 
Vischer seems to be very straightforward in giving a concise definition of the symbol: “Das 
Symbol ist bloß äußerliche Verknüpfung von Bild und Inhalt durch einen 
Vergleichungspunkt.”118 In essence this already gives us an inkling of the elements that we 
have seen were of great importance to Wind in the Warburgian method: the tension 
between the external (bloß äußerlich) and the internal (Inhalt). But, despite his directness, his 
definition is not immediately clear. What form does the point of comparison take, if the 
image (Bild) is already one of the elements being compared? The answer to this question lies 
in Vischer’s dual definition of the image. Image means “bald einfach ein sich darstellendes 
Sinnliches, angeschautes Anschauliches”, but it is also “bald ebensolches [Bild in the first 
sense], das dient, etwas Zweites, Gedachtes […] auszudrücken, […]”.119 In the first sense 
the image is the visually perceptible object we encounter. In the second sense the image is 
something that expresses the comparability between two things. Vischer names this the 
tertium comparationis.120 In Vischer’s definition of the symbol an image in the first sense 
becomes an image in the second sense: it is the point of comparison turned into one of the 
elements being compared. If we were to put this in terms of Saussurean semiotics, it would 
mean that a symbol is a visually perceptible sign (image) that compares a signifier (image) and 
a signified (content, Inhalt). The two senses in which Vischer takes the image are hard to 
separate. 
In contrast to ‘image’, Vischer does not spend any words on precisely defining 
‘content’. It is simply anything thinkable, which in the larger scheme of things also means 
something internal. This lack of a clear definition points us to the fact that, as Wind remarks, 
Vischer’s basic definition of the symbol if provisional. It is a heuristic tool that enables the 
philosopher to outlines the different ways image and meaning are connected.121 This shows 
that Vischer’s project is not one that tries to analyse the symbol semiotically, but as a 
psychological problem. 
 An important aspect of the symbol for Vischer is its inadequacy (Unangemessenheit). 
This is a concept he takes from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.122 Inadequacy indicates that 
both image and content have many aspects, but that only one or a few of these fit each 
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other. Image and content are not tailored to each other, but they only cover some aspect. 
Content will always have many abstract qualities that are not adequately described by the 
concrete features of the image, many of which bear no relation the specific sense of the 
content.123 
 Vischer notes that the connection made in the comparison between the image and 
the meaning of a symbol is a mental act. The nature of this act is not uniform, but it has two 
modes: “Für das vorliegende Gebiet unterscheiden wir zunächst sein Verhalten als 
helldenkender Geist und als nur ahnende Seele.”124 But this difference between clear thought 
and guesswork is not black and white; both come in different shades. 
The first category of symbolic act is the religious one. Vischer does not describe it in 
the most positive terms: “Wir beginnen mit derjenigen Art der Verbindung, die als dunkel 
und unfrei zu bezeichneten ist.”125 The most important characteristic of this category of 
symbolism is the confusion of image and meaning; they are mistaken for each other 
(verwechselt). The image is identified as the meaning itself and becomes its stand-in. The 
‘concepts’ of meaning belong to the realm of the abstract, which is infinite according to 
Vischer. This causes the viewer to see the object as sacred or divine: “Da die Bedeutung 
wesentlich dem Gebiete des Absoluten angehört, da es ein Unendliches ist, was die Ahnung 
sucht, so wird durch die Verwechslung der Gegenstand heilig.” We can see this 
phenomenon in the examples of a bull or a tree becoming objects of worship, but also in the 
religious ritual of the Catholic Eucharist, where bread and wine are transubstantiated into 
the divine body and blood of the Son of God. In each of these cases the image is treated as 
that to which it refers. The example of the Eucharist is analysed in some detail by Vischer, 
who argues that its symbols bread and wine appropriate the effects of the death of Jesus 
Christ, the act of atonement for the sins of humanity. In addition, these symbols also have 
concrete effects on the body, because in the act of eating and drinking they become part of 
it.126 Thus in every ritual the symbols themselves re-enact this atonement. This is an example 
of how in the religious category of symbolism symbols become causal agents. 
In relation to Vischer’s interpretation of the Eucharist Wind makes an interesting 
point, because there is of course another interpretation of Christ’s words ‘This is my body 
…’. We can understand them as trope, as is done by those who adhere to the doctrine of 
transubstantiation, or we can understand them metaphorically, which explicitly introduces 
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the ‘like’ of a comparison.127 The latter interpretation belongs to the other end of Vischer’s 
spectrum of the symbolic act, the free and enlightened one. Wind writes: 
 
“Die zweite Auffassung restituiert diese Stoffe in ihre Gleichgültigkeit, denn sie will 
das religiöse Erlebnis durch den Akt des Kults nicht gebunden wissen. Brot und Wein 
sprechen zu ihr als Zeichen, die intellektuell zu verstehen sind, nicht als Kräfte, die 
geheimnisvoll wirken. Das Symbol im Sinne einer unlöslichen Einheit von Ding und 
Bedeutung hat sich in die Allegorie verwandelt, wo die beiden Seiten des Vergleichs 
sich klar gesondert gegenübertreten.”128 
 
We can see in this latter interpretation a certain scepticism towards images that is 
reminiscent of the general iconoclast critique of images, namely that they present an artificial 
link between object and meaning that does not represent any real truth. It is perhaps no 
coincidence then that most protestant denominations reject the former interpretation of the 
Eucharist, while at the same time being very critical of the religious use of images. Here we 
can see that this detached understanding of symbols also means seeing them as a construct. 
 It is this allegorical understanding of the symbol that is one of the main characteristics 
of modernity. This idea of the transformation of symbolic understanding is one of the most 
important aspects of Warburg’s thought and it transforms Vischer’s aesthetics into a system 
for the interpretation of the history of the image. As art historian Matthew Rampley puts it: 
“Warburg’s thought uses [nineteenth-century psychological theories] to map out the 
emergence of a modern order of visual representation.”129 It is thus the second category of 
the symbolic act in Vischer’s system that becomes a hallmark of the modern experience. 
Vischer describes this allegorical category of symbolic act as enlightened and free. He 
contrasts this with the religious one, which is dark and unfree. There is also a middle zone in 
this spectrum between dark and enlightened, a sort of twilight zone that is neither 
completely unfree nor entirely free. This middle zone is the realm of Einfühlung: “Es ist die 
unwillkürliche und dennoch freie, unbewußte und in gewissen Sinne doch bewußte 
Naturbeseelung, der leihende Akt, wodurch wir dem Unbeseelten unsere Seele und ihre 
Stimmungen unterlegen.”130 This is something we do all the time in innumerable idiomatic 
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expressions and poetic metaphors: the morning smiles, trees whisper, thunder growls, dark 
clouds threaten, waves rage, grapes love warmth, the nail does not want to come out of the 
board, the parcel does not want to go into the bag, etc.131 In all these examples we transfer 
our own feelings onto inanimate forms. In that sense this category of the symbolic is 
anthropomorphic, because these forms become endowed with human characteristics. 
Vischer argues that originally all expressions of this type, all forms of language, were taken 
literally, but that they have developed into symbolic forms: “Dieser dunkelhelle, unfreifreie 
Akt ist symbolisch: die Verknüpfung vollzieht sich durch das Band eines 
Vergleichungspunkt.”132 At this point it becomes clear that Vischer sees this middle category 
as embodying the symbolic in a more narrow sense. While the enlightened and dark 
categories only qualify as symbols because they depend on the formal connection of image 
and content, the middle category functions strictly on the basis of the comparison, which 
ultimately defines the symbolic. 
While the belief in the life of a symbol is very much sincere, in case of the symbolic 
category in the narrow sense (the middle category) it is not. We only half believe that this 
entanglement of image and meaning is true, or the way we believe is conditional, reserved: 
“Ich habe die bei dieser Form mitten in der Täuschung sich erhaltende Freiheit von der 
Täuschung ein Vorbehalten genannt: die Unterscheidung zwischen Bild und Sinn, die Einsicht 
in die Verknüpfung als bloß symbolische bleibt vorbehalten [Vischer’s emphasis].”133 This 
concept, Vorbehalten, is of interest in relation to Warburg, as it prefigures his development 
of the idea that we create a certain distance between us and the symbol in order to be able 
to contemplate it and create space for free thought (as opposed to the unfree thought 
associated with the confusion of the image and its meaning). This Denkraum is of great 
importance to the emergence of modern thought. 
In the free and enlightened category of the symbolic this reservation takes over. 
Image and meaning are no longer seen as entangled, but they are understood as being 
merely connected by the symbol as tertium comparationis. While in the case of the symbolic 
act of the middle category this understanding is in the background, here it is very much 
present. Allegories belong to this third symbolic category. Both myth and allegories make 
use of personifications. But while in myth abstract concepts become truly living symbols 
(personifications), in allegory we always remain aware of the constructed nature of the link 
                                                
131 These are Vischer’s examples, ibidem, p. 433. 
132 Ibidem, p. 433. 
133 Ibidem, p. 434. 
	   51 
between the image and its meaning.134 In that sense they are a perfect example of the free 
and enlightened symbolic act. The allegorical figure of Justice, with her blindfold, her sword 
and scales, will not easily be confused with a living being. Zeus, on the other hand, is less of 
an abstract figure most of the time and much closer to a real being. 
 As we have seen, underlying Vischer’s system is a triadic structure.135 Within this 
system the different categories of the symbol can be positioned on a scale of polar 
opposites, where a third category of the symbol proper, which is the realm of aesthetics, 
mediates the two extremes of the religious and the rational symbol. This means that they 
can be sharply distinguished from this middle category. At the same time they constitute this 
mediating category by virtue of making up its different moments: aspects of both the 
religious and rational symbol are present here. However, this system of polarities is only 
implicitly present in Vischer’s writings on the symbol. It was Warburg who would fully 
develop this aspect (and others) of Vischer’s theory.136 
 
2.5. The Polarity of the Symbol 
 
Warburg appropriated Vischer system for the largest part. But where Vischer used his 
system as a foundation for his work on aesthetics, Warburg adapted it to serve as a basis for 
his method of Kulturwissenschaft. Here the concept of the symbol was used to describe the 
basic object of inquiry. We can see this, for example, in the introduction to the Warburg 
library’s Bibliographie, where Wind defines the role of the symbol as “Gegenstand 
kulturwissenschaftlicher Forschung”.137 Vischer’s analysis of the different categories of the 
symbol was used by Warburg to develop a scholarly research programme into the revival of 
the classics and, more broadly, to define the historical developments of the symbolic from 
the pre-modern era into modernity. As a result of these different interests Warburg had to 
adapt Vischer’s theory in several ways. Warburg radicalised Vischer’s conception of the two 
extreme categories of the symbol; the religious category was widened to encompass all 
instances of what he called magically entangled symbols (where meaning and image are 
interchanged) and the rational category also came to include all logically separated symbols 
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(where meaning and image are seen as detached). In this way culture came to designate 
everything from fetishes to the most abstract science and scholarship. Consequentially 
Warburg was able to use his system to theoretically talk about a very broad range of topics. 
 In another point of deviation from Vischer, Warburg widened the applicability of 
Einfühlung by seeing it as a hermeneutic strategy. While for Vischer Einfühlung was reserved 
to the realm of aesthetic experiences, for Warburg it was a mode of access to symbolically 
entangled forms.138 Movement was the aspect of Einfühlung that was among Warburg’s 
biggest interests. This interest is a good indication of the physiological approach that 
Warburg took from the Vischers, especially Robert. The experience of correspondence 
between the depicted movement and the body of the spectator was able to move the 
spectator emotionally.139 
Warburg made the polar nature of Vischer’s system explicit. He made the middle 
category a place of tension between two contrary forces, something that was not so much in 
the foreground for Vischer. In doing so, Warburg would conceptualise culture as a field 
spanning two extremes, from the magical realm of symbolic entanglement on the one end to 
the rational realm of symbolic detachment on the other. Still, the fact that the two poles of 
this field are opposite extremes does not mean that they exclude each other. In that sense 
‘polar’ does not mean ‘binary’. Even the realms of magic and logic at times include elements 
from their opposite pole. In every magically entangled symbol we still experience traces of 
the image as form and in every logically detached symbol we can still find traces of an 
emotional reference, stemming from the understanding of its meaning.140 Wind summarises 
this clearly for us: 
 
”Denn selbst das abstrakt gewordene Zeichen, das den höchsten Grad der 
Entäußerung darstellt, behält, sofern es überhaupt eine seelische Bedeutung hat und 
‘verstanden’ werden kann, eine wenn auch noch so gelockerte Beziehung zur 
Ausdrucksgestaltung bei. Und ebenso enthält auch der intensivste und daher am 
stärksten verinnerlichte Ausdruck, sofern er eben Ausdruck ist und ‘verstanden’ 
werden soll, ein Minimum der Bezeichnung und damit der Entäußerung.”141 [Wind’s 
emphasis] 
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Because of the essential structure of what a symbol is it will always contain these two 
divergent characteristics. Even when it has become a pure sign (Zeichen) there is still a trace 
of affective expression; even when it has become pure expression (Ausdruck) there is still 
something there to be understood cognitively. 
Both the will towards total engagement and autonomous detachment are 
fundamental human urges in Warburg’s system.142 Because Warburg’s approach toward 
culture was a fundamentally psychological one the characteristics he uses to describe culture 
are at their root universal aspects of human psychology. 
Wind quotes Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) at length to explain the 
psychological effects of the polarity of the symbol. It is about the difference between being 
so directly affected by an object that the distinction between the self and that object cannot 
be made and being able to distinguish between the two. Schleiermacher points towards the 
process by which some objects immediately affect the viewer, but he also describes the act 
of reflection that is the essence of the artistic object, which, in this case, exemplifies a 
modern understanding of the image: 
 
“Es ist das Wesen jenes kunstlosen Zustandes, daß Erregung und Äußerung identisch 
sind und völlig gleichzeitig durch ein bewußtloses Band vereinigt miteinander 
beginnen und miteinander verlöschen, oder, noch genauer zu reden, sind beide 
wahrhaft eins und nur von dem draußenstehenden Beschauer willkürlich getrennt; 
wogegen in jeder Kunstleistung diese Identität wesentlich aufgehoben ist: … Eine 
andere höhere Gewalt ist zwischen eingetreten und hat das sonst unmittelbar 
Verbundene geschieden; ein Moment der Besinnung schlagt gleichsam trennend ein, 
bricht auf der einen Seite schon durch das Anhalten, durch die Weile jene rohe 
Gewalt der Erregung und bemächtigt sich zugleich während dieses Anhaltens der 
schon eingeleiteten Bewegung als ordnendes Prinzip.”143 
 
For Wind an important insight from Schleiermacher that allows him to make an argument in 
favour of Warburg’s symbolic theory is the link he creates between the external stimulus of 
the object and its expression in the viewer; affect is taken as an immediate change in the 
bodily state of the viewer, excitation instantaneously leads to action. This is a state of 
complete material determination, in which, as Wind puts it, “jene durch einen äußeren Reiz 
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verursachte Erregung sich unmittelbar in organische Bewegung umsetzt.”144 This is a world of 
simple cause and effect. But, in contrast with Schleiermacher, Warburg and Wind saw no 
break between this state of direct arousal and a more reflective mode; they were certainly 
polar opposites, but there was also continuity between the two. 
Wind explains that by studying the different stages along this continuing scale we can 
come to understand images and their relation to bodily expression. Basic organisms are 
always in a state in which stimulation finds direct expression in the entire body. When, in 
higher life forms, the movement resulting from stimulation no longer affects the body as a 
whole but only certain parts, this represents the first step of reflection. This differentiation 
between different parts means that memory begins to form as a bodily function: “Die 
Ereignisse hinterlassen ihre Spuren.”145 
This association between more primitive states of experience and the magically 
entangled category of the symbol can also be found in Warburg. In fact, this association 
between the primitive, the unconscious, and the magically entangled symbol plays an 
important role in the development of his historical understanding of images. This perceived 
relationship between the primitive and the unconscious easily queues in the association of 
the expressive value of symbols with memory.146 It is the unconscious memory that allows us 
to slip back into a more primitive mode of perceiving images and out of our modern, 
reflexive Denkraum. 
The understanding of memory as a bodily function goes back to the influence of the 
work of Richard Semon (1859-1918) on Warburg. Semon explained the formation of 
memory with the concept of mneme, which he saw as the physical traces that events could 
leave in all organic matter. With reference to Ewald Hering (1834-1918) Winds highlights 
that memory is ‘a general function of organised matter’.147 The transformation of movement 
into memory then also means that with it a minimum amount of reflection creeps in – 
Schleiermacher already referred to it as an organising principle. All expressive movement is 
thus always already at least partly reflexive, because in this memory-like trace the direct 
relation between stimulus and expression is disrupted. The result of the differentiation of 
the affect of stimuli is also that different stimuli come to mean movements and actions of 
differing types. These types, the basic expressive gestures and movements of the body are 
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images “in statu nascendi”.148 
Because these movements create memories – and the more they are repeated the 
stronger these become – the muscles of the human body also serve the purpose of mimetic 
expression. Wind uses the example of the faces we make in disgust to illustrate this point. In 
this case the same expressive movement we make as the result of a certain physical stimulus 
(sickness, pain) can be used to express an apparently comparable feeling of revulsion in 
other situations. This mimetic expression is the basis of all symbolic expression: 
 
“Hier finden wir im Gebrauch des eigenen Körpers das Phänomen der Metapher 
wieder. Aller Ausdruck durch Muskelbewegung ist metaphorisch und unterliegt der Polarität 
des Symbols: Je starker, je konzentrierter die seelische Erregung ist, die sich im 
Ausdruck entlädt, desto näher kommt die symbolische Bewegung des physischen. (Im 
Zustand höchsten seelischen Ekels wird uns ja auch physisch übel.) Je schwächer, je 
milder die Erregung ist, desto mehr wird die mimische Bewegung retardiert, und der 
Grenzfall ist erreicht, wenn der momentane mimische Ausdruck sich in dem 
bleibenden physiognomischen Gesichtzug verflüchtigt.”149 [Wind’s emphasis] 
 
The use of the word metaphor is of interest here, because it indicates a mode of 
comparison. Every form of bodily expression can be related back to the comparison of a 
pose or move with that same pose or move as enacted in response to physical input, like 
recoiling in fear from a dangerous animal or leaning toward something we are deeply 
concentrated on. This way the gestures of moving toward and away ascertain their basic 
positive and negative meaning. Through the associated memory a certain movement comes 
to stand for a certain thought, just as in Friedrich Theodor Vischer’s philosophy the symbol 
is an image that is connected to a thought through a point of comparison. Wind’s argument 
on the formation of expressive forms touches on the link Robert Vischer draws between 
expression and the physical state of the viewer’s body. Beyond that it analyses in a much 
more detailed way how this aspect of Einfühlung as familiarity (Ähnlichkeit) between the body 
and expressive form could work and, as a result, what the basis of mimesis is. 
 Besides the bodily aspect of the nature of the symbol, Wind also draws attention to 
Warburg’s interest in man as ‘a tool using animal’, a description taken from Thomas Carlyle’s 
Sartor Resartus (1836) indicating that we also use technology to enhance the functions of our 
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bodies. Tools, like gestures, are able to express meaning beyond their direct use, but they 
always do this in a social context. This however does not mean that their meanings are 
strictly and uniformly codified, because they also move along the scale of polarities. The 
triumphal act of riding high in the saddle can become both an act of persecution or of 
generous pardon, depending on the way it is executed, as Wind explains. In addition to 
functional and expressive use, people also create objects external to themselves to 
encounter from a distance and contemplate. This is the beginning of Schleiermacher’s 
domain of art. 
As Wind explains – and this seems to be something he stresses again and again – at 
the core of Warburg’s system was the belief that there was a whole world in between that 
realm of detachment and of immediate connection between stimulus and movement. This 
world consists of two parts: the first one springs from the mimetic expressive capacities of 
the body, from  “ausdrucksgesättigten Muskelbewegung, deren beide Pole die mimische 
Anspannung und die physiognomische Ruhelage sind,” and the second one is the social realm 
of tools, of ”ausdrucksgesättigten Hantierung, die zwischen den Polen des sozialen 
Aneignungstriebes und des sozialen Entfernungswillens schwingt.”150 This is the essence of 
the polarity of the symbol in twofold: it can either immediately grab us in lively fashion or it 
can stay there and transmit meaning. There is an uncountable number of possibilities in 
between these two options. 
 
2.6. Einfühlung, Causality and Freedom 
 
The polarity of the symbol is predicated on the development from the magically entangled 
to the logically separated. Robert Vischer’s understanding of Einfühlung is one way into the 
functioning of this magically entangled origin story of the symbol. Another way in is offered 
by the theories of Tito Vignoli, who argued that the act of cause projection 
(Ursachensetzung) was the basic psychological act underlying all human activity.151 We could 
see this as a special category of Einfühlung, because it also involves the lending of life. 
Warburg coupled Vignoli’s ideas to the work on Einfühlung by both Vischers.152 In this way 
Vignoli’s theory offered an evolutionary explanation of biological necessity for this lending of 
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life. This aspect of Warburg’s thought was something Wind seemed to be less interested in. 
It is at least something he did not explicitly mention in either the conference paper on 
Warburg concept of Kulturwissenschaft or the introduction to the Bibliograhpie. However it is 
interesting to see that Wind criticised Gombrich for not paying enough attention to the 
importance of Robert Vischer to Warburg’s thought.153 This means he must have felt it was 
of considerable importance to understanding Warburgian methodology. Intellectual historian 
Bernhard Buschendorf explains this with the fact that Robert Vischer’s theory of empathy, 
and indeed Vignoli’s work on myth too, was of secondary importance – in the sense that 
they only offer supporting arguments to the main thesis – to Friedrich Theodor’s and 
Warburg’s symbolic theories.154 Indeed in his explanation of the polarity of the symbol Wind 
has little use for both Einfühlung and Ursachensetzung. His starting point in the paper on 
Warburg method was not the fact of a subject separate from the object it confronts, but 
one of close entanglement. Following Schleiermacher, he starts out with a state in which any 
‘external’ stimulus results in instantaneous expression in the subject’s body. The basic state 
of the subject is not one of freedom and reflexive rationality, but rather one of a magically-
entangled attitude. So while it seems that Wind did not completely buy the entirety of both 
Vischer’s and Vignoli’s theory, it is still relevant for us to look at the underlying conceptions 
of causality that resulted from these theories. The problem of Ursachensetzung in relation to 
Einfühlung is another way of dealing with an aspect of Warburgian symbolic theory that 
interested both Wind and us: the entanglement or detachment of humans and the material 
world around them. More importantly, this final part of the chapter allows us to investigate 
important aspects to the emergence of Denkraum. 
The link between Robert Vischer and Vignoli is as follows: the act of bestowing life 
on the external object that is part of the process of Einfühlung is also an act of designating 
something as cause. We can already clearly see this in one of Warburg’s Bruchstücke: 
 
“Das Thier sieht die ganze Natur als ‘beseelt’ an, das heißt, als ob jedes Ding im 
Stande wäre, zielbewusst – nicht auf dem kürzesten Wege zur Erde zu kommen – ein 
anderes zu verfolgen. (d. Stein der vom Berge herabspringt, hat dennoch die Tendenz 
auf d. kürzesten Wege zur Erde zu kommen.)”155 
 
                                                
153 [Wind] 1971, pp. 735-6; Gombrich does pay attention to Vignoli in the book. 
154 Buschendorf 1984. 
155 Warburg 2015, p. 36, p. 36n75. 
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What we do when we empathically designate something as cause is confer upon it the ability 
to break free from a chain of events, i.e. the ability to change the outcome of a situation that 
differs from the simple mechanistic effect of an impulse. A rock falling down a mountain 
would normally take the shortest way down according to the laws of gravity etc., says 
Warburg, but an animated rock would be able to purposefully take a different path. In short, 
animation is the capacity to intervene in the causal realm 
According to Vignoli, we perceive life where it might not be as a safety mechanism: 
everything that moves is a possible threat that can harm us. When related to Einfühlung, this 
idea becomes a way of understanding the world. When we project our life onto an external 
form this is also a way of establishing an emotional connection, which is something that we 
can work with and makes this potential threat manageable. We bring an external material 
object into the sphere of the subject and, in a way, make it part of the self. Warburg 
characterised this as follows in the notes for his Kreuzlingen lecture: 
 
“Der Wille im Geschehen muss für den mythisch Denkenden aus biomorph, das 
heisst, organisch umschriebener Umfangsbestimmung dadurch erklärt werden, dass 
sich diese für den naturwissenschaftlich ‘feststellbaren’ Erreger einsetzt, als 
Substitution des unorganisch zerfliessenden durch biomorph animistische bekannte 
und übersehbare Wesen.”156 
 
Any form of agency outside the self is thus explained via a biomorphic principle, allowing for 
a mechanism to understand events in our environment. As Warburg (in edited form) 
summarises it in the version of the lecture published in the Journal of the Warburg Institute: 
“Instinctively, for the unexplained effect, he [primitive man] substitutes the cause in its most 
real and most tangible shape. The masked dance is the danced law of causality.”157 Maybe the 
laws of physics would posit the cause in a completely different place, but when we hear a 
door creak a reflex puts into our mind the growl of a beast and not the draught in our 
house. In this explanation Warburg distinguishes between the causes of events as they are 
via the laws of physics and the human explanation for them. While the last may change at 
different moments, the first one will presumably always stay the same. However, we must 
                                                
156 Gombrich 1970, p. 219; Gombrich notes that these ideas on Ursachensetzung were not made explicit in the 
final (published) text of the lecture, Gombrich 1970 p. 224; for ease of accessibility I have made use of 
quotations provided by Gombrich in this section, even though this is not the most ideal source for Warburg’s 
original writings. 
157 Warburg 1939, p. 291. 
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pay attention to the quotation marks around ‘feststellbaren’. They indicate that it may not 
always be as easy as it appears to find the proper cause of events. 
In his lecture notes Warburg also comments on what he thinks is the most 
fundamental example of this type of thinking: “Die Urkategorie kausaler Denkform ist 
Kindschaft. Diese Kindschaft zeigt das Rätsel des materiell feststellbaren Zusammenhangs 
verbunden mit der unbegreiflichen Katastrophe der Loslosung des einen Geschöpfes vom 
anderen.”158 Warburg argues that the relationship between parent and child is the ultimate 
causal relation. What he also argues is that causal thinking is not only a way of forging a 
cognitive connection between subject and object, but also always a disconnection of some 
sort. We could say that this example has some characteristics of the indexical in the Peircian 
sense. Causality is here defined by the ‘puzzle’ of the physical trace. It takes the shape of the 
determinable material connection, while at the same time it can only be differentiated (i.e. 
cause and effect are no longer the same thing) when this connection has become detached. 
At this point the effect has become the material trace of the cause. In other words – and 
this may seems trivial – as long as cause and effect are identical, they do not exist as such. 
However, a child is obviously not identical to its parents but their index. In this way 
subjective differentiation (i.e. the ability to make the distinction between the self and the 
outside world) becomes possible trough causal thinking. A subject differentiates itself from 
the world by recognizing that there are causes outside of itself. The act of Ursachensetzung 
thus becomes the first step in the creation of Denkraum, the distancing of the self from the 
world. 
As a result of the link between Einfühlung and the understanding of causality, the 
historic development from magical entanglement to logic detachment in the symbolic was at 
the same time a change in the way people understood the world.  In Warburg’s view this 
ranged from the biopomorphic forces of primitive man’s vitalist pantheism to the calculated 
laws of the modern mechanist universe.159 This change in consciousness runs parallel to the 
historical development from the primitive to the modern way of experiencing the world that 
we have also seen in our exploration of the changes in the symbolic form from the magically 
entangled to the rationally detached. Warburg takes this historical development even further 
at the end of his Kreuzlingen lecture, where he goes into modern ideas on the causes of 
natural forces: 
 
                                                
158 Gombrich 1970, p. 220 [my emphasis]. 
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“Was setzt sie [the contemporary American] an dessen Stelle? Die Naturgewalten 
nicht mehr im anthropomorphen oder biomorphen Umfang gesehen, sondern als 
unendliche Wellen, die unter dem Handdruck dem Menschen gehorchen. Durch sie 
zerstört die Kultur des Maschinenzeitalters das, was sich die aus dem Mythos 
erwachsene Naturwissenschaft mühsam errang, den Andachtsraum, der sich in den 
Denkraum verwandelte.”160 
 
Here Warburg paints the changing picture of causality in the modern age and beyond. 
Where primitive man had a biomorphic idea of causality, a hermeneutic strategy that kept 
the external world and the subject close together, and later developments changed this 
understanding in such a way as to create more distance by creating more rationally detached 
symbols to explain and understand the world, this development is reversed in the industrial 
era. The anthropocentric worldview of post-industrial humanity once again draws nature 
closer by treating it as a controllable extension of the self. 
By establishing a relationship between Einfühlung and Ursachensetzung Warburg 
astutely saw the problematic relationship between the image, or any external object, coming 
to life and our general modern understanding of causality. In general we understand that 
only living things are capable of acting. When this is not the case – when things that do not 
have a consciousness are nonetheless alive – we speak of material agency, because the 
characteristic ‘life’ also designates the capacity to interfere causally, i.e. to act. However, like 
Warburg remarked in the Brüchstücke and considering how we normally see causality, we 
are only able to speak of agency when the actions of a phenomenon transcend simple cause-
effect relationships and become interventions in the causal milieu. This causal milieu is the 
material world governed by the laws of physics. If a chain of events (or perhaps rather a 
network) is the effect of the material properties of the universe and the physical laws that 
govern them, then we would not be able to speak of an act per se. Only if we intervene and 
change this network of events does an event become an act. Adhering to this understanding 
of causality means that one would not usually be able to speak of the life and acts of an 
image or any other object (and perhaps not even of conscious beings), which only follows 
the course that is dictated for it by the laws of nature. Warburg’s account here shows the 
main difficulty of material agency in the modern consciousness. 
 Tied into this problem is that of free will, which, as we have seen in the previous 
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chapter is also of great concern to Wind (§1.5). Because of the physiological aspects of our 
reception of symbols, the very direct affect felt in the reception of symbols of the magically 
entangled category often results in very direct physical expression in the viewer. In this type 
of interaction the subject is only ever so slightly differentiated from the object-world; there 
is more continuity than separation between the two. In a way, this makes the viewer directly 
subjected to external material forces: the viewer is not an autonomous subject because 
there is no will at play. Similarly, philosophers have for a long time considered the problem 
of a universe that only follows the causality of the laws of nature and makes even the actions 
of sentient beings into the effects of chains of events outside of their control or influence.161 
As pointed out above this was one of the questions that Ernst Cassirer and Martin 
Heidegger debated in Davos and one of the main problems that Wind highlighted in his 
introduction to Das Experiment und die Metaphysik (§1.5). How is freedom possible? The 
rejection of the idea of pure autonomy was perhaps the most important point of Wind’s 
interpretation of the Warburgian method. Warburg’s engagement with the concept of 
Ursachensetzung shows that it is also a major link between Wind’s concerns with the 
question of freedom in his habilitation. It shows that we should understand the development 
of Denkraum in the symbolic theories of Warburg and Wind in relation to the problem of 
material determinism versus free will. 
 
2.7. Epilogue: Denkraum and Continuity 
 
For Warburg freedom of thought is to be found in the detachment of representation and the 
thing represented, or image and meaning (Bild and Bedeutung) in Vischer’s terms. This also 
means a detachment of the self from this image, because the act of Einfühlung is suspended. 
That same detachment is also the starting point for the differentiation between subject and 
object to the extent that is allows external excitation to pass through the body without 
immediate effect. Because it played such an important role in the formation of modernity, a 
concept in Vischer’s philosophy that became perhaps even more important to Warburg than 
Einfühlung would be the act of separation from the symbol by the spectator, the creation of 
Denkraum. In the opening line of the introduction to the Mnemosyne Atlas, which was written 
                                                
161 Kant considers this problem in the third antinomy (§3.3.3). This question of free will vs. determinism is 
certainly a classic in philosophical inquiry, but it is also very current in light of recent scientific developments. 
Dutch neuroscientist Dick Swaab for example wrote a best-selling book that argued our choices are 
determined by neurological (i.e. physical) processes: Swaab 2010; this has been translated as Swaab 2014. For an 
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many years after the Bruchstücke, this is expressed very clearly: “Bewußtes Distanzschaffen 
zwischen sich und der Außenwelt darf man wohl als Grundakt menschlicher Zivilisation 
bezeichnen”.162 The awareness of this distance was most prominent in modern science and 
logic, which was why astrology was so interesting to Warburg; in it the problems of 
symbolic entanglement and logic separation came together. The more distance we take, the 
more disenchanted our experience of the world becomes. This is caused by the fact that we 
begin to see the symbolic as a construct.163 
We are able to do this, to redirect our own active interpretation of symbols, 
because Warburg’s adaptation of the Vischerian concept of Einfühlung was also ambivalent 
about the status of the object. As a result Warburg was confronted with a significant 
problem of interpretation: on the one hand he wanted to argue for the universality of the 
classical forms of expression, the pathos formulas, but on the other hand his research into 
the survival of these formulas showed an ever changing historically situated reception of 
those forms.164 
There is a tension in the relationship between Einfühlung and Ursachensetzung that is 
perhaps inherent to Robert Vischer’s philosophy and it is the same as this tension in 
Warburg’s interpretation of pathos formulas. The projection of life is at the same time an 
entanglement and a detachment. With Einfühlung we make something take part in our own 
psychological life, but with Ursachensetzung we externalise the agency that is part of it. A 
similar problem is to be found in our use of tools. When we use tools we extend our body 
into external objects; they become part of us, or as Wind puts it: with tools we extend and 
complete our bodily functions.165 At the same, we are able to differentiate between these 
objects we create and ourselves. This brings us back around to the polarity of the symbol: 
always partly close and partly at a distance, partly active and partly passive space for 
projection, partly autonomous and partly the heteronomous entity that is inseparable from 
us and from the world. It is these aspects in general, more than any specific understanding of 
the work of the Vischers or Vignoli, that is the main point of Wind’s symbolic theory. It 
presents us with a system of inherent continuity between two extremes, not distinct 
categories. In a world where only differences in degree exist, there is nothing that is truly 
external to something else. As a result Denkraum emerges from within the material realm of 
the symbolic and is not something that precedes it or is exposed externally.  It is this line of 
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thinking that also plays a large role in Wind’s engagement with the scientific experiment. 
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§3. An Investigation From Within. Wind’s theory of the experiment 
 
3.1. Introduction: Towards a Resolution of the Cosmological Antinomies 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter that one of the most important concerns of Wind’s 
methodological writings was the fight against autonomy. The tension inherent in the symbol 
as the object of cultural enquiry meant that strict separation between for example religion 
and economy was nothing but a misleading construct. However, Wind’s ideas not only had 
implications for the historical study of the interrelations between different fields of culture, 
but also for the present day relation between the methodology of the cultural and the 
natural sciences. Furthermore, as we have seen in our discussion of the idea of Denkraum, 
these ideas in the end also have consequences for our ideas about human subjectivity. 
Autonomy, after all, also denotes the ability to lay down the laws for the self. 
The consequences of Wind’s heteronomous philosophy for the shared methodology 
of the cultural and natural sciences are presented most explicitly in a text he wrote for a 
Festschrift for Cassirer a few years after his flight to England, ‘Some Points of Contact 
between History and natural Science’.166 As such, even though it is not the most detailed 
account of his theory of the experiment, a discussion of this text will form a useful bridge 
into the heart of the present chapter, where we will discuss Wind’s habilitation Das 
Experiment und die Metaphysik.167 The article sketches the points of contact of his 
experimental philosophy with history – or perhaps we should say Kulturwissenschaft – and so 
it allows us to immediately draw parallels with what we have seen in the previous chapter 
(§2) about Wind’s ideas on that topic. Wind’s circumstances had of course already changed 
considerably compared to the time he wrote and published Das Experiment, which was 
certainly his most expansive work on the natural sciences. The framework of open 
disciplinary boundaries and dialogue between art history and philosophy that he had worked 
within in Germany had narrowed.168 In addition, the debate between neo-Kantians and 
phenomenologist that formed the background to his habilitation (see §1) was centred on the 
German-speaking world and so it could not be used as a frame of reference in this new 
                                                
166 Wind 1963 (1936), pp. 255-264. 
167 Wind 2001 (1934) (from here on also referred to as Das Experiment). 
168 For example, in his essay on Warburg’s theory of art Matthew Rampley remarks that already in the 1930s 
the Warburgian method came to stand for the ‘empirical gathering of data’ about specific symbols, see: 
Rampley 1997, p. 55. 
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context.169 Still, the important themes can be discerned here and so it is a good point of 
entry into his experimental philosophy. 
In ‘Some Points of Contact’ Wind foreground’s several aspects of his philosophy. 
Firstly, under the header ‘Document and Instrument’, he reflects on the nature of the object 
of research, in parallel with his writings on the symbol as ‘Gegenstand 
kulturwissenschaftlicher Forschung’ discussed in the chapter above (§2.3, §2.5). Secondly, 
Wind discusses ‘The Intrusion of the Observer’ into the act, or as he also calls it ‘event’, of 
interpretation and of measurement. He gives short examples of these acts of interpretation 
and measurement, giving us an insight into his basic view of both. What is of particular 
interest for us here are the commonalities he sees between these two acts, based on the 
circularity of the researcher’s engagement with the object of research.170 Finally, under ‘The 
Self-Transformation of Man’ Wind writes about the fact that our intrusion into the external 
world also means that we ourselves are transmuted by this contact. In other words: in the 
entanglement of the observer and observed the human subject not only actively influences 
the material world, but this human-thing entanglement is also an event that actively 
influences the subject. 
 This discussion leads us immediately to the central problem of Das Experiment. We 
have already seen in the first chapter that perhaps the most important concern for Wind 
was the question of freedom, but this concern does not show itself as much in this later 
text. We shall see however in ‘Some Points of Contact’, which was published from the 
relative safety of England, that the material engagement with the world is still very much a 
problem of politics for Wind in the way he points at the present-day consequences of 
academic research. We need to turn to Das Experiment to see the question of freedom fully 
answered, from the arguments for the instrument as embodiment in the first part of the 
book to the refutation of Immanuel Kant’s antinomies in the second part. This second part is 
further divided into four chapters: the first one primarily focuses on questions of space and 
time (and consequently of relativity) in relation to Kant, while the second one delves into 
(sub)atomic particles (and therefore quantum physics); the third discusses the nature of 
causality and the fourth the contingency of things in the world. This way the chapters follow 
                                                
169 In fact we can see in the original German typescript that the references to other authors are a little more 
extensive that in the published English version, but there are no other structural differences; the typescript is in 
the Wind archive in Oxford but has also been published, for instance in the 2001 edition of Das Experiment: 
Edgar Wind, ‘Über einige Berührungspunkte zwischen Naturwissenschaft und Geschichte, in: Wind 2001, pp. 
254-269. 
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the four antinomies of reason Kant laid out and as such is a detailed analysis of them.171 
Because of this, it might be good to briefly look at them in advance. 
 Kant describes the antinomies in the part on the transcendental dialectic of his 
Critique of Pure Reason.172 They are pairs of opposing cosmological statements (i.e. statements 
about the nature of the cosmos as a whole) that rule each other out, thus forming logical 
paradoxes. Each is shown to be both potentially true and untrue at the same time. It must 
be noted that Kant’s argument for the first two theses actually starts with disproving its 
antithesis, thus showing the opposite to be true. Both cannot be right. For the second two 
antinomies Kant shows that we cannot rule out that either the thesis or the antithesis is 
correct, even though they are mutually exclusive statements. In this way Kant is able to 
demonstrate the limits of pure reason. 
The antinomies contain statements about transcendental ideas, i.e. ideas that are 
concerned with things beyond both the phenomenal and the purely reasonable. What is 
important is that we appear to be talking about sensible objects (i.e. parts), but that in fact 
we are talking about an unspecific whole. In metaphysical philosophy this relation between 
sensible phenomena as parts and cosmological ideas as referring to a whole is not 
acknowledged, which makes it ‘pseudo-empirical’ according to Kant.173 This argumentation 
based on a distinction between parts and whole is also very important for Wind and his 
reliance on it is perhaps a sign of his indebtedness to the Kantian paradigm. 
The first antinomy is centred on the statement “Die Welt hat einen Anfang in der 
Zeit und ist der Raume nach auch in Grenzen eingeschlossen” and its opposite “Die Welt 
hat keinen Anfang und keine Grenzen im Raume, sondern ist, sowohl in Ansehung der Zeit, 
als auch des Raums, unendlich”.174 In the discussion of this thesis Kant sets out to both prove 
and disprove the infinity of the nature of time and space. The second antinomy is about 
whether substances can be broken down into simple parts: “Eine jede zusammengesetzte 
Substanz in der Welt besteht aus einfachen Theilen, und es existiert überall nichts als das 
Einfache, oder das, was aus diesem zusammengesetzt ist,” is its thesis.175 This touches on 
various atomic principles, which state that substances can ultimately be broken down in the 
most elementary particles. The third antinomy is perhaps most easily understood by its 
                                                
171 It is interesting to note that, although Wind seems to have a detailed grasp of the Kantian corpus and he is 
interested in the role of the symbolic in philosophy, he never turns to the Kritik des Urteilskraft and its 
paragraph on symbolism. 
172 I will be referring here to the Gesamtausgabe edition published by the Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften 
(Berlin 1900ff) in 23 parts, accessed through https://korpora.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/Kant/ (13 April 2016). 
173 Grier 2012. 
174 Kant 1900ff, p. 294, 295. 
175 Kant 1900ff, p. 300. 
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antithesis: “Es ist keine Freiheit, sondern alles in der Welt geschieht lediglich nach Gesetzen 
der Natur.”176 This touches most directly on Wind’s central problem, the question of 
causality and freedom. The third antinomy’s thesis states that there are two types of 
causality: causality through the laws of nature and causation through acts of the free will. It 
also makes most clear that, as discussed in the previous chapter (§2.6), the question of our 
understanding of causality is directly related to questions of freedom and autonomy. Finally, 
the fourth antinomy discusses whether everything that exists does so inevitably (i.e. it could 
not have existed any other way) or whether it is also possible that contingent things exist in 
the universe. Its thesis is “Zu der Welt gehört etwas, das entweder als ihr Theil, oder ihre 
Ursache ein schlechthin nothwendiges Wesen ist.”177 As this issue touches upon the 
question whether the present state of the world is necessarily the only possible state, it is 
also connected to the problem of the third antinomy whether there exist the possibility (via 
causality through freedom) to bring a different arrangement of things and events into being 
and thus to Wind’s political concerns about freedom (as sketched in §1). 
The antinomies as a set show the interrelation of questions of knowledge and 
question about the freedom of thought. This points to a connection between Kant’s 
epistemology and his views on subjectivity. By showing the limits of reason and experience 
Kant is able to argue for the validity of his concept of Anschauungsformen. The fact that the 
antinomies are irresolvable shows that time and space are not aspects of the world itself, but 
aspects of our intuition. This ultimately affirms the autonomy of the subject and its 
separation from the object. 
As pointed out above (§1.5), new developments in physics formed a problem for the 
entirety of this system, partly because they showed that the antinomies were in fact not 
irresolvable. This also placed new question marks in relation to the question of freedom and 
the autonomy of the subject, which Wind tried to take away in his engagement with 
Kantianism. His solution to the problem of entanglement and freedom is the central theme 
of this thesis. The final step we need to take is to follow Wind’s argument in Das Experiment, 
after first engaging with his other themes in ‘Some Points of Contact’ as a preparatory 
drawing. 
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3.2. ‘Some Points of Contact between History and Natural Science’ 
 
Wind’s paper about the relationship between history and the natural sciences was, as 
mentioned above, part of a Festschrift for Ernst Cassirer, presented to him on his 60th 
birthday in 1936 and published by the Warburg Institute. Besides contributions by the art 
historians and former Hamburg colleagues Fritz Saxl and Erwin Panofsky, the collection of 
essays also featured international heavyweights such as Johan Huizinga and José Ortega y 
Gasset (1883-1955). The cast of contributors from eight different countries shows that, even 
though certain intellectual traditions were firmly grounded in a national context – and this is 
something most reviews of the book acknowledge – there existed somewhat of a shared 
space for debate around Cassirer’s philosophy or at least the themes he was working on. It 
must be noted however, that despite this space there was scant attention given to Wind’s 
contribution to it. Reviewers ocasionally mention his contribution in a single sentence, but 
nothing more than that.178 It is ironic that precisely Martin Heidegger’s most famous pupil, 
Hannah Arendt (1906-1945), would remark in her book Between Past and Future (1961) that 
"it seems strange that so fundamental and obvious an argument should have played no role 
in the subsequent methodological and other discussions of historical science" when referring 
to the fundamental overlap between history and natural science Wind argues for.179 It seems 
to have been Wind’s fate that his philosophical oeuvre has been mostly overlooked until the 
translations and republications of the 1990s and present century in the wake of the Warburg 
revival. Fortunately we are here to set things right. 
 Wind begins his account in what he says is a rather “trivial” way: history and nature 
share points of contact because they share points in time. Because history is defined as an 
account of human achievement, it only begins at that moment in history we can first speak of 
the human. History is thus also the transition into a specific time, while at the same time it 
marks a division between the natural and the human. While even defining this relationship 
leads to a substantial set of problems of a very fundamental nature, Wind immediately tells 
us of his decision to leave this aside. Instead he confines his argument to the way the 
methods of historical and natural sciences “render each of them [history and nature] an 
object of human knowledge and experience”.180 As pointed out above this is a recurrent 
mode in Wind’s writings and his work on the symbol is also centred on its role as scientific 
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English Historical Review and Mind. 
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object of knowledge and experience. In addition to this, we also encounter our old 
adversary Dilthey, who is once again the target of criticism in a sentence that echoes the 
problem of determinacy and free will: “The very concept of nature in opposition to which 
Dilthey proclaimed his Geisteswissenschaft has long been abandoned by the scientists 
themselves, and the notion of a description of nature which indiscriminately subjects men 
and their fates like rocks and stones to its ‘unalterable laws’ survives only as a nightmare of 
certain historians.”181 The implication of this is that the notion of nature currently held by 
natural scientist does not amount to a mechanist worldview and allows at least some 
amount of freedom for its human subject. 
 
3.2.1. ‘Document and Instrument’ 
 
As a result of this interest in the methodological status of the object of research, Wind’s 
first argument consists of a short section that focuses on the parallels between the 
operations of the historical document and the scientific instrument in producing knowledge. 
The document and the instrument are the basic object of the scientific process. There seems 
to be a structural problem to both the scientist and the historian; they are involved in 
circular arguments when producing knowledge. This is reminiscent of the hermeneutic circle 
and with good reason, although there are also differences between the two methods.182 
Wind gives several examples to demonstrate the occurrence of this kind of circular 
reasoning in the study of history. 
In the study of history a certain document is used to interpret its wider context, but 
in order to interpret its meaning within that context we already need knowledge of the very 
same context we want to study. We can see this in the case of the art historian who studies 
the role of a work of art in de development of the artist who made it; they become a 
connoisseur because the question is immediately tied up with the attribution to this 
particular artist. We presume that the work was made by a certain artist in order to say 
something about how the work is part of this artist’s oeuvre, which in turn establishes more 
                                                
181 Wind 1963, p. 256; perhaps we can even discern a vague glimmer of Warburg’s inanimate stone taking the 
shortest way down a mountain (§2.6). 
182 In ‘Some Points of Contact…’ Wind refers to August Boeckh (1785-1867) and to Schleiermacher, who, as 
we have seen, is also quoted in Wind’s paper on the Warburgian method (§2.5); it seems to be the case that 
‘Some Points of Contact…’ originated in a November 1930 Hamburg lecture called ‘Die experimentelle und 
die hermeneutische Methode’, Buschendorf 2001, p. 254. 
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firmly that the work was in fact made by that very artist. Our point of departure is 
reinforced in a successful argument.183 
As Wind writes: “the information which one tries to gain with the help of the 
document ought to be presupposed for its adequate understanding”.184 This is, however, not 
a criticism of this kind of reasoning, but the acceptance of it as a matter of fact. It is 
inescapable that we participate in a structure when we try to study it. What it means to 
participate is something we will discuss in the next section. For Wind, an (historical) 
argument does not exactly end up where it started. Instead the circularity of its reasoning 
turns our “focus from object to means of inquiry”.185 Wind gives several more concrete 
examples of this. When we study the Baroque, for instance, and use Bernini’s theoretical 
ideas as our means of inquiry, our study is actually about Bernini’s theory and its relation to 
his artistic practice. What has happened here is the “inversion of object and means”: what 
started out as our means, Bernini’s theory, has turned into our object.186 Somewhat 
surprisingly perhaps – considering the things we have seen about this above – we can read in 
a footnote to this section of “Some Points of Contact” that Das Experiment is in fact devoted 
to a more detailed analysis of this insight and its wider implications.187 
This points to something of importance. What we are actually talking about when we 
talk about the circularity of scientific reasoning is the fact that our understanding of the 
object is informed by our understanding of its context and vice versa. Wind refers to this as 
the “dialectic of the historical document”.188 We can take this dialectic as a defining 
characteristic not only of the historical document, but of any object of research. This is 
something we have encountered in the previous chapter (§2.3); culture at large cannot be 
studied without paying attention to its manifestation in specific objects and specific objects 
cannot be cut loose from their wider context without killing off their ability to say anything 
meaningful. That Wind suggests that Das Experiment more closely examines his ideas about 
the circularity of scientific reasoning means that the notion of embodiment that is central to 
his argument there is a concept that precisely captures the entanglement of objects and their 
surroundings. In other words, if we take ‘embodiment’ as the central concept of Das 
                                                
183 Wind was already interested in the problem of connoisseurship in his doctoral thesis and, as Pascal Griener 
has suggested, criticism of its methods was also a motivation behind the writing of Das Experiment: Griener 
1998, pp. 77-104. 
184 Wind 1963, p. 257. 
185 Ibidem, p. 256. 
186 On the question of Bernini’s theory of art see Delbeke 2012. 
187 Wind 1963, p. 257n1; Wind also refers to one of his earlier papers: Wind 1934, which is partly a response 
to an American review of Das Experiment: Nagel 1934, pp. 164-165. 
188 Wind 1963, p. 257. 
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Experiment, Wind’s reference to the book here suggests that one of the most important 
aspects of that concept is this dialectic entanglement. The fact that scientific enquiry always 
involves circular reasoning is thus used to demonstrate that the escape into autonomy is 
never possible. Let us keep this in mind for our later discussion of embodiment. 
Let us now explore the question whether this circularity is problematic by looking at 
what it means ‘to presuppose’ and when science is considered ‘accurate’. The structure of 
presumptions takes the shape of a motion from whole to part. We use an instrument in a 
specific empirical set-up and ultimately derive from the outcome of its measurement 
knowledge about nature as a whole. Presumption is thus part of a deductive inference from 
whole to part. This distinction between whole and part is the basis for Wind’s definition of 
the empirical and the metaphysical in Das Experiment, where the former refers to the 
knowledge of the parts that are accessible to us and the latter refers to a theory of the 
unknown whole.189 To flesh this out Wind uses an example we have encountered before 
(§2.1), the yardstick:  
 
Classical mechanics employs measuring rods and clocks that are transferred from 
one place to another; the assumption being that this alteration of place leaves 
untouched their constancy as measuring instruments. This assumption, however, 
expresses a mechanical law (viz. that the results of measurement are independent of 
the state of motion) the validity of which must be tested by instruments which, in 
their turn, are reliable only if the law assumed is valid. 
The circle thus proves in science as inescapable as in history. Every instrument and 
every document participates in the structure which it is meant to reveal.190 
 
There is a paradox present in our methods of inquiry. Whenever we try to chase an answer 
we need first to arrive at a point of certainty regarding something else, but we cannot reach 
that point without an answer to the first question. We make an inference from whole to 
part just in order to be able to find an answer. This inference has the epistemological status 
of an assumption, the validity of which can be tested. To make things clear: this is not like a 
Popperian hypothesis in the sense that it is not the explicit goal of an experiment to falsify 
the presumption. We will come back to this issue of confirmation later on. ‘To presuppose’ 
means to apply assumptions about the whole to a part. 
                                                
189 Wind 2001, p. 67. 
190 Wind 1963, p. 257. 
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What do we mean when we say science is accurate? Taking the example of 
mechanical measurement, Wind defines three ‘moments’ of accuracy: The first moment that 
can be considered to be either correct or incorrect is the axiomatic system that defines the 
concepts of measurement (e.g. the system of Euclidian geometry) and that is presupposed 
for the experiment. The second moment of accuracy lies in the choice of an object that 
represents these concepts in the sensual world (‘Erfahrungswelt’). This serves as the 
measuring instrument (e.g. the choice of a rigid material for measuring straight Euclidian 
lines). The third moment for judging accuracy is in the application of the instrument to the 
object of research (e.g. putting a certain yardstick next to another body). 
 Accuracy of the third kind is a simple physical event: “Die beiden aufeinandergelegten 
Körper fallen an bestimmten vorgezeichten Punkten zusammen, oder sie fallen an diesen 
Punkten nicht zusammen. Ihre Koinzidens oder Nichtkoinzidens läßt sich – im Sinne Leibniz’ 
– als ‘vérité de fait’ bestimmen.”191 In direct contrast with these Leibnizian vérités de fait, 
Wind uses the concept of vérités de raison to express accuracies of the first kind. They are 
simply cases of logical reasoning: “Die dargestellten Lehrsätze sind logisch folgerichtig 
entwickelt, order es fehlt ihnen die logischen Folgerichtigkeit.”192  
 So far so good: we have not yet happened on the paradox of circularity. Things only 
start to become problematic once we want to connect the two accuracies in such a way that 
enables us to choose a measuring instrument, because this means we have to award 
properties of mental concepts to objects we only know empirically. We cannot justify this 
either way, as both vérités de raison and vérités de fait are not sufficient. As a result Wind 
defines the choice of instrument as an act of symbolic representation, because it is at the 
same time random and purposeful. “Sie ist willkürlich, da sie einem physischen Objekt die 
Funktion auferlegt, ein metrisches Schema darzustellen. Sie ist zweckvoll: denn durch dieses 
Verfahren werden die physischen Koinzidenzen zwischen diesem Körper und anderen 
Körpern zu Anzeichen metrischen Entsprechungen”193  
 We can clearly see a reflection of Wind’s writings on the symbol here. Axioms as 
purely theoretical (rational/mental/etc.) are contrasted with the act of measurement itself as 
purely physical (empirical) in a scheme similar to the polarity of the symbol. Where the one 
represents internality the other represents externality. Wind stresses this contrast by using 
the Leibnizian concepts of vérités de raison and vérités de fait. 
                                                
191 Wind 2001, p. 74. 
192 Ibidem, p. 74. 
193 Ibidem, p. 75. 
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3.2.2. ‘The Intrusion of the Observer’ 
 
Under the header ‘The Intrusion of the Observer’ Wind starts to go deeper into what it 
means ‘to participate’. In what is certainly a recurring theme in the texts we have discussed 
so far we start with a point of critique directed at Dilthey, who observed that participation 
was not a trait the natural and historical sciences have in common, but only characteristic of 
the latter. This distinction between approaches towards doing research stems from the fact 
that we are able to examine our participation in the social sphere more closely by virtue of 
our own ability for self-knowledge and self-reflection. We are able to know ourselves and so 
we are capable of a much more intimate form of knowledge when we deal with humanistic 
objects of research. For Wind this reveals a very simplistic view of human psychology: 
“Whatever objections may be made to the current psychology of the unconscious, it is 
undeniable that men do not know themselves by immediate intuition and that they live and 
express themselves on several levels.”194 Dilthey’s appeal to direct inner experience does 
not hold in practice; instead we must consider what Peirce wrote about the psychology of 
ideas: “it is the belief men betray, and not that which they parade, which has to be studied.”195 
The implication of this is that the experience we have of our own idiosyncratic historical 
position is not a guideline for the interpretation of history. This means that the act of 
participation in the study of history is no longer any different from the way that physicists 
and their instruments are part of the physical world they are investigating. 
 While this might destroy what Wind terms – no doubt with some irony – the 
profundity of Dilthey’s insight, it leaves us with a simple truth: because the investigator is “an 
element in the interactions” of nature and history this also means they intrude into the 
process that they are investigating.196 The necessity of this is explained as follows: 
 
“This is what the supreme rule of methodology demands. In order to study physics, 
one must be physically affected; pure mind does not study physics. A body is needed 
                                                
194 Wind 1963, p. 258; Wind also hints at the correlation between the classical “moral precept” ‘Know thyself!’ 
and the separation between mind and body, an observation worked out by Richard Shusterman as part of his 
argument for an expanded role of the body (in the humanities for instance); see Shusterman 2008; his account 
also points us towards the interest of American pragmatists (William James John Dewey) in the role of the 
body, which is of interest to us given Wind’s interest in the ideas of pragmatists like James and Charles Sanders 
Peirce. 
195 Peirce 1903, as quoted (with italics as presented here) in Wind 1963, p. 258; reprinted in Hartshorne, 
Weiss 1934, p. 297. 
196 Wind 1963, p. 258. 
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–however much the mind may 'interpret' – who transmits the signals that are to be 
interpreted. Otherwise, there would be no contact with the surrounding world that 
is to be investigated. Nor does pure mind study history. For that purpose, one must 
be historically affected; caught by the mass of past experience that intrudes into the 
present in the shape of 'tradition'; demanding, compelling, often only narrating, 
reporting, pointing to other past experience which has not as yet been unfolded."197 
  
Here Wind beautifully points us towards what we could call the performative nature of 
doing research by showing how it is the unfolding of experience in interaction.198 Our bodies 
interact with our environment and are affected by it. What is very striking is the use of ‘who’ 
to refer to the body in place of the more common ‘that’. This transforms the body from an 
impersonal object into an entity endowed with subjectivity. The investigator does not only 
have a body, they are a body. That body is part of the physical world and so it is in contact 
with it. The experience of affect is a prerequisite of research. We must be caught by our 
object of study as much as it is our goal to catch it. But Wind also points out, by referring to 
‘tradition’, the importance of memory – just think of the centrality of Μνηµοσύνη for the 
Warburgian project. This works two ways, as the experience of the past is both object and 
means of research.199 The circularity of research is not only the result of the entanglement of 
the object with its context, but also results in the entanglement of the object and its 
investigator. 
 Having a body is thus placed at the centre of Wind’s conception of doing research 
and, by extension, of being in the world. This does not mean that there is no such thing as a 
‘mind’. Rather it is the rejection of any definitive antithesis between ‘body’ and ‘soul’, a 
dismissal of the idea of pure mind. "The only antithesis that does apply is that between 'part' 
                                                
197 Ibidem, pp. 258-259. 
198 As Erika Fischer-Lichte has argued Körperlichkeit (the state of being corporeal) is a central concept of the 
performative turn; the same goes for Ereignishaftigkeit (‘eventlikeness’), an aspect that also features in Wind’s 
account of the experiment. See: Fischer-Lichte, Horn, Umathum et al. 2004, p. 11, pp. 18-21. 
199 Wind points this out in his paper on Warburg’s methodology. His remark about the double sense in which 
we should take memory’s role in historical inquiry becomes much clearer when we take his views on the 
circularity of research in mind: "Es [die Betrachtung] wird für ihn [der Forscher] zu einem begrifflich geleiteten 
Erinnerungsvorgang, durch den er eintritt in die Reihe derer, die die 'Erfahrung' der Vergangenheit lebendig 
erhalten. […] Das Wort Μνηµοσύνη, das er [Warburg] über den Eingang seines Forschungsinstituts hat setzen 
lassen, ist in diesem doppelten Sinnen zu verstehen: als Aufforderung an den Forscher, sich darauf zu besinnen, 
daß er, indem er Werke der Vergangenheit deutet, Erbgutverwalter der in ihnen niedergelegten Erfahrung ist - 
zugleich aber als Hinweis auf diese Erfahrung selbst als einen Gegenstand der Forschung, d.h. als Aufforderung, 
die Funktionsweise des sozialen Gedächtnisses an Hand des historischen Materials zu untersuchen.” See Wind 
1931, p. 169. 
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and 'whole'," Wind writes, but even this is not completely true.200 ‘Part’ and ‘whole’ do not 
form an antithesis in the traditional sense, because strictly speaking they are not opposed. 
The part of some whole does not negate the whole in the same way that an antithesis 
negates a thesis. Instead, speaking in the same analogy, the part confirms and backs up the 
whole. The part is a share of the whole and this points to the fact that, far from being its 
opposite, part and whole partake in a set of common characteristics. In this sense, the 
antithesis between ‘part’ and ‘whole’ is a tool not for point pointing out oppositions, but for 
marking an internal delineation. It allows us to make distinctions between the different 
elements in an interaction – and we must note that we are still able to spell out differences 
even though it is becoming increasingly clear that there is no place for completely separable 
entities in Wind’s philosophy. 
 Within this framework the traditional Kantian separation of subject and object does 
not hold. As Wind points out the investigator (i.e. the subject) "becomes part-object […]; 
'part-object' to be taken in a twofold sense: he is, like any other organ of investigation, but a 
part of the whole object that is being investigated. But equally it is only a part of himself that, 
thus externalized into an instrument, enters into the object-world of his studies”.201 Even as 
the separation between subject and object disappears and they are seen as entangled, this 
entanglement is also not taken as absolute. It is important to note that Wind still reserves a 
place for internality, and, even though he stresses the centrality of being a body, retains the 
distinction between mind and body as a form of the distinction between internality and 
externality, at least to a certain extent. While part of the subject is externalized and 
becomes part-object, another part remains internalized. This presents us with a close 
resemblance to Wind’s account of Warburg’s psychology, where the guiding principle of 
polarity also represents a scale between extreme externalization (e.g. those rational symbols 
used in the realm of physics) and internalization (e.g. magical symbols). And so the opposite 
of the statement “pure mind does not study physics” is also true: "If the physicist were 
nothing but a physical apparatus, there would be no physics; nor would history exist, if the 
historian were merely a historical document."202 
 Because the investigator is only part-object we cannot say that the only thing that 
happens in the process of research is that they are affected by their interaction with the 
object and its physical or historical context. Instead we must also take into consideration the 
                                                
200 Wind 1963, p. 259. 
201 Ibidem, p. 259 [Wind’s emphasis]. 
202 Ibidem, p. 259. 
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active behaviour of the investigator. The historian and the physicist do something. Measuring 
or interpreting is an act, a type of behaviour. Because it is an act taking place in time, Wind 
says we must consider it as an event: "The critical interpretation of a document by an 
historian, […], is in the first instance an event, no less than, say, the anger or joy caused by 
this document..."203 It is of interest to note here, first of all, that Wind equates 
‘interpretation’ and ‘affect’ and, second, that this points out the eventlike nature of affect. 
Both modes of engaging with the object – and this is at the same time being engaged, ‘caught 
by it’ – are happening in time. We will return to the importance of this eventlike aspect of 
the experiment and its consequences for our view of reality later on. 
 For now Wind too does not dwell too much on the implications of this. Instead he 
turns his attention to the systems on which we base our acts of measurement and 
interpretation. These axioms, as Wind calls them, perform a double role. They guide our 
initial affect into “a more thoughtful mode of behaviour” and they form the basis for the 
presuppositions we use to establish a relationship between part and whole.204 The question 
is how we can be sure that these axioms are trustworthy. According to Kant this was the 
case, because the “order of things” was fundamentally dependent on “the order of ideas, i.e. 
the forms of judgement”.205 According to Wind, the answer to this lies not only in a theory 
of truth, but also in a theory of error. How do we explain those moments when the order 
of things does not seem to conform to our ideas? Kant and other philosopher before him 
(Leibniz, Spinoza) took the ‘order of ideas’ we use to investigate the ‘order of things’ as an 
epistemological or metaphysical principle. This is a problem, because there is no universal 
validity. Axioms need not be true all of the time. Instead, following French philosopher and 
scientist Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), disproving a hypothesis is also a very useful event.206 
Explaining the failure of a hypothesis is as necessary as explaining its validity, but "error can 
only be accounted for if the methodical rules of investigation are consider as part of the 
experimental hypothesis.”207 When we perform an experiment or interpret a source we are 
not just testing a single hypothesis concerning our object of research, but an entire 
axiomatic system that guides and supports it. 
 There may even be more value to an experiment that disproves a hypothesis than to 
one that happens as expected: 
                                                
203 Ibidem, p. 260. 
204 Ibidem, p. 260. 
205 Ibidem, p. 260. 
206 Poincarré wrote: "The physicist about to abandon one of his hypotheses ought to rejoice, for he finds an 
unexpected opportunity for a discovery." Poincaré 1902, as quoted in Wind 1963, p. 261. 
207 Ibidem, pp. 260-261 [Wind’s emphasis]. 
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"An epoch-making event in a laboratory is often not so very different from an 
ordinary road accident. However, it is peculiar to the physicist that […] he does not 
shun but seeks these collisions, because by them he learns something of the structure 
of the occurrences he wants to investigate, and of the rules of the game which he 
hypothetically presupposes."208 
 
So while it may not be presented as a necessary condition of the scientific method to falsify 
hypotheses, Wind certainly sees an important role for failure. In fact, there is even a third 
option besides true or false: doubtful. It is the goal of the investigator to neither prove nor 
disprove a hypothesis, but to test its validity. It is precisely from the assumption of the 
validity of an axiomatic system as experimental hypothesis that we are able to even disprove 
it. 
This becomes even more clear when we investigate what it means to test and what 
we are testing; not vérités de raison or vérités de fait, but the physical presupposition that is 
used to demonstrate the results of measurement mathematically: “Was tatsächlich geprüft 
werden soll, ist die physikalische Voraussetzung, auf deren Grundlage das Messungsergebnis 
mathematisch demonstriert worden ist.”209 When the result of the experiment corresponds 
with the predictions, the presupposed physical law is ‘valid’ and the constructed instrument 
can be considered ‘accurate’. And so it follows that the experiment’s goal is to test its own 
presupposition. 
 Because of this the focus of research shifts from its object to its means. This is the 
same in the study of history. We know as much about the object as we know about the 
means in their fundamental subjection to the general rules of their context: 
 
“Denn genau wie das physikalische Instrument zugleich physikalisches Objekt ist, und 
daher den Gesetzen unterworfen, die es allererst erproben soll, - genau so ist das 
historische Dokument selbst Gegenstand historischer Forschung; denn es hat teil an 
dem historischen Leben, das er erschließen hilft.“210 
 
                                                
208 Ibidem, p. 261. 
209 Wind 2001, p. 83. 
210 Ibidem, p. 84. 
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This is a necessary fact: the instrument or document must be part of the world if it is able to 
tell us something about it. But this brings with it a problem of objectivity: the object is partial 
to the world. “Andererseits scheint es aber, daß gerade, indem sie einen Teil der Natur und 
einen Teil der Geschichte bilden, sie für eine objektive Darstellung beider disqualifiziert 
sind.”211 How is the object able to reveal anything more than the part that it constitutes? In 
other words: how does it relate to the whole? 
 The answer is that we construct this relation whenever we construct a measuring 
instrument or interpret a source. This means that where objective representation is 
impossible, symbolic representation successfully creates a relation between part and whole. 
This is what the embodiment is about in the scientific experiment. We must form an idea 
about the place of this object in the larger whole that it forms a part of. This is the 
background we create and against which we measure or interpret: the system of axioms and 
hypothetical presuppositions. Thus when we compare our results to this system, they will 
either confirm or reject it, i.e. they will immediately become part of the system or change it 
in such a way that they can eventually be absorbed by it.  
This creates facts that we could call contingent. At the very least they are not 
autonomous of the process of their discovery: 
 
“Im Verlauf dieses Prozesses läßt sich beobachten, daß dasjenige, was wir gewöhnlich 
‘Tatsachen’ nennen, nichts Letztes, nichts unmittelbar Gegebenes ist. […] Indem wir 
uns auf ‘Tatsachen’ berufen, berufen wir uns, ob wir es zugeben oder nicht, auf die 
Systeme, welche für ihre Formulierung verantwortlich sind.“212 
 
This system also includes all events and instances in which it was put to the test, i.e. 
empirical information. The reliance on both the system as a logical construct and a series of 
physical events means that we cannot call the knowledge that it produces either ‘empirical’ 
or ‘a priori’. The questions that we ask are also neither merely restricted to the logical nor 
to the empirical. Here Wind directly refers to the metaphysics that features in the title of his 
book for the first time: 
 
“Vorausgesetzt, daß ein Experiment mit aller emthodischen Vorsicht ausgeführt 
worden ist – und zu dieser Vorsicht gehört auch die logische Prazision der darin 
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verkörperten frage –, so kann sein Mißlingen oder Gelingen als nichts Geringeres 
betrachtet werden denn ein metaphysisches Signal.“213 
 
The relation between this metaphysical signal and the logical and empirical interplay of the 
experiment is perhaps best explained by a quote from Wind’s earlier (English-language) 
paper ‘Experiment and Metaphysics’ (1927): "The method of his [the physicist's] art consists 
in testing a purely logical and therefore, pre-physical conception by provoking an entirely 
metalogical and, therefore, also meta-physical act."214 What this means is that hypotheses 
about the nature of the universe like those presented in the antinomies have the capacity to 
become ‘real’, i.e. the answer to these questions can be decided because they present 
considerable consequences for the working of physical reality. Wind wants to argue that 
cosmological hypotheses are not inconsequential in their irresolvability (as proposed by 
Kant), but that they are part of meaningful questions. The fact that these hypotheses have 
real consequences is of great importance. The idea for this itself was inspired by Peirce’s 
paper on the clarity of ideas already referred to in the first chapter (§1.5). It is an expression 
of a wider understanding of what pragmatism means to Wind: it is not only the fact that 
idea’s value lies in their instrumentality, but the extent to which this is instrumentalisation of 
ideas is possible.215 
 In any case, in making the entire axiomatic system and the experimental hypothesis 
co-dependent we see the reflection of a characteristically Windian move. Once again 
elements are not presented as operating independently, but as inherently entangled. As a 
result it is only a short step from considering the methodical rules of investigation as part of 
the hypothesis to arguing that the presence of the investigator too is part of the 
experimental setup. This is already a result of the fact that the investigator is part of the 
reality under investigation and the prerequisite that they must make contact with their 
material in order to study it. But, as pointed out above, this contact is more than being 
affected. It is a type of active behaviour on the part of the investigator. As such it is 
ultimately also the intrusion of the observer into the reality they are investigating. 
 This intrusion is a kind of disturbance without which we cannot have access to the 
object of research. Each time we investigate an object, we disturb it: “The physicist disturbs 
the atoms whose composition he wants to study. The historian disturbs the sleep of the 
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paper. 
215 Wind 1934, p. 177f; republished in Wind 2001, pp. 232-234. 
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document that he drags forth from the dusty archive.” Even though it is easily possible to 
think of the terms Wind uses the describe the process of doing research – think of 
‘participate’, ‘intrude’ and in this case ‘disturb’ – as metaphors, he explicitly warns us not to 
do this and gives examples of how it works: 
 
“This word 'disturbance' […] is meant literally. Even the astronomical physicist acts 
disturbingly on nature […]. True, he does not disturb the star, but the nexus of 
nature in which the star is only a member. […] If we look upon [the document] as an 
historical object, and consider its present status - viz. how it has been discarded and 
forgotten - as part of the historic process itself, then this process is indeed 'disturbed' 
by him who brings the forgotten words back to memory.”216 
 
It is our intrusion into the external world in order to investigate it that disturbs it and this 
disturbance changes the quality of what we encounter. 
Disturbance is not only an unwanted side-effect of our investigation, it is even the 
investigator’s goal to create a disturbance, because this makes it possible to advance our 
knowledge of things. 
 
“If the term 'disturbance' is taken in a sufficiently wide sense, so that it embraces 
every amplification, confirmation, or intensification, that is to say, every qualitative as 
well as every factual alteration of our belief, no historical inquiry is ever undertaken 
without the intention of creating such a disturbance.”217 
 
In this sense, the ‘disturbance’ is not only the disturbance of the object as we measure it, but 
also the disturbance – and this time this is meant more metaphorically – of our perceived 
knowledge about it. 
 It seems at first that Wind is making a distinction here between our perceived 
knowledge (he speaks of “belief”) and objective reality. The disturbance only affects our 
beliefs, but cannot actually change the “objective order of historical events”. And while this 
is true, he also immediately calls this distinction into question: "Between the objective order 
of historical evens and our own belief that is directed to and determined by it, no shaper 
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boundary can be drawn."218 He explains this by showing how the Nachwirkung of a historical 
entity, which consists of real historical events, is changed by a disturbance of the commonly 
held opinion about that entity. Thus our beliefs about history also constitute a historical 
reality. The same is true for the natural sciences in the sense that every advance in physics 
brings about a change in the instruments of physics. And, as the theory of relativity shows, a 
change in instruments, a change in the means of measurement, also means a change in the 
results of those measurements.219 
  
3.2.3. ‘The Self-Transformation of Man’ 
 
It is with this section that we come to a discussion of our inability to cut a person loose 
from their material surroundings. The very first quotation by Wind we encountered (in the 
introduction to this thesis) was taken from this section. Whenever we investigate reality we 
participate in it and whenever we participate we disturb. Any advancement of our 
knowledge is a disturbance of reality and because we participate in that reality this also 
changes us: 
 
“Every change of our ideas about our ancestors entails a change of our ideas about 
ourselves and will indirectly affect our behavior. In precisely the same way, it ought 
to be recognized that those successful disturbances by which we intrude into the 
natural world which surrounds us amount in the last resort to disturbances, that is 
modifications, of our personal equipment.”220 
 
This shows that it is impossible to unambiguously separate the investigator from the reality 
that they are surrounded by. Subject and object are entangled in a way that makes it difficult 
to decide where the one starts and the other ends. In the end this leads to the principle of 
internal delimitation that plays a big role in the way Wind tries to resolve the antinomies.  
 
 
                                                
218 Ibidem, p. 262. 
219 This only becomes apparent in light of Wind’s reference to the work of Arthur Eddington, who played a 
large part in disseminating Einstein’s work in the Anglophone world. In a passage that Wind quotes Eddington 
sums up this relation between belief and objective order: "We have found a strange foot-print on the shore of 
the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last, we have 
succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the foot-print. And lo! it is our own." Eddington 1929, p. 
201, as quoted by Wind 1963, p. 263. 
220 Ibidem, p. 263. 
	   83 
3.3. The Antinomies and Understanding Nature 
 
While Wind’s development of a theory of the experiment grew from his interest in the 
methodology of both history and the natural sciences, his engagement with the experiment 
as a relevant research issue was guided first and foremost by a philosophical problem: the 
understanding of nature used by Kant and the neo-Kantians was historically situated and had 
become outdated by developments in modern physics. Especially when presenting his 
antinomies, Kant’s ideas about the possible nature of space and time, which in turn framed 
ideas about causality and chance, were confined by the Newtonian paradigm that ruled 
physics at the time. Wind was not the first who had spotted this historical aspect of Kant’s 
philosophy, but he was the first to confront the question whether the changing 
understanding of nature in physics had any significant consequences for Kant’s system as a 
whole and his treatment of the antinomies in particular.221 
 For Kant the antinomies are irresolvable because we can show, by using reason, that 
the thesis and antithesis of which they consist are both at the same time necessarily false or 
necessarily true. This leads to a paradox. It is not possible that at the same time the world is 
neither finite nor infinite (which refers to the first antinomy). It is not possible that 
everything in the world is an inevitable and essential aspect of that world and that 
contingency exists at the same time (which refers to the fourth antinomy). These questions 
are also not answerable through experience. According to Wind, this stems from the fact 
that Kant defines experience as sensory observation. This only gives us access to a part of 
reality without allowing us to establish a relation to the whole with which metaphysical 
questions are concerned in any useful way. As we have seen above, in Wind’s view the 
experimental method does allow for this to happen. In fact, an experiment is metaphysical 
act par excellence. Thus, when we take ‘experience’ not to mean ‘as expressed in sensory 
observation’ but ‘experimentally tested’, metaphysical questions can be answered through 
experience and the antinomies are resolvable, at least in theory.222 
In order to solve the antinomies in practice, however, they must also be shown to 
contain real (and not inconsequential) hypotheses. What Wind does in his discussion of the 
Kantian antinomies is show that the thesis and antithesis are based on an assumption that 
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preconditions their irresolvability. He calls this assumption the tertium. This tertium was 
taken by Kant as an unquestionable given, even though it turned out to be an element of 
classical Newtonian physics. Wind admits that when we assume there is no alternative to 
the structure of this tertium, the antinomies remain dialectic issues to which a definitive 
answer can never be given. If, however, we are able to show that there are alternatives, then 
this allows us to change the antinomies into questions that allow real hypotheses, because 
the experimental method would be able to decide whether one of these alternatives 
presents the more valid claim.223 As a result of this insight, in the second part of Das 
Experiment Wind sets out to evaluate two things for each of the antinomies: what does the 
tertium look like and can it be made the object of a real hypothesis? 
 
3.3.1. The First Antinomy: The Principle of Internal Delimitation 
 
“Die Welt hat einen Anfang in der Zeit und ist dem Raume nach auch in Grenzen 
eingeschlossen.” 
 
“Die Welt hat keinen Anfang und keine Grenzen im Raume, sondern ist sowohl in 
Ansehung der Zeit als des Raumes unendlich.”224 
 
Kant’s first antinomy is concerned with a double object; it deals with both time and space.225 
Using critiques of Kant’s concept of the infinite by Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and 
Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), Wind breaks the antinomy down into statements concerning 
time and space separately. While Russell and Wundt both argue that Kant confused the 
infinite (without limit) and the transfinite (beyond the limit), Wind contends that what is 
actually at play here is different ideas of totality. Take for instance the difference between 
‘the entire time’ and ‘the entirety of time’. While the first refers to the whole of a given 
(period of) time, the second refers to the totality of all time. Or, as Wind puts it: “Die 
Wurzel der [erste] Antinomie liegt in der Unvereinbarkeit zweier Ganzheitsbegriffe, von 
denen der eine, subjektivisch gefaßt, das Ganze der Welt bezeichnet, während der andere, 
adjektivisch gefaßt, die Ganzheit der Welt beurteilt.”226 This is the first problem with this 
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antinomy and the second step is to show how the tertium of the first antinomy connects 
these two concepts of totality. 
 The two concepts of totality lead to a paradox: the totality of space in the universe 
can only be considered finite when it has clear limits that describe it as complete, however a 
delimited universe can never be considered to cover all, precisely because of these 
limitations that circumscribe it; this also means that an infinite universe in the traditional 
sense can never be considered a totality because there is no way to describe it as complete 
without setting a boundary that would negate its infinity. This paradox is the direct result of 
Kant’s assumption of the system of Euclidian geometry, which only knows space of 0 
curvature.227 At Kant’s time there was no alternative system of geometry available and so the 
only road he could take was to show the contradictions in the universe as a delimited 
totality.  
 Euclidian geometry was also the basis for Isaac Newton’s (1642-1726) physics. 
However, the use of the Euclidian system in Newtonian physics caused some problems in 
studying and describing the distribution of matter across the universe. In a Euclidian universe 
matter would have to be spread out more or less evenly, but this assumption of Euclidian 
space implies, at least within Newtonian theory, that gravitational forces should become 
stronger in relation to spatial extent, which is contrary to empirical evidence. So the system 
of Newtonian physics uses Euclidian geometry and predictions about the distribution of 
matter that cannot be true at the same time if gravity is to work in the normal Newtonian 
sense. But the system also cannot really choose between the two, because the assumption 
that matter is distributed evenly across the universe is itself based on the assumption of 
Euclidian space. The problems of totality and of the distribution of matter that stem from 
the use of Euclidian geometry allowed Kant to argue that absolute space was a pure idea, 
because seeing space as a physical structure is shown to lead to several insurmountable 
problems. Precisely these problems fit perfectly into the Kantian system by showing the 
impossibility of solving metaphysical issues.228 
 It follows from Wind’s analysis that Kant committed himself to the Newtonian 
system because it allowed him to show his philosophy in action. It allowed him to explain 
these inherent paradoxes by presenting absolute space as a mere idea. This in turn 
strengthened the validity of his own system, because it was shown to be a very good 
explanation for the otherwise perfect functioning of classical mechanics. And so when 
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physicists started to revise their views on the relation between space and matter, this 
imperilled the Kantian system to the same extent that its earlier commitment to Newtonian 
physics had strengthened it. Wind hastens to add that this does not mean that because of 
this single revision the entire philosophy of Kant has suddenly become invalid. It is of much 
more interest to ask what effect this revision has on the Kantian system.229 
 The revision in physics was made possible by some considerable developments in 
mathematics during the nineteenth century. The subdiscipline of geometry had, up until that 
point, been ruled by the axioms set out by the Greek mathematician Euclid in ancient times. 
The development of non-Euclidian geometry immensely widened the possibilities for 
structuring geometric spaces by showing that the occurrence of parallel lines within a 
geometric system was not inevitable for a working system of geometry and that it was a 
mathematically real position to construct geometric spaces without them. Euclidian 
geometry is only able to model a curved surface (i.e. two-dimensional space) such as the 
surface of a sphere by reference to the third dimension. Two-dimensional curved surfaces in 
Euclidian geometry are simply abstractions of three-dimensional objects. The development 
of a new system of coordinates by Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777-1855) for non-Euclidian 
geometry not only allowed the two-dimensional modelling of curved surfaces, but also 
presented tools to better construct and describe three-dimensional spaces by extending the 
modelling of curved surfaces to curved spaces. This was done by Bernhard Riemann (1826-
1866) and makes it mathematically possible to create a space that is at the same time infinite 
and delimited (bounded): 
 
“Derjenige Raum nun, welcher das dreidimensionale Analogon der Kugeloberfläche 
darstellt [...], hat die Eigenschaft, zugleich endlich und unbegrenzt zu sein. Genau wie 
die Oberfläche einer Kugel einen endlichen Inhalt hat, obwohl, wenn wir uns 
vorstellen wollten, daß zweidimensionale Wesen sich in ihr bewegen, sie dort 
umherwandern könnten, ohne jemals auf eine Schranke zu stoßen, – so hat auch der 
sphärische Raum ein endliches Volumen, obwohl dreidimensionale Wesen ihn 
durchstreifen könnten, ohne jemals an ein äußeres Ende zu kommen.”230 
 
In this way the paradox of (in)finity and totality we have seen above can be overcome 
mathematically and space is shown to have its own inherent delimitation. 
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 The fact that the antinomy is resolvable with a different mathematical model, Wind 
warns us, does not mean that this new mathematical model is physically valid. It is however 
certainly the case that the first antinomy is not necessarily irresolvable. But how is it possible 
to confirm from within a certain space that it is both infinite and limited? Here Wind applies 
his theory of the experiment with reference to Einstein’s concept of practical geometry. 
Through embodiment in an experiment, what is mathematically equivalent should be able to 
predict points of physical coincidence. If for example, we want to know the average density 
of matter in the universe (and in that way conclude whether the spread of matter points 
towards a finite or an infinite universe), instead of trying to measure the totality of the mass 
of all stars and thereby running the risk of never knowing whether our set of data is 
complete, what we must do is predict what this supposed totality would mean for the parts 
and measure whether the parts conform to those ideas. In Wind’s words: 
 
“Statt zu versuchen, die Idee ‘ihrem ganzen Inhalte nach in der Erfahrung zu geben’ 
(was schlechterdings unmöglich ist), – faßt man sie als seine Hypothese über die 
Struktur des Ganzen auf und untersucht, wie sie auf das Verhalten der Teile 
zurückwirkt.”231 
 
Wind offers a concrete example of such an experiment by referencing a proposal by 
Einstein, who suggests that we measure whether the predicted velocity of stars is in line 
with a Newtonian gravitational field that has been calculated based on the assumption of a 
certain distribution of mass throughout the universe.232  
 Physics has not yet found a definitive answer to the question whether the universe is 
finite or infinite. This was the case when Wind wrote his habilitation and remains the case to 
this day. But for him, this is beside the point. Wind wanted to show that it was a question 
that fell within the realm of physical inquiry. The problem the antinomy offered can be 
thought out in a meaningful way that highlights certain aspects of the experimental method 
in physics, namely its relationship to metaphysical questions. Kant’s antinomy was based on a 
Euclidian understanding of space in which the concept of the universe as a totality is 
irreconcilable with both finitude and infinity. When we use non-Euclidian space as our 
starting point, the antinomy is no longer irresolvable. There is a choice between different 
geometric systems, a choice that is not arbitrary because every system will present us with 
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properties that matter in the world if our ideas about them are clear enough. If a system is 
thought through far enough it will result in real hypotheses. The method of embodiment 
ascribes a physical meaning to the properties of this system, which allows us to gauge 
whether these properties are empirically valid. For Wind this entire argument points to a 
central principle in his resolution of the antinomies, the principle of internal delimitation 
The principle of internal delimitation (‘Prinzip der inneren Grenzsetzung’) expresses 
that we can never gain an outside perspective. Kant’s antinomies work in disagreement with 
this principle, because they always use an external boundary (äußeren Grenzsetzung). In 
working out the antinomies Kant assumed that in order to experience the totality of the 
universe it must be presented to us as an object of sensory observation. This assumption 
implies that we are outside of it, or that we at least must be able to set its outer boundaries. 
But by setting these outer boundaries we can never be sure that we have in fact covered the 
totality of our object. We are, however, able to fathom the totality of our object when we 
make use of the principle in internal delimitation and the corresponding method of 
experimental embodiment. For Wind, this is the principle that expresses that we ourselves 
are part of the structure we investigate: 
 
“Philosophisch betrachtet, ist […] dieses Prinzip nur der formale Ausdruck der 
Grundtatsache, daß wir selbst mitsamt unseren Instrumenten der zu erkennenden 
Welt als Teile angehören und sie daher nu ‘von innen her’ erforschen können – auf 
Grund von Kriterien, die sie selbst uns liefert. Der ‘außerweltliche Standpunkt’ ist ein 
Widersinn.”233 
 
3.3.2. The Second Antinomy: Fundamental Uncertainty 
 
“Eine jede zusammengesetzte Substanz in der Welt besteht aus einfachen Teilen, und 
es existiert überall nichts als das Einfache oder das, was aus diesem zusammengesetzt 
ist.” 
 
“Kein zusammengesetztes Ding in der Welt besteht aus einfachen Teilen, und es 
existiert überall nichts Einfaches in derselben.” 
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Wind’s discussion of the second antinomy is very short, especially in comparison to the 
extensive treatment he gives the first. He is able to resolve the second antinomy in a 
relatively short amount of pages, because it is in some sense only the opposite problem of 
the first: instead of infinitely adding to space, here we confront the question whether space 
is infinitely divisible. In this way, the particle (einfache Teil in Kant’s words) as object is 
confronted with the same problem as the universe as totality. Just as the universe as totality 
is, in Kant’s words, either too big – as infinity we can never know it as totality – or not big 
enough – the finite universe can never cover everything in its delimited nature – a particle is 
always either too small or not small enough. Either we never arrive at a definitive atomic 
particle because we need to go through an infinite number of divisions to get at it or we do 
arrive at an atomic particle through a finite number of divisions, while never being sure if we 
could not have extended that number.234 
Wind sets out to shows that Kant’s understanding of what it means to divide, the 
tertium of the second antinomy, is the limiting factor. If that is the case, then the impossibility 
of arriving at a definitive atomic particle is set by a limit external to physical reality itself, 
instead of one that is inherent.235 Where Wind made extensive use of Einstein research 
when he devoted himself to cosmological questions on the largest scale, in the case of 
particles he turns to the quantum mechanical work of Max Planck (1858-1947). The word 
‘quantum’ indicates the smallest possible amount of something, the minimal quantity of which 
all other quantities must be a multiple. 
In classical mechanics a physical process is describable as a set of individually 
determinable points in space. All these points together determine what a process looks like 
in such a way that we only know what happens at each local point in reference to the points 
surrounding it. A process is seen as the series of individual points that it consists of and all 
we need to know is the local position of each point and the local forces that act on the 
positions it successively occupies in order to fully describe this process. In contrast, non-
classical mechanics (i.e. quantum mechanics) is not interested in the local relations of the 
individual points, but in the process as a holistic system. As Planck puts it: “Demgemäß 
befindet sich nach der neuen Mechanik jeder einzelne materielle Punkt des Systems zu jeder 
Zeit in gewissem Sinne an sämtlichen Stellen des ganzen System zur Verfügung stehenden 
Raumes zugleich.”236 This actually means that the whole concept of a material point as it is 
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understood in classical mechanics is more or less obsolete. Instead of taking the individual, 
localised position of a particle as its object, quantum mechanics looks at this particle as a 
system in the form of a wave function, which expresses that it is ‘spread out’ over an area. 
Wave functions can only represent localised aspects of individual points in terms of 
probability. The result of this is an inherent ambiguity of such points, because we are never 
able to pinpoint them with absolute certainty. 
As such, quantum mechanics knows a fundamental uncertainty. Wind stresses that 
this uncertainty is not caused by, for example, a current lack in refinement of measuring 
instruments or unknown variables, but that it is the outcome of experimental inquiry, a 
physical theorem derived from the quantum mechanics of waves. The uncertainty of 
measurement is not set by contingent factors, but is an essential property of the physical 
universe. The best known of these limits to certainty is the fact that position and momentum 
are mutually indeterminate; we can know either one but not both at the same time. This 
also means that uncertainty always takes place within a finite domain, that it has an inner 
limit.237 
Wind concludes: “Wird […] die Unsicherheit aus den gesetzlichen Bedingungen der 
Messung als ein zahlenmäßig bestimmbares Quantum abgeleitet, so liegt in der Behauptung 
der Endlichkeit eine wirkliche Hypothese über die Struktur der zu messenden Materien 
selbst.” If uncertainty were simply a case of not yet knowing enough, then the question 
whether we are able to divide space finitely or infinitely could never be set a limiting 
criterion and thus it could not be decided empirically. If ‘to divide’ practically means building 
instruments that allow for ever greater refinement of our ability to detect the smallest 
particle, then it is only this extraneous limit that defines in what way the most fundamental 
particles exists. This would truly be a ‘pure noumenon’ in the Kantian sense, with all the 
inherent contradictions that come with it. The antinomies are supposed to show that space, 
time, and causality are a priori, which in turn sets up the distinction between ‘Ding and sich’ 
(‘unaffected’ by a priori thought) and phenomenon. This distinction technically places the 
observer outside of the world they are observing, and makes them autonomous in it. 
Quantum mechanics shows us that there is a physical limit to the extent in which the world 
can be broken down into increasingly smaller parts, because there is an inherent uncertainty 
in the world that dictates the limit of our knowledge. This is in accordance with Wind’s 
principle of internal delimitation, – or perhaps Wind’s principle conforms to this quantum 
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mechanical theorem – because the limits of the system are properties of the system itself. It 
shows us that the antinomy is resolvable (once again at least in theory) and thus that the 
supposedly a priori Anschauungsformen do not exist independently of the physical world. In 
the end this is an argument that stresses the heteronomy of all things in the world. 
 
3.3.3. The Third Antinomy: Configurative Time and Statistical Law 
 
“Die Kausalität nach Gesetzen der Natur ist nicht die einzige, aus welcher die 
Erscheinungen der Welt insgesamt abgeleitet werden können. Es ist noch eine 
Kausalität durch Freiheit zur Erklärung derselben anzunehmen notwendig.” 
 
“Es ist keine Freiheit, sondern alles in der Welt geschieht lediglich nach Gesetzen der 
Natur.” 
 
The third antinomy, as it is concerned with the problem of freedom already highlighted in 
the preface of Das Experiment, receives far more attention than the third. Central to Wind’s 
discussion here are two issues: our understanding of the structure of physical laws and our 
understanding of time. The third antinomy differs from the first and the second in that it 
tries not to show that it is impossible that both thesis and antithesis are true, but that is 
possible that both of them are true, even while they seem to contradict and exclude each 
other. In fact, Kant argues that the antinomy presents two modes of causality that 
complement each other. Both of these modes of causality are an aspect of the phenomenal 
world. The first one is the causality of phenomena, where effect is related to a cause that 
precedes it in time. The second is causality in phenomena, where effect is assigned a cause 
that does not have such a temporal relation, i.e. the cause originates in the phenomena 
itself.238 The first type is the causality of the laws of nature, while the second it the causality 
that the autonomous subject can enact. While they complement each other, it is still 
assumed that they are each other’s opposites. 
 Again Wind tries to identify what the tertium of the third antinomy is. Kant assumes 
the way cause and effect have to be connected has a certain structure, just like, for example, 
he assumed that space was necessarily Euclidian. This structure is based on the laws of the 
subdiscipline in classical mechanics that deals with the effects of forces on the motion of 
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objects called dynamics. Physical laws as understood by classical dynamics have several 
consequences for causality as Kant saw it. Firstly they imply that cause and effect are 
heterogeneous, which means that they are not identical. Even though the effect follows the 
cause, the new situation that is the effect of a previous situation is not already present within 
that previous situation. Effect is different from the cause, as it brings about a new situation.239 
Secondly, the connection between cause and effect is inevitable or necessary. This basically 
means that a certain effect must follow from a certain cause with absolute certainty, whether 
it is an act of the free will, or an event in nature. It is this last aspect in particular that is the 
ground for the irresolvability of the third antinomy in Kant’s philosophy: “Es gibt innerhalb 
der Natur keine Stelle für Freiheit als ein erfahrbares Phänomen oder Faktum, sondern sie 
kann ihre Rechtfertigung und ihren Ort als praktische Idee nur im Übersinnlichen finden, das 
niemals zum adäquaten Gegenstand unserer Erkenntnis werden kann,” as Wind explains the 
situation.240 As a result of this, causality must be seen as an a priori intuition, in which cause 
and effect are tied together in a meaningful way. 
 Once again modern physics confronts the antinomy’s apparent irresolvability, for it 
has cast into doubt the dynamic character of the laws of nature and replaced them with 
statistical laws. These laws only express the probability that something may happen and so 
they are not bound to absolute certainty that a specific thing has to happen. “Der Begriff des 
statistischen Gesetzes stellt gerade jene Unausbleiblichkeit der Folge in Frage, die vom Begriff 
der kausalen Determination und damit vom Kantischen Begriff des Naturgeschehens 
schlechterdings unabtrennbar ist.”241 This is made perfectly clear by Werner Heisenberg 
(1901-1976), who points out that the assumption that underlies the dynamic law is that a 
given present can be determined precisely. However, the reality of this assumption is 
physically speaking impossible. Again, as with the uncertainty of wave functions, this is not a 
contingent result of our own lack of technological progress. These limits are essential 
properties that arise from within reality itself: “Der Begriff der ‘Gegenwart’ schließe seinem 
Wesen nach die eindeutige Bestimmbarkeit aus.”242 
Underlying these different views are two different ideas about the nature of time, 
especially how the ‘present’ is constructed. They result in two systems that are entirely 
different in how they conceive of the relation between past, present, and future. The first 
system can be compared to a film roll. If we pause the film the current frame is the ‘present’. 
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This frame presents a picture of all things that happen simultaneously. All the frames before 
this present frame are the ‘past’ and all frames that are still to come are the ‘future’. This 
means that each ‘present’ is a precisely determined, singular slice of time, while the past and 
the future are larger ‘surfaces’. As already pointed out above, this view of time is in conflict 
with the empirical findings of modern physics. Besides the fundamental uncertainty of the 
now, we also have to take into account the limit to the speed of light set in the theory of 
relativity.243 
Instead of seeing, past, present, and future as precise instantaneous snapshots, 
modern physics has developed a view of time where the past constitutes those parts of 
spacetime from which signals can reach a certain point (which we will designate as ‘now’) 
within a certain time set by the speed of light and the future constitutes those parts that a 
signal from that point could possible reach within those limits. Because the limit of 
interaction within spacetime is set at the speed of light, the past and the future take on the 
shape of what is called a ‘past light cone’ and a ‘future light cone’. If I want to influence 
another point in spacetime, which every event or act involves, this can happen at the speed 
of light at the most. This also means that events cannot be strictly instantaneous from any 
given point, because this suggests there is a medium that is able to traverse spacetime with 
unlimited speed. Events that happen at the same time in a different place are in either the 
past or future light cone of the point that is ‘now’ and so they cannot be instantaneous with 
each other. Time and space form a continuum. The now as both a moment and a position in 
spacetime cannot stand in any direct relation to the other position in the present in any way: 
“‘Gegenwart’ […] ist für diese betrachtungsweise das schlechterdings Unverbundene, 
Unvermittelte.”244 
There are however are a great many points in this dark and undetermined present 
the future light cone of which would potentially overlap with points in the future light cone 
of our ‘now’. This means that the future is indeterminable to the same extent as the present 
is indeterminate. In Winds words:  
 
“Die ‘Gegenwart’ ist […] niemals eindeutig bestimmbar. Und doch enthält gerade sie 
diejenigen Elemente die auf 0s ['the now’s’] Zukunft bedingend einwirken. Diese 
Zukunft wird also in dem gleichen Maße unbestimmt sein, als die Gegenwart 
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unbestimmbar ist. Das System der dynamische Verknüpfung erscheint unanwendbar, 
weil am Begriff des ‘Jetzt’ prinzipiell eine Mehrdeutigkeit haftet.”245 
 
There is a fundamental ambiguity to the present that makes the way cause and effect are 
connected as if they were subject to the laws of classical dynamics inapplicable. Given that 
the now always constitutes a particular point not only in time but also in space and given 
that all things in the universe only happen relative to that point, the present cannot be 
instantaneous in the way that Kant’s tertium assumes. In modern physics there is no 
inevitable future to any present the way it exists in classical physics, because the present 
does not exist in any definite way from a particular point. 
 The dynamic conception of the flow of time uses a ‘moment’ that only exist in ideal 
cases, where we are fully aware of all aspects of a situation and their relations. The modern 
conception – Wind calls this understanding of time configurative in contrast with the 
classical linear understanding – uses a ‘moment’ that is limited in its extent. It describes a 
concept that can be realised as physical configuration, while the dynamic snapshot should be 
considered a utopian vision that presupposes unmediated access to an instantaneous 
present.246 Again this assumption of unmediated access is indicative of the idea that the 
observer is in fact not a part of the reality they are investigating, but floating above it as 
some kind of all-observing god. Just like quantum indeterminacy is not the result of some 
failure in constructing a measuring device that is precise enough but an inherent limit to 
what can be know, the ambiguity of the present is the result of the physical limits to the 
medium by which we are able to know it.247  
The point here is not that this limit is specifically set to the speed of light. What 
Wind wants to stress is the fact that there is a fundamental constraint in the form of an 
internal delimitation set by the system itself. The observer and his instruments are bound to 
this limit because they are always already part of the system they are studying. ‘If only we 
could get an impartial, outside perspective, then we would be able to describe a system in a 
neutral and precise way!’ some people undoubtedly lament. Wind replies that this simply 
does not make sense: 
 
                                                
245 Ibidem, p. 180. 
246 The concept ‘configurative’ is one Wind borrows from Peirce, see Krois 1998, p. 93n61. 
247 Wind 2001, pp. 180-181. 
	   95 
“Wir wissen genau, daß dieses ‘Können’ ein Unsinn ist; nicht nur faktisch ein Unsinn, 
weil wir – (eine brutale Tatsache) – aus der Welt, in der wir stecken, nicht 
herauskönnen, sonder auch logisch ein Unsinn, weil der Bergriff einer Messung von 
außen her ein Widerspruch in sich selbst ist.”248 
 
We can only make sense of the world when we use the means given to us by that world and 
in that world. So even if it were possible to gain an outside perspective, this would not give 
us meaningful results. This also why in the end experiments have a metaphysical side: “Jedes 
Urteil über die Stellung der Instrumente zur Welt zugleich ein Urteil über die in der Welt 
bestehenden Maßverhältnisse.”249 As a result of this we can only conclude that, given the 
inherent limits to our instruments, unambiguous relations – just like infinite, unbounded 
space – in the world simply do not exist. There is no definitive (or infinite) world beyond. 
The question of the third antinomy has been turned into an empirical question, because it is 
related to experimental results about the determinacy of the world. 
 Of course the fact that the third antinomy is concerned with real hypotheses has 
consequences for our understanding of causality, which is what we have set out to discuss in 
this section after all. Seeing that we have to describe the laws of nature statistically and that 
any use of certainty is just the heuristic use of a prediction with a very high probability, no 
cause has to be inevitably tied to an effect. In the case of causality Wind argues that the 
principle of internal delimitation is also applicable, because there is an inherent limit to the 
extent in which the universe is determined by the laws of physics. The fact that cause and 
effect are not tied together in a necessary way means there is a certain room to play around. 
No event is predictable with absolute certainty and the outcome of every situation is 
random to a certain extent, not because we do not know enough but because we can never 
know enough. The randomness or chance of this outcome suggests that ‘causality’ might not 
even suffice to explain the relation between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. Chance only designates the 
fact that a certain arrangement deviates from the inevitable and so it can only exist within a 
world of dynamic causality.250 
 Permanence in such a world is only possible as a form of emergence. If the 
permanence of a given system is only based on a ‘random’ configuration of the parts that 
constitute it, any case where these parts remain in a constant, rigid state is itself not their 
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necessary state. The permanent qualities – or any quality for that matter – of a system thus 
cannot be simply reduced to the sum of its parts, but must be seen as emergent.251 So it is 
also true that embodiment itself can be referred to in more general terms as emergence. In 
this understanding of emergence Wind builds on Whitehead’s process philosophy.252 The 
essential emergent properties of the universe also make the ideas of an absolute beginning 
and end of time obsolete. Emergence theory does not take as its point of departure 
something constant that cannot really be ascribed a beginning and end in its permanence, but 
proposes that any state is temporary. In nature things are not simply in existence across 
time existence, but come into existence constantly.253 The point of emergence theory for 
Wind is that the flow of time is both continuous and discontinuous. Continuous in the sense 
that it cannot be broken up into atomic moments, and discontinuous in the sense that it 
does not flow linearly from past to present to future, but that there is always the possibility 
of a break.254  
 Now we finally come to the central question: is there any freedom at work within 
the framework of nature and what shape does this freedom take? Kant could only prove that 
human beings have free will by making the distinction between Ding an sich and phenomena: 
 
“Die Möglichkeit, eine Handlung aus der Autonomie des Willens entspringen zu 
lassen und sie zugleich als einen Vorgang zu verstehen, der auf einen vorgegangenen 
Vorgang unausbleiblich nach einer Regel folgt, kann nur unter der Bedingung 
gewährleistet werden, daß das sinnliche Wesen des Menschen von seinem 
intelligiblen Wesen getrennt werden kann.”255 
 
However, when we replace the understanding of the laws of nature on which this distinction 
was based, then the distinction between the cognition and sense experience itself has also 
been called into question, at least to the extent that it proposes the extrasensory nature of 
some aspects of reality. 
 Statistical laws do not exclude spontaneity, but they set a limit to it. It is precisely this 
limit that still allows for meaningful predictions about the future. The complexity of, for 
instance, events such as a solar eclipse is so significant in relation to the measure of its 
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uncertainty that we can be practically certain of their occurrence. Statistical deviations even 
themselves out by their low probability. But still the fact that we are talking about a 
probability signals that we cannot think in absolute certainties. The same is true for 
predicting human behaviour: “‚Im allgemeinen’ mögen wir mit ziemlicher Sicherheit wissen, 
wie ein Mensch, den wir sehr genau zu kennen glauben, unter bestimmten Umständen 
handeln würde. Im jedem einzelnen Fall müssen wir trotzdem die Möglichkeit, daß er anders 
handeln könnte, offenlassen.”256 We must always acknowledge the possibility of certain 
alternatives. 
 Wind then starts to argue that there are internal limits to the extent that we can 
know someone’s character in the same way that there are internal limits to our ability to 
know the world. He points out the emergent and performative nature of our ‘characters’ 
when he directly compares this to the theatre. If the characters in a play have been written 
(and thus determined) beforehand, must we not be able to precisely determine the way they 
will act? If we take theatricality as a model this is certainly not the case: 
 
“Was wir […] im voraus bestimmen können und im Interesse des dramatischen 
Effekts auch bestimmen sollen, ist der Spielraum der Möglichkeiten, – mehr nicht. 
Wären die Charaktere von vornherein festgelegt, so brauchten wir nur die 
Situationen zu kennen, und die Ausführung des Stückes wäre ein Rechenexempel. In 
Wirklichkeit aber entfalten sich die Charaktere an diesen Situationen, und wir kennen 
sie erst ‘ganz’, wenn das Stück zu Ende ist.”257 
 
This is a very interesting passage in the book, because it explicit draws a connection 
between the emergent nature of the universe and peformativity. It is yet another link in the 
chain that secures Wind’s disavowal of any truth beyond and thus confirms his ‘materialism’. 
It also makes clear his insistence on such insights as that ‘pure mind does not study physics’, 
because theatricality is conditioned by corporeality. As we have seen above, this is an 
important aspect of Wind’s theory of the experiment, but here it also comes back in the 
discussion of free will. Consequently it could be argued that performativity is a central 
aspect of Windian subjectivity in general. 
 The emergent nature of our characters shows that what in a Kantian system is seen 
as necessary effect, the proposition that someone would never have acted differently form 
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the way they actually did (making the act retroactively inevitable), is a very likely outcome at 
most if we accept the notion of configurative time established by relativity and quantum 
theory. There is not one necessary effect of a certain cause, but a limited number of 
possibilities: “Im konfigurativen Geschehen […] ist zwar der Spielraum der möglichen 
Handlungen, die auf eine gegebene Handlung folgen können, eingeschränkt. Innerhalb dieses 
Spielraums aber ist Platz für freie Entscheidungen.”258 
 With reference to George Edward Moore’s Ethics (1912) Wind argues that our 
ability to act differently always also involves our ability for a willed decision to do 
differently.259 This does not mean that the will is absolutely self-determined. There are 
certain conditions that frame our capacity for decision making: “Auch eine Ethik, die sich auf 
Entscheidungen bezieht, die sich im Rahmen des Naturgesetzes auswirken sollen, [kann] 
niemals jene Unbedingtheit in der Selbstbestimmung des Willens lehren, die das Kernstück 
der Kantischen Ethik bildet.”260 Willed decisions take place within the limits of the physical 
world. This means will is not absolute, but fully subject to its conditions. It is interesting to 
note here that Wind indicates that one of his goals is to offer the conditions of a naturalistic 
ethics, i.e. an ethics that is in some ways conditioned by the laws of nature. The central 
principle of this ethics is that we are conditionally free. 
Free will, if it is to be a concept of any significance, can only be situated within a 
world in which its decisions lead to acts, but this freedom is set an internal limit by the 
statistical laws of nature that operate in that world. “Faßt man […] die Willenseintscheidung 
als Teil der natürlichen Welt, so kann das Gesetz dieser Entscheidung niemals allein durch 
eine übersinnliche Form des Wollens bestimmt werden, sondern die Geltung der 
Entscheidung steht zugleich unter den materialen Bedingungen des Naturverlaufs, in denen 
jenes Wollen sich verwirklichen soll.”261 Not only are our options limited by their material 
entanglement, but the act of deciding itself is also conditioned by the physical world as our 
mind does not exist outside of it. The will does not unconditionally determine itself. Wind 
argues this means that Kant’s categorical imperative, which declares the absolute necessity of 
rational moral acts, is transformed into a provisional one. Because there is a limit to our 
freedom the unconditionality by which a certain act is necessitated by the categorical 
imperative is not applicable. In every case our alternatives are conditioned and so we can 
never exclude the chance that we will have to act in a certain way if it belongs to the 
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physical possibilities, given the rules of probability. Within this framework we can only 
determine the extent to which a certain action is suitable, but never its absolute moral 
contents separate of the given situation: 
 
“Entscheiden wir uns […], so erhält diese Entscheidung ihre ethische Qualifikation 
durch das Maß der Bestimmtheit, mit der wir sie fallen. Ohne eine solche Maßsetzung 
hat eine Entscheidung überhaupt keinen ethischen Sinn. […] Jede solche Maßsetzung 
aber enthält eine Hypothese […] über unsere eigene Stellung innerhalb dieses 
Geschehens, d.h. über unsere Eignung für diesen Eingriff.”262 
 
In this case, whether this hypothesis is correct or incorrect is not a matter of an empirical 
experiment in the normal sense. If our hypothesis is false, we can only speak of an ethical 
error. 
  
3.3.4. The Fourth Antinomy: The Modality of Events 
 
“Zu der Welt gehört etwas, das entweder als ihr Teil oder ihre Ursache ein 
schlechthin notwendiges Wesen ist.” 
 
“Es existiert überall kein schlechthin notwendiges Wesen, weder in der Welt noch 
außer der Welt, als ihre Ursache.” 
 
Wind’s discussion of the fourth antinomy is relatively short. It concerns itself with the place 
of ideas in the world, but also takes the shape of a conclusion concerning his overall 
discussion of the antinomies. He connects the ideas that shape our decision making (in direct 
relation to its physical conditions) to the unearthing of meaning in the world: 
 
“Jede Entscheidung ist – über die Bedingungen ihres Entstehens hinaus – von 
bestimmten Ideen geleitet […]. Und obwohl die Diskussion dieser Ideen an die 
Untersuchung der Bedingungen, unter denen die Entscheidung gefällt wird, gebunden 
ist – denn es ist für die Beurteilung des ‘Sinnes’ sehr wesentlich, unter welchen 
                                                
262 Ibidem, p. 204. 
	   100 
Bedingungen er sich verwirklicht –, so geht doch die eigentliche Analyse der Ideen, 
die Bestimmung des Sinnes, niemals restlos in solchen Untersuchungen auf.”263 
 
It is clear that we are no longer in the territory of experimental physics here. The first point 
seems to be that our decision are not only conditioned by nature, but that they are actively 
led by ideas (to which we can ascribe at least some extent of internality). The second point 
is that the meaning of a certain act, as the realisation of a decision, is determined both by the 
ideas that it embodies and the material circumstances of its coming into being. What Wind 
tries to argue here is that a cosmological analysis of freedom within the laws of nature is a 
prerequisite of any ethical theory, but that it does not give a full account. Ideas are always 
tied in with reality. This is what Wind has tried to show in the second part of Das 
Experiment. For each of the antinomies he turned what started out as a question in the ideal 
realm into a material question. This is the only way to show that ideas are meaningful; their 
meaning arises when they cross into the material realm.264 
This is, however, not as easy in the case of the fourth antinomy. How do we even 
determine if everything that exists does so because it has to? This is the question of the 
‘Modalität des Geschehens’, the modality of events. We are not looking for the structure of 
how things happen in the world, but the mode in which they do. In this question, Wind says, 
all our previous questions come together and so the solutions to the first three antinomies 
offered by Wind condition its answer. He has shown how the finitude of space is dependent 
on the empirically determinable average density of matter in the universe; how quantum 
uncertainty sets an internal limit to the infinite division of the universe into smaller parts; 
how the irreducible emergence of phenomena that follows from quantum mechanics shows 
that traditional causality is untenable; how a configurative instead of a linear understanding of 
time is conditioned by the physical properties of the universe. If all of these things were not 
true and Kant would be right after all, then the fourth antinomy would also prove to be 
irresolvable. 
But given that this probably is not the case – that Kant’s assumption about Euclidian 
space, the division of the world into particles, the nature of physical laws as dynamic and the 
linear flow of time are probably not all true – we are presented with a solution to the 
paradox of the simultaneous existence of necessity and chance in the world. Wind 
summarises this as follows: 
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“Erweist sich hingegen das kosmische Ausmaß des Raumes als endlich, die Teilbarkeit 
der Materie als eingeschränkt, das Naturgesetz als statistisch und der Zeitablauf als 
konfigural, so eröffnet sich gegenüber der schroffen Antithese zwischen dem 
Schlechthin-Notwendigen und dem Nichts-als-Zufälligen als dritte Alternative der 
Begriff einer Welt, in der der Zufall ein Maß hat.”265 
 
The continuing application of the principle of internal delimitation has shown us that 
contingency and chance too are set to a certain limit.  
 The universe only knows different shades of chance and necessity. It is a question of 
degree, of mode, and not of the essential structure that underlies everything to the same 
extent. There is no singular answer to the question of necessity and chance; even the 
question itself is always already a multiplicity of questions:  
 
“Ein einfache allgemeine Antwort, die in unterschiedsloser Strenge das Sandkorn wie 
die Sterne, den Gott wie den Wurm umfaßt, wird man nicht mehr erwarten dürfen. 
Man wird vielmehr – je nach dem zu untersuchenden Phänomen und dem Blickpunkt 
der Untersuchung – verschiedene ‘Mischungen’ des Zufälligen und Notwendigen, des 
Sinnlosen und Sinngemäßen unterscheiden müssen. Der Grenzfall des hoffnungslos 
Zufälligen, das sich keinem Blickpunkt als sinnvoll erschließt, wird ebenso selten sein 
wie der des makellos Sinnvollen, das für jeden Blickpunkt seine Notwendigkeit hat. 
Das irdische Leben bewegt sich ‘in der Mitte’.”266 
 
There are two things of note here. One is that Wind equates ‘chance’ (‘das Zufällige’) with 
‘meaninglessness’ (‘das Sinnlose’) and necessity (‘das Notwendige’) with ‘meaningful’ (das 
Sinngemäße’). The second is that the world that Wind presents here is precisely the same 
we encounter in his writings on the symbol; it stretches between absolute chance and 
meaninglessness on the one hand and absolute necessity and meaningfulness on the other, 
without ever swinging complete to one of these poles. This is the backbone of Wind’s 
philosophy: even though we are able to talk about cases of extreme internality and extreme 
externality in theory, the reality of our world only consists of things that are somewhere in 
between. Experiments only gain real meaning when they are connected to metaphysical 
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questions in an act of embodiment and, reversely, metaphysical questions only gain meaning 
when they are given material form in an experiment. 
 The relation between necessity and chance in the world allows us to ascribe meaning 
to things. 
 
3.4 Epilogue: Meaning in the World 
 
“To  man, propose this test – 
Thy body at its best, 
How far can that project thy soul on its 
lone way?”267 
 
“Wenn ein Mensch sein Leven vollendet hat, suchen wir den Sinn dieses Lebens zu 
deuten. Dabei bilden gerade diejenige Elemente, die den Menschen zu einem 
endlichen, scheinbar zufälligen Wesen machen, den eigenlichen Gegenstand der 
Deutung; die ‘Dauer’ des Lebens, das ‘Ausmaß’ der Wirksamkeit, der ‘Grad’ der 
Freiheit, der ihm Gebote stand, usf. – Man brauch nur die Dauer des Lebens als 
unbegrenzt zu setzen, ebenso das Ausmaß der Wirksamkeit als unendlich, die Freiheit 
als unbeschränkt, und jede Möglichkeit einer Sinndeutung wird verschwinden; das 
Leben wird schlechterdings sinnlos werden.”268 
 
Contingent (chance) elements are always our object of interpretation; they express the 
extent to which something has a certain quality. Absolute values lose their meaning; they are 
always the same and thus they cannot mark any difference that allows us to make an 
interpretation. Universal meaning is no meaning, but it is the extent to which something is 
contingent that carries meaning. The quotation above expresses the anthropomorphism that 
is at the centre of Wind’s understanding of the world: we always create meaning through the 
contingency of our own existence. 
 The world only starts to make sense once the questions that are asked by the 
antinomies become meaningful, i.e. when we are able to discover the measure of 
contingency in the world and the limits set to it by how we should understand the structure 
of nature. Only then are we able to situate humanity‘s place within the world. And in this 
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way science itself also becomes a humanistic disciple. Conversely, the interpretation in the 
humanities in the end also benefits from the same method as the sciences do. Where the 
principle of internal delimitation allows scientific questions to become meaningful by giving 
them real instead of inconsequential hypotheses, the fact that we are part of the world we 
study also makes humanistic questions more meaningful because it conforms the reality of 
the objects we study and the answer give look to give for them. The reality of symbols gives 
philosophy, and the humanities in general, a renewed right to hypotheses.269 
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Conclusion 
 
Let us now return to our starting point, the man and his walking stick. Where exactly do we 
draw the line between him and his environment? To what extent does the entanglement 
with things change his constitution? 
I hope it does not come as a surprise by now that for Wind the first of those 
questions is essentially unanswerable: “The dividing line between man and his surroundings 
can no more be fixed […] than the line of division between man and his antecedents.”270 
People are part of nature and history and so they are as determined by their material 
surroundings as by their past. Wind argues that, as a result, our understanding of the world 
is necessarily anthropomorphic. Our inability to attain an outside view already prefigures this 
anthropomorphism. The fact that we are always a part of the world means that we can 
never represent things from outside the human. This too is an expression of entanglement: 
the human extends into the external world, but that world also determines the constitution 
of the human. The question we have been meaning to answer, the second question above, is 
how far this determinism goes.  
 
We started out in the first chapter exploring where Wind’s interest in this question came 
from. His uniquely transdisciplinary effort was informed first and foremost by the influences 
of Warburg and Peirce, but it was a reaction to debates in contemporary German 
philosophy about humanism, the position of the sciences and the status of knowledge, and 
human freedom. Wind wanted to rescue these topics from their abandonment by the 
phenomenologist schools that were on the rise between the wars and move beyond the 
dogmas of neo-Kantianism that trapped the human subject in a sphere of its own making.  
 In order to do this Wind drew on the symbolic theories of Warburg, whose main 
inspiration in this aspect was Friedrich Theodor Vischer, but in the end he inflected these 
ideas for his own purposes. He developed these theories into a systematic whole in 
extensive conversations with Warburg (before his death) and captured them in written form 
after his death. His most important innovation in this respect was to use ideas about the 
symbolic externalisation present in Vischer and Warburg’s work to advance a concept of 
embodiment that could form the basis for a realist epistemology. In this aspect, the concept 
of the symbol is used in an argument against the existence of autonomous entities. Wind’s 
symbols are real in the sense that they constitute material entities and as such they present 
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ways the human and the world are entangled. On the other hand, it is also in the symbolic 
that we are able to develop a certain distance between the world and ourselves. 
 ‘Polarity’ is a key word in Wind’s symbolic theory and it is a concept that we can 
discern at work in his entire philosophical project. It is important to stress that this polarity 
is not dichotomous, but exactly the rejection of dichotomous thinking. Rather, a polar 
system describes a continuous field between two hypothetical poles in which only objects in 
an ‘in-between’ state can be found. For example, Wind opposes the strict opposition 
between internality of the mind and externality of the empirical world found the in 
Geisteswissenschaftliche and neo-Kantian worldviews. This puts into place a distinction 
between humanities and sciences that has no basis in the reality of doing research or being in 
the world. These two areas of the academy both involve symbolic elements, in which there 
is a constant tension or interplay between external and internal, a swinging back and forth 
that makes it impossible to truly distinguish the one from the other. There are always 
affective traces in our study of the natural world, as to study physics also means to be 
affected as a physical body. Conversely, to study art or history also naturally involves 
cognitive symbolic moments in which we encounter elements that speak to our rational 
understanding. Neither pure mind nor pure body exist as a meaningful category in the world. 
 Another major organising principle in Wind’s philosophy is the relationship between 
part and whole. This relation is always relative and never absolute, by which is meant that 
the whole is not made up of discrete and definite parts. This is also what makes it impossible 
to draw a definitive line between humans and things. The analogy between the relation of 
part and whole and the relation of the internal and the external shows us that there is also 
no discrete internality, but only layers of subjectivity.271 While these ideas about internality 
and externality are based upon the psychological principles of Wind’s symbolic theory, they 
are mirrored by his work on the Kantian antinomies. The insight that there are no discrete, 
definite parts is supported by modern physics, but the ability of modern physics to show this 
also works on the basis that ideas about the whole can be embodied in parts in a process of 
symbolic representation. Symbolic representation as the method of drawing up relations 
between part and whole is simultaneously an example of this rule and the mechanism that 
underpins it. 
If we were to set this understanding of polarity as continuity loose on the problem of 
autonomy, the different symbolic modes (i.e. magically-entangled, rationally-detached) 
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become configurations on the axis between the two poles of relative dependence and 
independence. This shows that Einfühlung is a way to characterise human-thing entanglement. 
This again finds an echo in Wind’s discussion of the third and fourth antinomy, where 
freedom is shown to be relative to the world and not autonomous of it. However, in 
Vischer’s theory, even though it involves a holistic idea of mind and body, subject and object 
are still very much thought of as a priori separate entities. Einfühlung is a way to characterise 
very specific relations between subjects and objects (namely aesthetic ones) and not a 
general mode of being. This points towards a major point of departure from Vischer that 
Wind postulates. Vischer refers to the symbol as a means of connecting something external 
(bloß äußerlich) to something internal or contained (Inhalt). In his theory the symbol is still 
very much taken as a traditional vehicle for representation: it is a means of bringing together 
realms that are normally not in connected. The mental world of content and ideas is brought 
in contact with the external world of objects by symbolically linking them together. This is 
ultimately not what the symbolic is in Wind’s theory, because of the idea of embodiment. In 
Wind’s theory there are not two separate elements that have to be brought together, but 
rather, one element is turned into another. For Wind the act of embodiment is described as 
“Eingriff in eine Welt die die Idee heteronom ist” and a “μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος”, where 
internality crosses over into externality.272 This means there is no realm ‘beyond’ that a 
symbol refers back to, as would be the case in objective representation. 
Vischer draws the connection between entanglement and the problem of freedom. 
His two extreme categories, the religious and the enlightened, are also described as 
respectively free and unfree. The middle category of the symbol proper is described as 
neither completely free nor unfree, but somewhere in between. This is the domain of 
Einfühlung and thus of the systematic entanglement of humans and images. There is a striking 
parallel between Vischer’s description of this entangled state as both free and unfree and 
Wind’s conclusions about the status of freedom in modern physics. Both describe a subject 
that is neither completely determined nor absolutely free. In both cases this is an expression 
of the tension inherent in Wind’s understanding of the symbolic as polar. After all, in 
Warburg and Wind’s adaptation of Vischer’s system the symbolic is always a place of tension 
between two extremes, be it rationality and irrationality, cognitive understanding and affect, 
freedom and determinism, externality and internality. This means that such categories as 
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Zeichen, Symbol, and Ausdruck as used by Wind are not definitive categories as Vischer 
described them; they only differ in degree and not in kind.273 
Wind uses Schleiermacher to describe a state where the human body is entangled to 
such an extent that an external stimulus immediately takes effect in the viewer’s body, and 
so completely determines them without differentiation. Given the tension in the symbolic, 
this state never ends completely, but we are also able, in a way, to stave off certain effects 
and this is the creation of free will in Denkraum. Whereas Vischer (and Kant) saw freedom 
as the complete lack of entanglement, Wind (and Warburg) looked for freedom within or 
despite entanglement. 
Wind further grounds this understanding of freedom within entanglement in the 
concept of nature as it emerges in modern physics, namely relativity and quantum mechanics. 
Wind’s resolution of Kant’s antinomies is governed by the principle of internal delimitation. 
The rejection of autonomous entities by this principle means that the humanities and the 
natural sciences cannot be seen as fundamentally distinct. They share the fact that the 
investigator is continuous with his object of study. This is even a precondition of any 
engagement with the world and thus also the starting point of investigating human-thing 
entanglement. The fact of the continuity between observer and object also means that we 
cannot take an outside perspective. Our point of view is always relative to the object. This 
means there are no absolute criteria by which to conduct our measurement or 
interpretation. As a result there is always a circularity between the object that we are 
investigating and the framework we use to do that. The two elements in this circularity are 
mirrored in the two poles of internality and externality that we have encountered in Wind’s 
symbolic theory. Axiomatic theories are contrasted with physical occurrences, where the 
middle ground between them is taken up by the embodied instrument, which deals in both 
theory and physicality. 
Wind argues that entanglement with an object results in mutual transformation. This 
happens on different levels. First, the observer ‘disturbs’ the object that is investigated 
(although there is no ‘undisturbed’ object). This points towards the contingent nature of 
facts. Second, to investigate also means ‘to be affected’, but always within a cognitive 
framework. As pointed out, this centres investigation of the world on embodied cognition, 
but it is also again an expression of polarity: we are neither completely mentally detached 
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nor physically unreflective but always somewhere in between. Third, the knowledge we have 
greatly influences our lives, both on a pragmatic level of technology as on the level of the 
changing image of the human and its place in the world. 
The aforementioned relationship between part and whole, in which they are relative 
and do not form an opposition, also represents some form of internal delineation. This is 
important for the idea of embodiment: what is embodied (or symbolically represented), the 
referent, is not something ontologically different from the representing symbol but just a 
part of the same whole. As a result of the principle of internal delimitation, there also cannot 
be an ontological difference between subject and object. Every subject is part-object. This 
means that the finite subject is only a part of the object-world and its mind cannot be 
ascribed any totalising capacities, but also that the entanglement with this object-world is 
only partly. Here again we see the rejection of absolute values in favour of in-betweennes: 
neither autonomy nor entanglement should be seen as the only explanatory principle, but 
the truth is somewhere in between. 
The world Wind sketches in the second part of Das Experiment has three main 
characteristics: fuzzy or imprecise, indeterminate and ambiguous (mehrdeutig).274 As shown 
by quantum mechanics, the world is inherently uncertain at a fundamental level. This is not a 
matter of not being able to know enough, but the expression of a physical property of the 
world, which knows an internal delimitation regarding the smallest possible extension of 
basic values. Uncertainty is thus also limited. Furthermore modern physics postulates that 
the laws of nature only present us with probabilities, not absolute certainties. This is the 
result of the inherently indeterminable nature of any present state of affairs. The present is 
never completely unambiguous. This has consequences for how we should understand the 
structure and flow of time: from a linear model with discrete moments, to a configurative 
model that considers the present as a constellation between past and present. Given the 
impossibility of instantaneous action within this model of time, the present does not exist in 
any definite way and so there is no inevitable future. 
This means that there is an inherent limit to the extent in which events are 
determined by the laws of physics. Every moment in the present necessarily has a certain 
amount of leeway, some space to play around. The emergent nature of reality is in some 
ways performative. Recall how Wind describes how the characters in a play only come into 
being at the moment they are performed in interaction with the audience. This model does 
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not only apply to situations in physical reality, but even to our subjectivity, which, as a result, 
must also inevitably be subjected to the triplet of imprecision, indeterminacy and ambiguity. 
Still this does not mean that anything imaginable can happen in such a world. Both freedom 
and determinism are delimited, which means there is only ever the possibility of the one 
within the other. All acts and all events are inevitably heteronomous. Freedom is conditioned 
by its constitution in the material world, which is the space in which we act. 
This brings us to the ethical side of things. If our actions are even partly determined 
how can we judge the value of a certain action? For Wind any ethical theory is only made 
possible by the analysis of how the meaning of a certain act is determined both by the ideas 
that it embodies and the material circumstances of its coming into being. Meaning is always a 
material practice and as such it is the precondition of all ethics. 
This also affects the problem of agency as described in the introduction. Agency is a 
capacity that as a concept is bound up with intention, because of the social need to ascribe 
ethical value to the actions of someone. Agency allows us to posit acts that are distinct from 
events, which means that we can pass moral judgements on them. But, as Hicks has argued, 
this social origin of the concept of agency makes it a bit awkward to generalise to things and 
contexts that are not purely social in nature.275 One solution to this problem would be to 
throw away all references to judgement and meaning and to end up with a world in which 
there are only things making a difference.276 It only seems that in this case we will not be able 
to theorise the difference between, for instance, accidents and hate crimes. The current 
understanding of agency presents us with an either-or question, just like our general 
understanding of acts and events makes them mutually exclusive. 
Wind’s conception of freedom as heteronomous presents a way out of this. It seeks 
the possibility of freedom within materiality, instead of seeing it as emancipation from it. As 
Wind and Warburg argue Denkraum emerges from within the materiality of symbolic 
thinking. As such the material, understood as both human and non-human things, shapes the 
possibilities for freedom, instead of making all freedom impossible. This has considerable 
consequences for how we should understand agency and the act/event distinction. It actually 
means that we should not see act and event as two distinct categories, but two poles at 
either end of a continuous field. This polarity dissolves definite distinctions, so the same is 
true of the dualism between event and act, subject and object. This is why Wind is able to 
speak of ‘part-object’. 
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This model is able to account for both events and acts and an entire range of actions 
in between. Wind describes this in his discussion of the emergence of mimetic symbols. We 
go from the extreme case where a stimulus equals immediate effect in the body (an event) 
to the other end where a stimulus’ effect is delayed to such an extent that it dissipates (a 
non-event). At first there is a stimulus that results in direct expression in the body. Opposite 
to that is a stimulus that leaves the body at rest trough the ‘intervention’ of Denkraum. In 
between we have heteronomous acts that are partly the direct result of a stimulus and 
partly the result of reflective action in relation to that stimulus. Also the other way around 
we could speak of heteronomous events, where a certain effect is largely the result of 
material stimuli, but also partly deflected by reflective action. In this framework an act is 
grounded in our theoretical ability to distance ourselves from direct action by means of the 
symbolically constituted Denkraum. This is not simply a case of pure mind withdrawing 
inward. The mind’s abilities are constituted by embodied symbols and thus emerge from 
human-thing entanglement. 
Wind presents us with a world in which there is no definite distinction between act 
and event. That does not mean there is no difference. This difference without distinction 
allows us to move beyond the problematic opposition of agency and non-agency without 
giving up the distinction between event and act that is the necessary condition for ethical 
responsibility and accountability. It is a world in which both human-thing entanglement and 
freedom are real. 
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